VZCZCXRO1059
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHGP #0611/01 1800612
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 290612Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6885
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3006
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 0106

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SINGAPORE 000611 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON CH BM SN
SUBJECT: SEMINAR READOUT: CHINA'S POLICY TOWARDS BURMA 
 
REF: RANGOON 33 
 
SINGAPORE 00000611  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Two visiting Chinese academics described 
China's policy toward Burma as creating strategic 
opportunities for China, but also supposedly promoting 
stability in Burma.  The scholars, speaking at a seminar in 
Singapore, focused on Burma's strategic importance to China's 
energy security, border stability, and "Two-Oceans Strategy" 
to open links to the Indian Ocean.  China is increasing its 
substantial investment in Burma and seeking ways to cooperate 
in areas such as education, science and technology and 
combating transnational crime.  The Burmese government has 
struggled with some aspects of China's economic cooperation 
and exploitation of Burma's natural resources.  One speaker 
noted that China sells heavy arms and equipment to Burma but 
not light weapons that could be used to "suppress the 
people."  The seminar reflected a divide in views on Burma, 
with non-Western participants at the seminar expressing more 
support for China's approach and Western participants 
expressing dismay at comments saying Aung San Suu Kyi would 
be incapable of leading Burma even if given the chance.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) The East Asian Institute (EAI) at the National 
University of Singapore hosted a seminar on June 19 entitled 
"China's Policy Towards Myanmar:  Objectives, Contents and 
Problems."  Dr. LI Chenyang, Director of the Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies at Yunnan University and visiting 
research fellow at EAI, led the seminar along with Dr. ZHAI 
Kun, Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian and South 
Asian Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary 
International Relations and a visiting research fellow at the 
¶S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang 
Technological University in Singapore.  The seminar provided 
an overview of China's interests and influence in Burma and 
was attended by approximately 25 people, including 
Singaporeans and Westerners.  Dr. Li and Dr. Zhai outlined 
China's objectives toward Burma, the policy-making mechanisms 
in place, and mentioned some of the negative aspects of 
China's approach. 
 
Strategic Importance of Burma 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Li and Zhai emphasized the strategic importance of 
Burma to China's efforts to enhance its energy security, 
maintain border stability, and realize China's "Two-Oceans 
Strategy."  China has always been viewed as a one-ocean 
state, Li pointed out, but for strategic purposes it would 
like to be able to access both the Pacific and Indian oceans 
and become a two-ocean state "like Russia and the United 
States."  China's relations with Burma also help it "cope" 
with India's rise, he added.  China uses a "brotherly 
friendship" approach towards Burma and other countries in the 
developing world where China sees the greatest opportunities 
for its brand of diplomacy because it often encounters 
difficulties engaging with the West and developed nations, Li 
said. 
 
Formulating China Policy Toward Burma 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Li asserted that China formulates its policy 
towards Burma using input from diverse sources at all levels 
of government, including the Chinese Embassy in Burma, 
central government entities responsible for commercial and 
energy issues, and state and provincial levels of government. 
 He said policymakers also incorporate input from think tanks 
and academics.  Li acknowledged the special relationship 
Yunnan Province has as an immediate neighbor to Burma, but 
said that Yunnan's interests do not always align with or 
reflect the official policy of the central government. 
However, some problems that are especially acute in Yunnan, 
such as illegal immigration, drug trafficking and HIV/AIDS, 
have helped bring the strategic importance of Burma to the 
attention of the most senior levels of Chinese government, Li 
said. 
 
Economic Cooperation: David and Goliath 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) China has invested at least USD 900 million in 
Burma, Li said, making it the fourth largest investor there 
after Thailand, the UK and Singapore.  (Note:  Embassy 
Rangoon estimated Chinese investment to be about USD 1.33 
billion in 2008 (reftel).)  Chinese economic and development 
activities include a USD 200 million investment in 
poppy-alternative agriculture projects, hydropower projects, 
and the Sino-Burma oil and gas pipeline, which, when it comes 
online, could carry about 200 million tons of oil to China 
 
SINGAPORE 00000611  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
annually and reduce China's dependence on oil shipped through 
the Malacca Straits, Li said.  China also sees room for more 
cooperation in areas such as education, science and 
technology, health, and countering non-traditional security 
threats like illegal immigration, transnational crime, and 
environment issues. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Not all has been rosy in the relationship.  Li and 
Zhai indicated that Burma's military government has been 
dissatisfied with some aspects of China's economic 
cooperation, the excessive exploitation of natural resources 
and timber smuggling.  Li cited (without much elaboration) 
one instance in 2005 in which Burma asked Yunnan to suspend 
its timber imports because of the extent of the deforestation 
occurring in Burma.  Li suggested that Yunnan rejected 
Burma's request without consulting the central Chinese 
government.  Burma has accused China of being the root of its 
drug problems, alleging that Chinese are planting drug crops 
in minority controlled areas of Northern Burma and bringing 
the chemicals used for heroin processing into Burma, Li said. 
 
 
Military Cooperation 
-------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Li touched on China's military cooperation with 
Burma which has been ongoing since 1988.  China does not 
maintain military bases in Burma but sells arms and provides 
training for military personnel.  Li said that China sells 
military equipment and advanced weapons such as missiles and 
fighter planes, but does not supply light weapons, such as 
rifles, pistols or sub-machine guns that could be used to 
"suppress the people."  Li stated that China has not 
conducted any joint military exercises with Burma aimed at 
countering India's or other countries' military capabilities. 
 
China's Political Influence on Burma's Future 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Principles of "peaceful coexistence" guide China's 
interactions with Burma, Li and Zhai stated.  Burma has won 
favor by supporting a One-China policy.  China, in turn, does 
not interfere in Burma's internal affairs, but has offered 
suggestions on how to deal with "international pressure" and 
political demonstrations, Li said. China would like to see a 
stable, harmonious, and "democratic" Burma, but Li advised 
that the international community should create an environment 
conducive to democratization and not force democratization 
through interference and sanctions.  China rejects 
"high-handed" measures that the United States and EU use in 
an effort to impose their will on Burma, Li said.  In China's 
view, the more inclusive approach adopted by the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has value long-term, but 
ASEAN has no immediate ability to take a leadership role in 
Burma.  Dr. Li called Singapore "the best friend to Burma," 
pointing out that Burmese money sits in Singapore's banks and 
Burmese leaders go to Singapore, not China, for medical 
treatment. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The National League for Democracy and Aung San Suu 
Kyi have no ability to lead Burma, Li and Zhai stated.  China 
favors stability over democracy and fears that Burma could 
devolve into civil war and ethnic strife, and the human 
rights situation could worsen, if the military regime is 
forced out.  Zhai speculated that multiparty talks on Burma 
would never get off the ground because it is difficult to 
identify which parties should participate and there is no 
urgent threat to motivate talks.  Li stated several times 
that such talks were not in China's national interest, but he 
did not explain further.  Seminar participants were quick to 
point out that China's Two-Oceans policy depends on China's 
preeminent influence over Burma's military regime and that 
China benefits from having two problematic buffer states -- 
Burma and North Korea -- sitting between it and two potential 
rival states -- India and South Korea. 
 
Reaction of Seminar Participants 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The two presentations elicited a strong response 
from the audience comprised of other academics, diplomats, 
students and businesspeople.  Feelings were mixed regarding 
the overall message in the presentations.  One European 
attendee called the seminar "depressing" as it sketched in 
high-relief China's considerable influence in Burma, which he 
assessed China has no interest in using for purposes other 
than its own self-interest.  Many of the non-Western 
participants who appeared to be Singaporean or from elsewhere 
in Asia spoke in more supportive terms regarding China's 
approach to Burma and the value of stability above democracy 
 
SINGAPORE 00000611  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
there.  They echoed the belief that Aung San Suu Kyi is 
incapable of leading Burma, and several non-Western 
participants were very amused by the presenters' criticisms 
of U.S. and EU policies toward Burma.  Some of the 
non-Western participants laughed aloud when Dr. Li mentioned 
China does not sell arms that the Burmese military regime can 
use to suppress the people.  The seminar audience's views 
reflected only the opinions of a small group of local 
Singaporeans, Asians and Westerners, but the reaction to the 
presentations highlighted a divide among locals who track 
Burma policy issues.  A Swiss participant who lives in 
Singapore remarked to Econoff that the division in the room 
was palpable with most of the Asians on one side of the issue 
and the Westerners on the other. 
 
Visit Embassy Singapore's Classified website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/singapore/ind ex.cfm 
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