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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 12 SEOUL 000973 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US
SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; June 18, 2009 
 
TOP HEADLINES 
------------- 
 
Chosun Ilbo 
ROK-U.S. Summit Produces New Approach to N. Korea's Nuclear Issue: 
U.S. Should Negotiate with N. Korea as Representative of the Five 
Countries of the Six-Party Talks 
 
JoongAng Ilbo 
Leaders of China and Russia "Urge N. Korea 
to Quickly Return to the Six-Party Talks" 
 
Dong-a Ilbo 
Soft Obama? That was N. Korea's Illusion: Less than Five Months into 
Office, Obama Sends Strong Message to N. Korea, Saying, "We will 
Break Past Pattern of Rewarding 
¶N. Korea's Bad Behavior" 
 
Hankook Ilbo 
ROK-U.S. Summit Demonstrates Firm ROK-U.S. Cooperation on N. Korea's 
Nuclear Issue... but Fails to Produce Incentives for N. Korea to 
Return to Dialogue 
 
Hankyoreh Shinmun 
ROK-U.S. Summit Only Toughens Stance on N. Korea, "Declaring New 
Cold War" on Korean Peninsula 
 
Segye Ilbo 
ROKG Begins Work to Enforce UNSC Resolution 1874 
 
Seoul Shinmun 
U.S. Congress Pledges Cooperation 
on KORUS FTA, N. Korea's Nuclear Issue 
 
 
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 
--------------------- 
 
According to diplomatic sources, Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Barack 
Obama agreed on a new approach to the North Korean nuclear issue, an 
eclectic mix of Clinton-era bilateral talks and the Bush-era 
Six-Party Talks. (Chosun, JoongAng) 
 
According to an ROKG source, a North Korean patrol boat briefly 
intruded into ROK territorial waters (the Northern Limit Line) in 
the East Sea (Sea of Japan) on June 16. (Chosun) 
 
The Seoul High Court ruled yesterday that MBC TV must run two more 
corrections concerning last year's controversial "PD Diary" episode 
about mad cow disease. (All) 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL NEWS 
------------------ 
 
The State Department, in its "Trafficking in Persons Report 2009," 
again listed North Korea, along with 16 other countries, as one of 
the worst countries in human trafficking. (Hankook, Segye, Seoul, 
all TVs) 
 
According to the AP, Marine Gen. James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in a June 16 Senate hearing that the 
(U.S.) West Coast may be vulnerable to a missile attack from North 
Korea within three to five years. (Chosun, Segye, Seoul) 
 
 
MEDIA ANALYSIS 
-------------- 
 
-ROK-U.S. Summit 
---------------- 
The June 16 ROK-U.S. summit in Washington continued to grab the 
 
SEOUL 00000973  002 OF 012 
 
 
headlines in the ROK media.   Most media assessed the summit as a 
"success" in terms of alleviating the ROK's security concerns about 
North Korean provocations, but regretted the summit's failure to 
come up with solutions on how to resolve the North Korean nuclear 
issue. 
 
Newspapers carried the following headlines: "Soft Obama? That was N. 
Korea's Illusion: Less than Five Months into Office, Obama Sends 
Strong Message to N. Korea, Saying 'We Will Break Past Pattern of 
Rewarding N. Korea's Bad Behavior'" (conservative Dong-a Ilbo); 
"ROK-U.S. Summit Demonstrates Firm ROK-U.S. Cooperation on N. 
Korea's Nuclear Issue... But Fails to Produce Incentives for N. 
Korea to Return to Dialogue" (moderate Hankook Ilbo); and "ROK-U.S. 
Summit Only Toughens Stance on N. Korea, 'Declaring New Cold War' on 
Korean Peninsula" (left-leaning Hankyoreh Shinmun) 
 
Right-of-center JoongAng Ilbo editorialized: "The summit did help 
reduce concerns about a third North Korean nuclear test, but it has 
not entirely erased the basic sources of anxiety.  The two nations 
... didn't come up with any solutions on how to actually solve the 
nuclear conundrum.  Given that China holds the key to imposing 
sanctions on North Korea, more must be done to persuade China to 
become more active in putting pressure on Pyongyang and helping to 
resolve the nuclear issue. ... Without fundamental solutions to 
these problems, the North Korean nuclear reserves will continue to 
grow and we may, in the end, reach a point of no return.  We can use 
either the stick or the carrot.  Time is running out." 
 
Conservative Dong-a Ilbo's editorial argued: "The question is 
whether such firm determination (by the two leaders) can result in 
changes in North Korea's behavior. ... Pyongyang is set to defy the 
U.N. Security Council's new resolution ...   Therefore, the ROK and 
the U.S. must be prepared for further provocations and aggression by 
the North.   No less important is the need to create an 
international atmosphere to promote sanctions against the North. 
The G8 Summit next month in Italy is expected to discuss North 
Korean issues.  Washington should take the lead in enforcing UN. 
sanctions on the North and implementing what was agreed upon in the 
Seoul-Washington summit." 
 
Left-leaning Hankyoreh Shinmun editorialized: "The two leaders 
failed to mention ways to fundamentally resolve the North Korean 
nuclear issue.  ... The continuing commitment of 'extended 
deterrence, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella,' in the Joint 
Vision for the ROK-U.S. Alliance collides with the objective of 
denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula because it is based on the 
premise that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons." 
 
Conservative Chosun Ilbo front-paged a report from Washington that 
Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Barack Obama agreed on a new approach 
to the North Korean nuclear issue, an eclectic mix of Clinton-era 
bilateral talks and the Bush-era Six-Party Talks.  The report went 
on to say that under the new plan, the U.S. will serve as the main 
negotiating partner for North Korea, representing the five nations 
in the Six-Party Talks - the ROK, China, Japan and Russia - and the 
pattern will differ from the Clinton-era bilateral dialogue from the 
following standpoints: First, the U.S. will engage in talks with the 
North after discussions with the five countries regarding  a joint 
plan as to  what price the North should pay if it doesn't abandon 
its nuclear ambitions and what benefits the North will gain in 
return for its nuclear abandonment.  Second, while the U.S.-North 
Korea talks during the Clinton era followed a single track - freeze 
the North's nuclear program through bilateral talks - the talks now 
will follow a double track policy in which the U.S. will prepare to 
impose sanctions on the North through five-way talks on the one 
hand, and invite the North to multilateral talks through the 
U.S.-North Korean dialogue channel on the other. 
 
Right-of-center JoongAng Ilbo filed a similar report entitled "Will 
the Five-Way Talks, Proposed by Lee Myung-bak and Agreed to by 
Obama, Become a New 'Negotiating Framework' to Resolve the North 
Korean Nuclear Issue?" 
 
In a related development, conservative Chosun Ilbo editorialized: 
 
SEOUL 00000973  003 OF 012 
 
 
"In a situation where North Korea is looking only at the U.S., 
negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea will be inevitable. 
However, we must keep in mind that the U.S. can change its attitude 
at any time, depending on its national interests.  During the first 
nuclear crisis in the 1990s, the ROK maintained this kind of 
cooperation with the U.S., but was left out in the cold soon after 
the U.S. undertook talks with North Korea. ...  Above all, it would 
be "out of the question" for the U.S.-North Korea talks to develop 
into nuclear disarmament talks, which would amount to recognizing 
North Korea as a nuclear state." 
 
-Human Trafficking Report 
------------------------- 
Most ROK media gave straight, inside-page play to the State 
Department's "Trafficking in Persons Report 2009," in which North 
Korea was again listed as one of the worst countries in human 
trafficking, along with 16 other countries. 
 
 
OPINIONS/EDITORIALS 
------------------- 
 
Pres. Lee-Obama Summit 
(Dong-a Ilbo, June 18, 2009, page 31) 
 
President Lee Myung-bak and U.S. President Barack Obama, in their 
summit talks Tuesday in Washington, agreed on principles to deal 
with North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.  They also adopted a 
"joint vision for the ROK-U.S. alliance."  Due to the two leaders' 
commitment to close cooperation, they were able to accomplish this 
significant achievement to stave off nuclear proliferation and 
eliminate security fears on the Korean Peninsula, in addition to 
taking the bilateral alliance to the next level. 
 
Presidents Lee and Obama pledged their commitment to achieving the 
"complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear 
weapons and existing nuclear programs, as well as ballistic missile 
programs."  President Obama also reaffirmed that he will not 
recognize the North as a nuclear state.  He provided a written 
guarantee providing "extended deterrence," which includes putting 
the ROK under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Extended deterrence refers 
to the U.S. pledge to defend the ROK against the North's nuclear, 
biochemical and missile attacks.  By doing so, the two leaders not 
only pledged to prevent Pyongyang from possessing nuclear weapons, 
but also affirmed a joint defense principle to protect the ROK from 
the North's weapons of mass destruction. 
 
The question is whether such firm determination (by the two leaders) 
can result in changes in North Korea's behavior.  Strong cooperation 
between Seoul and Washington is an inevitable response to 
Pyongyang's confrontational policies.  Before taking office, 
President Obama suggested the possibility of direct talks with the 
North, but has shifted to a hard-line stance after Pyongyang 
exhibited anachronistic and contemptuous behavior. 
 
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il made a serious mistake by throwing 
cold water on President Obama's show of goodwill.  Kim might have 
assumed that the North's old brinkmanship tactics would also be 
effective on the Obama Administration.  Instead, Pyongyang should 
stop its reckless confrontations with the international community by 
responding to President Obama's offer of negotiations with the 
North.  Pyongyang is set to defy the UN Security Council's new 
resolution condemning its second nuclear test and missile launches. 
Therefore, the ROK and the U.S. must be prepared for further 
provocations and aggression by the North. 
 
No less important is the need to create an international atmosphere 
to promote sanctions against the North.  North Korean issues are 
expected to be discussed at the G8 Summit next month in Italy. 
Washington should take the lead in enforcing UN sanctions on the 
North and implementing what was agreed upon in the Seoul-Washington 
summit.  It must persuade China and Russia to agree with President 
Obama's stance of not rewarding the North for its improper behavior 
and take the initiative in curbing further provocations. 
 
SEOUL 00000973  004 OF 012 
 
 
 
On the fate of the inter-Korean industrial complex in Kaesong, 
President Lee said he will reject excessive demands from the North. 
He is correct given that Pyongyang's demand is unacceptable from an 
economic point of view, and President Lee's hard-line stance is also 
necessary to press the North to abandon its improper actions.  When 
the two Koreas meet tomorrow for their third working-level talks on 
the (Kaesong Industrial) complex, Seoul officials should drive home 
the point to Pyongyang that the ROK and the U.S. will follow through 
on what they agreed in the summit. 
 
The joint vision for the ROK-U.S. alliance is the creation of a 
future-oriented bilateral cooperation on a global level.  For the 
partnership to evolve into a genuine comprehensive and strategic 
alliance that shares the same values, the ROK should aim beyond the 
resolution of the North's nuclear program.  The best way for Seoul 
to actively improve its fortunes and survive between the two main 
Asian powers -- China and Japan -- is to strengthen ties with the 
U.S., the world's sole superpower.  The joint vision includes 
principles to deepen the bilateral alliance, such as enhanced 
cooperation in space development and the peaceful use of nuclear 
power. 
 
Concrete measures to implement these principles should be developed. 
  Being seen as a global partner of the U.S. can sometimes require 
the ROK to pay a hefty price or make sacrifices.  Therefore, Seoul 
needs to explain to its people the future vision of the bilateral 
alliance and convince critics.  It should also overcome pro-North 
Korean forces resistant to the principle of pursuing "peaceful 
reunification based on the principles of free democracy and a market 
economy." 
 
On the bilateral free trade agreement, Presidents Lee and Obama 
agreed on "working together to chart a way forward."  The U.S. 
Democratic Party continues to oppose the accord, and opinions differ 
over the timing of the ratification and certain details.  However, 
the two sides must begin work to move it forward since they have 
recognized the accord's significance in raising economic, trade and 
investment relations." 
 
In particular, Washington must follow in Seoul's footsteps in its 
effort to ratify the accord. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
No Time to Lose 
(JoongAng Ilbo, June 18, 2009, page 42) 
 
We regard the ROK-U.S. summit as a success that will contribute to 
alleviating the ROK's security concerns about the recent situation 
on the Korean Peninsula. 
 
As President Lee Myung-bak said at the joint press conference 
following the meeting, the U.S. reaffirmed its security pledges to 
the ROK, including its commitment to maintaining the nuclear 
umbrella. That was the biggest accomplishment of the summit. 
 
In the statement which was adopted -- "The Joint Vision for the 
Alliance of the Republic of Korea and the United States of America" 
-- both countries affirmed support of their security interests and 
outlined a provision for "extended deterrence." 
 
The summit was held amid heightened tensions on the peninsula, with 
North Korea conducting its second nuclear test and acknowledging its 
uranium enrichment program.  The fact that the ROK and the U.S. 
declared their strong intention to make a coordinated response 
against the nuclear problem was an outstanding achievement as well. 
 
In the statement, the two leaders said they would try to build "a 
comprehensive strategic alliance" on a global scale based on "common 
values and mutual trust."  Although this is overshadowed by the 
North Korean nuclear issue, it is nonetheless a very important 
 
SEOUL 00000973  005 OF 012 
 
 
agreement regarding the future of the ROK-U.S. alliance.  It is a 
declaration that the alliance will develop and evolve beyond its 
current form. 
 
The summit did help reduce concerns about a third North Korean 
nuclear test, but it has not entirely erased the basic sources of 
anxiety. 
 
The two nations said they would not recognize North Korea as a 
nuclear power but would pressure the North via sanctions.  But they 
didn't come up with any solutions on how to actually solve the 
nuclear conundrum. 
 
Given that China holds the key to imposing sanctions on North Korea, 
more must be done to persuade China to become more active in putting 
pressure on Pyongyang and helping to resolve the nuclear issue. 
 
And although United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 allows 
for inspections of suspicious North Korean cargo on the open sea, 
there are still several risks involved with carrying them out. 
 
The possibility of a North Korean provocation on the peninsula 
cannot be ruled out.  At this moment, the most important task is to 
ensure the practical efficacy of sanctions while limiting these 
dangers. 
 
But without fundamental solutions to these problems, the North 
Korean nuclear reserves will continue to grow and we may, in the 
end, reach a point of no return.  We can use either the stick or the 
carrot.  Time is running out. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
The Risks of Direct Talks Between N. Korea and the U.S. 
(Chosun Ilbo, June 18, 2009, page 35) 
 
Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Barack Obama agreed on a five-country 
framework that requires the ROK, the U.S., China, Russia and Japan 
to meet together first to discuss the North Korean nuclear impasse 
and then one of these countries would negotiate with Pyongyang 
afterwards on behalf of the group.  An ROK official said the U.S. 
would likely to be the representative for the five countries as long 
as none of the other countries object.   In the end, it means that 
there will be bilateral talks between Washington and Pyongyang. 
 
The U.S. and North Korea will not start talks immediately.  At a 
press conference that followed the summit, Obama said there will be 
no repeat of the pattern of rewarding North Korea for its 
provocations.  If North Korea continues to pose a threat, it would 
face tough sanctions, he said.  Following UN Security Council 
Resolution 1874, the U.S. Navy has ordered its forces to search all 
suspicious North Korean ships. 
 
But Obama left open the possibility of a peaceful resolution to the 
nuclear crisis through talks, saying North Korea would be rewarded 
if it embarks on a road to peace and economic development and 
strives to win the recognition of the international community.  The 
proposed method by which  the five countries that have tackled the 
North Korean issue for the past five years come up with a solution 
and then let one of them deal directly with Pyongyang is a plan that 
would be put into effect if the situation enters into a "negotiating 
stage." 
 
In a situation where North Korea is looking only at the U.S., 
negotiations between the U.S, and North Korea will be inevitable. 
However, we must keep in mind that the U.S. can change its attitude 
at any time, depending on its national interests.  During the first 
nuclear crisis in the 1990s, the ROK maintained this kind of 
cooperation with the U.S., but was left out in the cold soon after 
the U.S. undertook talks with North Korea.  When North Korea 
conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, the UN Security Council 
adopted a resolution and sought to implement it, but once Washington 
 
SEOUL 00000973  006 OF 012 
 
 
and Pyongyang began talks, the sanctions fizzled. 
 
This time, the leaders of the U.S. and the ROK vowed they would not 
repeat past mistakes.  But such vows may lose strength once the U.S. 
and North Korea begin direct negotiations.  The U.S. must not be 
fooled again by North Korea's negotiating strategy.  And the five 
countries must take a unified stance and pressure North Korea in 
unison to ensure the success of a two-way meeting between Washington 
and Pyongyang.  China's role is essential.  If Washington-Pyongyang 
talks begin, nothing will be accomplished as long as China pushes 
all of the responsibilities on the U.S. and plays a passive role. 
 
U.S. pressure will increase if North Korea lashes out against 
UN-imposed sanctions, conducts a third nuclear test and fires an 
intercontinental ballistic missile.  But so far in the saga of North 
Korea's nuclear standoff, talks have always followed such 
provocations.  It is easy for the ROK and the U.S. to maintain 
cooperation when the situation is stalled, but once that situation 
changes, that level of cooperation may be difficult to maintain. 
 
The government must come up with a carefully planned strategy not 
only in terms of sanctions against North Korea but for the next 
stage as well.  Above all, it would be "out of the question" for the 
U.S.-North Korea talks to develop into nuclear disarmament talks, 
which would amount to recognizing North Korea as a nuclear state. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
Washington Must Speed Up the Ratification of Korea-U.S. FTA 
(Chosun Ilbo, June 18, 2009, page 35) 
 
During the Korea-U.S. summit, President Lee Myung-bak and his U.S. 
counterpart Barack Obama said they saw the potential of the 
bilateral free trade deal, predicting it would deepen economic, 
trade and investment relations between the two sides, and agreeing 
to cooperate in advancing the pact.  However, Obama said he would 
only submit the FTA bill to Congress when he and Lee feel the pact 
would benefit their own citizens.  Obama added that he first needed 
to resolve the disagreement over the terms of the Korea-U.S. free 
trade agreement before considering submitting the bill to Congress. 
What he was saying was that, although he agreed in principle with 
the need for a bilateral free trade pact with Korea, he will only 
submit it to Congress when outstanding issues regarding beef and 
automobiles are ironed out. 
 
Obama met Lee on the sidelines of the G20 financial summit in April, 
saying he was aware of the substantial amount of effort the ROK 
government had put into the FTA, adding that he intended to see the 
issue move forward. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and U.S. 
Trade Representative Ron Kirk also expressed their willingness to 
see progress in the bilateral FTA.  Working-level talks between 
Seoul and Washington over the ratification of the trade pact began 
last month.  Considering these and other announcements, Obama's 
latest comments appear to represent a step backwards. 
 
Both countries completed talks in April 2007, but further steps have 
still yet to be taken to ratify the deal and put it into effect. 
Braving physical clashes with those against the FTA, the National 
Assembly of Korea passed the bill at the standing committee level in 
April before handing it over to the plenary session of parliament. 
However, in the United States, the FTA bill has not yet even been 
presented to Congress. 
 
It would be inappropriate to renegotiate the bilateral pact, a pact 
already agreed upon by both sides.  The existing agreement is a 
balanced representation of the interests of both countries.  Both 
countries signed the deal based on mutual interests.  Seeking a 
renegotiation of the existing deal signed back in 2007 because some 
terms are now deemed unfair will derail the entire deal. 
 
However, if the U.S. government simply cannot accept the agreement 
as it is, then it is up to it to propose alternatives that Korea can 
 
SEOUL 00000973  007 OF 012 
 
 
accept without breaking its stance.  As seen in the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the success or failure of the 
Korea-U.S. FTA depends on the leaders of both nations.  Obama must 
speed up the ratification and implementation of the Korea-U.S. FTA 
from the standpoint of strengthening the bilateral alliance. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
Don't Rush to Ratify KORUS FTA 
(JoongAng Ilbo, June 18, 2009, Page 42) 
 
At their summit in Washington, ROK President Lee Myung-bak and U.S. 
President Barack Obama adopted a "Joint Vision for the ROK-U.S. 
Alliance" which calls for mutual efforts toward progress on the 
Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS-FTA) as well as the North 
Korean nuclear issue.  It is quite disappointing that, contrary to 
expectations for concrete progress on the trade deal during this 
summit, the two leaders only issued a principled declaration. 
 
President Obama said that he has a firm belief in the KORUS FTA and 
expects there will be progress (on the pact).  However, he added it 
will take time to submit a ratification bill to the U.S. Congress. 
Obama went on to say that the ROK seems to be concerned about U.S. 
beef and the U.S. is concerned about the pact's automotive 
provisions.  He noted that even if these concerns are settled, what 
matters is the political timing for submitting the trade pact to 
Congress for a vote.  President Obama said that he does not want to 
put the cart before the horse, adding that the ratification of the 
KORUS FTA should be sought in the proper order.  This is construed 
to mean that he is carefully weighing the timing for persuading 
Congress and presenting a ratification bill since it is politically 
tricky to push for the ratification of the pact when massive 
restructuring efforts are underway in the auto industry. 
 
It is understandable that due to Obama's lukewarm attitude, some 
observers note pessimistically that the trade pact is unlikely to be 
ratified this year.  However, it is not wise to abandon hope for the 
KORUS FTA based on mere speculation.  What is important is to get 
the KORUS FTA ratified, even if it takes time.  President Obama has 
taken issue only with the timing and order in presenting a 
ratification bill but has consistently expressed his belief in the 
trade deal itself.  The U.S. government wants to ratify the KORUS 
FTA but has not submitted the pact to Congress for a vote due to 
potential opposition from the U.S. Congress.  Since the U.S. 
government is not in a position to press Congress, it will not rush 
to present a ratification bill to Congress.  What is most needed now 
is for (the ROK) to give the Obama Administration time to persuade 
Congress, and the two countries and (their) economic sectors should 
work together to create an atmosphere for the ratification of the 
pact.  For the sake of the future of the ROK, we cannot give up the 
trade deal. 
 
 
¶S. Korea-U.S. Summit Raises More Issues Than Solutions on N. Korea 
Nuclear Issue 
(Hankyoreh Shinmun, June 18, 2009, page 23) 
 
The content of the Washington summit between ROK President Lee 
Myung-bak and U.S. President Barack Obama a few days ago was 
disappointing.  They discussed a coordinated response to the North 
Korea situation and adopted a "joint vision for the ROK-U.S. 
alliance," but they presented no solution to the biggest pending 
issue, North Korea's nuclear program, and only went as far as 
voicing their concerns. 
 
The confirmation given by the two leaders that North Korea cannot be 
recognized as a nuclear state is significant in that it draws a 
clear line with regard to speculation by some people in the U.S. 
that it is inevitable that (North Korea) would be recognized (as a 
nuclear state.)   In addition, their pledge to faithfully carry out 
the terms of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874, which 
specifies sanctions against North Korea, reflects unity in the 
 
SEOUL 00000973  008 OF 012 
 
 
international community's response to North Korea's unilateral 
actions that include its second nuclear test. 
 
However, the two leaders failed to mention ways to fundamentally 
resolve the North Korean nuclear issue.  Although President Obama 
said North Korea's economic opportunities and integration into the 
international community could "only be reached through peaceful 
negotiations that achieve the full and verifiable denuclearization 
of the Korean Peninsula," he did not discuss a method for achieving 
this.  At the time Obama took office, he expressed support for 
comprehensive negotiations in which North Korean denuclearization, 
the normalization of North Korea-U.S. relations, the construction of 
a system of peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, and 
economic cooperation with North Korea would all be discussed 
together.  Yet this remains only at the level of diplomatic 
rhetoric, with no specific framework for discussions presented, 
ultimately leaving the nuclear problem to worsen. 
 
President Lee, for his part, has carried a biased attitude 
emphasizing only pressure against North Korea.  He calls for North 
Korea's complete abandonment of its nuclear program, saying that the 
nation will "come to realize that the methods of the past do not 
work any more."  Far from resolving the nuclear issue, this kind of 
attitude that seems to view simply strengthening sanctions and 
pressure against North Korea as sufficient could instead very likely 
heighten conflict between the countries.  Also, holding five-party 
talks, as he suggested, apart from any question of the feasibility 
of such talks, would likely conflict with the larger principle of 
resolving the nuclear issue peacefully.  President Lee also evinced 
an understanding reminiscent of the Cold War era when he said, 
"North Korea has a lingering attachment to war, but it will not turn 
that into action." 
 
The continuing commitment of 'extended deterrence, including the 
U.S. nuclear umbrella,' in the Joint Vision for the ROK-U.S. 
Alliance collides with the objective of denuclearizing the Korean 
Peninsula because it is based on the premise that North Korea 
possesses nuclear weapons.  Going beyond the level of the ROK-U.S. 
alliance and adding a phrase about "peaceful unification based on 
the principles of liberal democracy and the market economy" was also 
careless.  In connection with the South Korea-U.S. free trade 
agreement (KORUS FTA), President Obama made it clear that he would 
not rush things, saying that he did not want to "put the cart before 
the horse."  This means that while the Lee Government is rushing the 
agreement through, the U.S. is calmly weighing the benefits. 
 
Instead of first creating a desirable solution to the North Korean 
nuclear issue and eliciting cooperation from the U.S. at these 
talks, the ROK government opted for the misguided approach of 
focusing on a self-serving hard-line response.  Without any other 
alternative, the U.S. also appeared to get awkwardly caught up in a 
hard-line argument.  Now some figures in both nations are arguing 
that discussions are useless, since North Korea's goal lies in 
securing its status as a nuclear state.  This easily ties in with an 
ultra-hard-line argument for increasing pressure against North 
Korea, even if it means war.  It would be incredibly unfortunate if 
these talks contribute to the spread of such a perspective.  It is 
time for both nations to actively reexamine their North Korea 
policy. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
MBC Ordered to Broadcast Two More Corrections 
(JoongAng Ilbo, June 18, 2009, page 10) 
 
By Reporter Park Sung-woo 
 
Makers of 'PD Diary' might go the Supreme Court to overturn ruling 
 
The Seoul High Court ruled yesterday that MBC must run two more 
corrections concerning last year's controversial "PD Diary" episode 
about mad cow disease. 
 
SEOUL 00000973  009 OF 012 
 
 
 
MBC was appealing a previous ruling but yesterday's upper court not 
only upheld the lower court's ruling from last year, but also told 
MBC it had to clarify two other points. 
 
The Seoul-based MBC broadcast a report in April 2008 warning that 
the consumption of U.S. beef may lead to the human form of mad cow 
disease.  In response, tens of thousands took to the streets to 
protest a Seoul-Washington agreement to resume U.S. beef imports. 
 
The Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
subsequently filed a complaint against the program makers claiming 
the April 29 episode contained seven errors. 
 
On July 31, 2008, the Seoul Southern District Court ordered the 
current affairs program to make corrections on two parts of the 
program and include a refutation. 
 
The program had maintained that Koreans are genetically more 
vulnerable to mad cow disease and had shown footage of a downer cow 
supposedly suffering from the disease.  Judges ordered both items to 
be corrected. 
 
In yesterday's ruling, the court said PD Diary does not need to run 
another correction on the downer cow because it had already 
voluntarily run one. 
 
PD Diary had also asserted that the ROKG could do little if mad cow 
disease breaks out in the U.S.  The ministry had demanded a 
correction, but in the first ruling the lower court said MBC did not 
have to because the issue was actually media opinion. 
 
Yesterday's ruling, however, said that MBC must run a correction on 
this matter.  "Under the current import safety measure signed in the 
Seoul-Washington beef deal, (the ROKG) can halt imports of U.S. beef 
if a case of mad cow disease is confirmed in the U.S.  Therefore, 
(PD Diary's claim) is false," the court ruled. 
 
In regard to PD Diary's statement that the ROKG has little knowledge 
about U.S. slaughter houses, the court ordered it to run a 
correction. 
 
"It is not true that the government either did not know about the 
risks of U.S. beef or it tried to conceal and curtail (health) risks 
posed by U.S. beef," the court said. 
 
MBC said it will make a decision after receiving the written record 
of the ruling from the court.  It will decide whether to appeal to 
the Supreme Court. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
FEATURES 
--------- 
 
Wait! Measures to Get Pyongyang to Abandon Nuclear Weapons and 
Missiles Are Missing 
(JoongAng Ilbo, June 18, 2009, Page 3) 
 
By Senior Columnist Kim Young-hie 
 
News Analysis 
 
The Joint Vision for the ROK-U.S. Alliance came out, but 
regrettably, it relies on hard power, including the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella over the ROK... China, which can communicate with North 
Korea, must be pushed to move. 
 
North Korea may have wanted to see a strong and sensational response 
to its nuclear and missile provocations at the U.S.-ROK summit.  In 
order to overcome UN Security Council sanctions, North Korea 
inevitably needs internal unity.  If there is a crisis, which North 
 
SEOUL 00000973  010 OF 012 
 
 
Korea can publicly tell its people is being created by the ROK and 
the U.S., that internal unity will be solidified effectively.  The 
"Joint Vision for the ROK-U.S. Alliance," announced by the ROK and 
U.S. Presidents, is strong and defiant enough for the North to 
welcome. 
 
In the Joint Vision, the U.S. reaffirmed its previous promise to 
protect ROK security with an extended deterrence, including a 
nuclear umbrella.  Although the U.S. made the same promise in 2006, 
it was made under the name of the Secretary of Defense.  This time, 
however, the promise was put into writing, thereby increasing the 
importance of the promise and strengthening the determination of the 
U.S. to fulfill it.  North Korea will probably use the U.S. promise 
of a nuclear umbrella to justify its nuclear and missile 
development. 
 
In the Vision, the phrase that the North is most worried about is as 
follows: "Through our Alliance, we aim to build a better future for 
all people on the Korean Peninsula, establishing a durable peace on 
the Peninsula and leading to 'peaceful reunification on the 
principles of free democracy and a market economy.'" 
 
This provision reflects the view of President Lee Myung-bak.  He 
said in Washington last November that the ROK's ultimate goal is to 
reunify the Korean Peninsula under free democracy.  Such 
reunification denies North Korea's Stalinist dictatorship and 
planned economy, among other things.  While reading that provision, 
North Korea would see the specter of a frightening reunification of 
the Korean Peninsula through absorption. 
 
The Joint Vision for the ROK-U.S. Alliance calls for the complete 
and verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons and 
ballistic missile programs.  Ballistic missiles were newly added to 
those subject to complete and verifiable elimination.  This 
reaffirmed the determination of the ROK and the U.S. to denuclearize 
North Korea.  It is noteworthy that in the provision mentioned 
above, the two nations also agreed to work together to promote the 
fundamental human rights of the North Korean people.  The North 
Korean human rights issue has been elevated to the same level of 
significance as denuclearization.  This provision will infuriate the 
North and remind it of the good-old days of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh 
Moo-hyun Administrations. 
 
The ROK-U.S. summit took place amid unprecedentedly heightened 
tensions on the Korean Peninsula and North Korea's continuing 
belligerent provocations against the international community, which 
desires a denuclearized North Korea.  By agreeing to build a 
comprehensive strategic alliance based on common values, the ROK and 
the U.S. met today's demand. 
 
We now have the vision that we had expected, and we are supposed to 
welcome it.  Still, regret lingers.  A 21st century vision for the 
ROK-U.S. alliance would have to be based on soft power.  However, 
because of North Korea, rather, thanks to North Korea, the vision 
was mainly focused on hard power, which is an extended deterrence, 
including a nuclear umbrella.  In this sense, the Joint Vision for 
the ROK-U.S. Alliance is retrogressive rather than being 
future-oriented. 
 
What is lacking in the Joint Vision for the ROK-U.S. Alliance are 
measures to persuade Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons and 
missiles.  The U.S.'s provision of a nuclear umbrella is premised on 
the assumption that North Korea launches a nuclear attack on the 
ROK.  What is important for us is to deter North Korea from arming 
itself with nuclear weapons.   North Korea will use international 
sanctions to its favor and improve its nuclear and missile 
technologies on a path towards becoming a nuclear state.  For the 
time being, the situation will continuously get worse.  The nation 
that can communicate with North Korea is China.  The ROK and the 
U.S. should do their best to make China act in a way to persuade 
North Korea to abandon its nuclear and missile programs.  A vision 
that does not include measures to prevent North Korea from going 
nuclear is just a conceptual discourse about the future.  The 
nuclear umbrella in the Joint Vision is a matter in the far distant 
 
SEOUL 00000973  011 OF 012 
 
 
future.  However, North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles are in 
our own backyard. 
 
 
¶S. Korea, U.S. Moot New Dialogue Framework for N. Korea 
(Chosun Ilbo, June 18, 2009, Front page) 
 
By Reporter Joo Yong-joong 
 
Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Barack Obama agreed on a new approach 
to the North Korean nuclear issue, an eclectic mix of Clinton-era 
bilateral talks and the Bush-era Six-Party Talks. 
 
Under the new plan, the U.S. will serve as the main negotiating 
partner for North Korea, representing the five nations in the 
Six-Party Talks - the ROK, China, Japan and Russia - and the pattern 
will differ from the Clinton-era bilateral dialogue from the 
following standpoints. 
 
First, the U.S. will engage in talks with the North after 
discussions with the five countries regarding  a joint plan as to 
what price the North should pay if it doesn't abandon its nuclear 
ambitions and what benefits the North will gain in return for its 
nuclear abandonment. 
 
Second, while the U.S.-North Korea talks during the Clinton era 
followed a single track - freeze the North's nuclear program through 
bilateral talks - the talks now will follow a double track policy in 
which the U.S. will prepare to impose sanctions on the North through 
five-way talks on the one hand, and invite the North to multilateral 
talks through the U.S.-North Korean dialogue channel on the other. 
 
In a press conference, Obama said, "North Koreans must understand 
that they will not be able to gain compensation by provoking a 
crisis.  This has been a pattern in the past, but this will no 
longer be the case.  The firm U.S.-Korea cooperation and alliance 
will not allow that...  The message we're sending -- and when I say 
'we,' not simply the U.S. and the Republic of Korea, but I think the 
international community -- is that we are going to break that 
pattern." 
 
The U.S. does not intend to repeat the old pattern in which every 
time North Korea pretends to engage in negotiations, the process of 
sanctions is stopped, giving North Korea time to develop nuclear 
programs and gain other economic benefits.  On June 16, when the 
ROK-U.S. summit was held, the New York Times reported that the U.S. 
will take the most  "confrontational" North Korea policy ever, under 
which North Korean ships suspected (of carrying banned cargo) would 
be stopped and  directed to a nearby port for inspection.  The U.S. 
intends to make North Korea realize that its endless pursuit of 
nuclear weapons will drive the country into a blind alley and induce 
the North to follow the path of denuclearization. 
 
The ROK apparently proposed the new dialogue framework. Before 
leaving for Washington, Lee made his suggestion public, telling the 
Wall Street Journal, "Our ultimate objective is to try to convince 
North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program, but we must also 
ask ourselves: What do the North Koreans want in return for giving 
up their nuclear weapons program?  I think this is the type of 
discussion that the five countries should be engaging in now, 
robustly." 
 
After the summit, Cheong Wa Dae said, "The two leaders agreed to 
seek concerted and effective ways for the five countries to 
cooperate to see the irretrievable dismantlement of the North Korean 
nuclear weapons."  The statement is apparently mindful of public 
concerns that the ROK could be left out in the cold in the process 
of the U.S.-North Korean talks. 
 
But whether the new framework will work depends on North Korea and 
China. 
 
North Korea has said it will never return to the Six-Party Talks. 
But it would not be against principle for the North to sit down with 
 
SEOUL 00000973  012 OF 012 
 
 
the U.S.  North Korea will have to make the choice whether to 
continue its nuclear weapons program in the face of the U.S.-led 
sanctions or consider seeking denuclearization.  Whichever choice it 
makes, ROK and U.S. authorities speculate the North will likely 
either propose or accept senior-level talks with the U.S. at an 
appropriate time. 
 
China signed up to adopt UN Security Council Resolution 1874 against 
the North last week, having clarified it does not want the North to 
become a nuclear state.  Now that the Six-Party Talks exist in name 
only, the ROK and the U.S. expect that China can be persuaded to 
accept the new dialogue framework. 
 
(We have compared the English version on the website with the Korean 
version and made some changes to make them identical.) 
 
 
STANTON