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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2173
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RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000638 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER IT

SUBJECT: FRATTINI TELLS AG HOLDER ITALY FAVORS ACCEPTING 
GITMO DETAINEES 

Classified By: cda elizabeth l. dibble for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 

Summary 
-------- 

¶1. (C) Attorney General Eric Holder (AG) discussed 
resettlement of Guantanamo detainees with Italian Foreign 
Minister Franco Frattini in Rome May 29 on the margins of the 
G8 meeting of interior and justice ministers. Frattini said 
the GOI ""profoundly shares"" the President's views on 
Guantanamo and identified Italy as one of six EU member 
states ""firmly in favor"" of accepting detainees. He shared 
his positive assessment of the EU's legal framework to be 
considered at the EU JHA ministerial meeting June 4, 
including limitations on movements through the listing of 
detainee names in the Schengen Information System. Frattini 
also proposed that the USG seek a TransAtlantic statement of 
principles on human rights and security in the fall under the 
Swedish EU presidency as a capstone to the process. 

¶2. (C) At a press conference May 30 following the G8 
ministerial, Interior Minister Roberto Maroni said, in his 
view, ""The European Union ... should reach a unanimous 
decision and welcome, only if they so desire, those inmates 
that can be put back in jail."" He expressed concern that, 
absent detention in Europe, former Guantanamo inmates would 
be free to move throughout the Schengen zone and thus 
represent an unacceptable increase in terrorism risk. These 
public comments, which are not in synch with internal EU 
discussions or GOI policy, play to Maroni's political base; 
he is a leader of the Northern League political party, which 
is tough on security and anti-immigration. 

Review of EU Arrangements 
------------------------- 

¶3. (C) Frattini opened by saying that the GOI was ""on the 
same page"" with the United States. He noted that there were 
still a number of EU members reluctant or hostile on the 
issue of accepting Guantanamo detainees for resettlement, 
naming Austria, Germany, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and 
the Netherlands. They were ""raising doubts"" in Europe about 
the whole undertaking, but Frattini assured the AG ""we will 
persuade them"" ultimately. Frattini said Germany was 
particularly problematic, with the atmosphere in the 
Bundestag quite hot ahead of elections. However he 
underlined that the EU was close to a solution that would 
accommodate everyone. Frattini said he expected EU Justice 
and Home Affairs ministers to reach agreement at their June 4 
meeting (""we are 99 percent of the way there"") on a legal 
framework which would lay out the conditions for individual 
state solutions and proposals vis--vis the United States. 

¶4. (C) Frattini described the basic elements of the 
framework as: 1) a data-sharing arrangement among Schengen 
and non-Schengen states; 2) a voluntary agreement between the 
receiving states and the detainees setting terms and 
conditions; and 3) a roadmap to integration of the detainees 
where they were settled. On the first, once the United 
States made a specific proposal to transfer a detainee 
""cleared for release,"" that state would circulate the name 
and any related data to the intelligence network of Schengen 
and non-Schengen states for clearance. Any objections would 
have to be on the basis of ""public order or national security 
concerns,"" and would affect only the objecting state, i.e., 
that state could refuse circulation of the detainee on its 
territory but could not veto such on behalf of any other 
state. Flagging the detainee's name in the Schengen 
Information System (SIS) would limit the detainee's rights of 
movement in Europe, which seemed to be the solution, Frattini 
said, to meeting everyone's concerns. 

¶5. (C) On the voluntary agreement to be signed between the 
receiving state and the detainee's lawyers, Frattini said the 
agreement would reference the detainee's USG status as well 
as host country conditions. Frattini noted he would have to 
set ""preventative conditions,"" such as daily check-in with 
local police and notification of any intent to travel. Each 
case would have to be treated differently, with some, 
perhaps, being forbidden to travel abroad at all. He noted 
that Italy would not want to risk a detainee traveling to 
Somalia or the Middle East and re-engaging in terrorist acts, 
noting the substantial measures the GOI was obliged to put in 
place to keep four Palestinians (the Bethlehem Church of 
Nativity case) under surveillance since accepting them in 
¶2002. As for integration of detainees, Frattini noted 
approvingly of news that several detainees settled by the 
United States in Albania were now opening legitimate 
businesses, saying it was critical that any detainees 
accepted by Italy be permitted to take up employment. He 

ROME 00000638 002 OF 003 


noted that Italy would require as part of the voluntary 
agreement with the detainees that they agree not to sue the 
United States in Italian courts. 

Italian Political Support and Advice 
------------------------------------ 

¶6. (C) AG Holder expressed his deep appreciation for GOI 
support of U.S. efforts to bring about an orderly closure of 
Guantanamo. He noted that FM Frattini had sketched out a 
highly creative approach within the EU to tackle the Schengen 
movement issue, and applauded Italy's role in that effort. 
Frattini underlined that the Italian government's point of 
departure was not legal but political - to show solidarity 
with the Obama administration. He noted that the GOI 
""profoundly shares"" the President's views on Guantanamo. 
With that in mind, he suggested that the United States 
consider a political-level TransAtlantic declaration of 
principles later in the year, to frame the issue. He 
sketched a three-step process: the legal recommendation by 
EU JHA ministers on June 4; the EU Foreign Ministers' embrace 
of it on June 15; followed by an EU/US Foreign Ministers 
meeting in October/November in which ministers would issue a 
declaration of Transatlantic principles on human rights and 
security, under the Swedish EU presidency. Frattini noted 
that such a declaration would be a capstone for the efforts 
now under way to lay the legal groundwork for individual 
states to work with the United States on transfers. It would 
provide the political wrapping for all states and would be a 
good signal to the European public, as well. Frattini 
offered to raise the issue informally with Swedish FM Bildt, 
whom he will see on a visit to Stockholm shortly, and asked 
the AG to float the idea in Washington. 

¶7. (C) Frattini also said that a number of people, 
particularly in Germany, were demanding to know why the U.S. 
could not itself take the small number of detainees thus far 
identified for transfer (50). Frattini said he told his 
colleagues regularly that it was critical that Europe showed 
it could be a co-producer of security, not just a consumer. 
It was time to share the burden, having criticized the 
previous administration so harshly over Guantanamo's 
existence. 

¶8. (C) Frattini told the AG he had established a restricted 
working group within the GOI (chiefs of staff of the MFA, MOJ 
and MOI, plus Italian intelligence). In order to facilitate 
its work and avoid surprises, Frattini asked that the USG 
informally pass to this group the names of any potential 
detainees for transfer to Italy ahead of a formal request. 
He also asked that the USG share any models it had used for 
voluntary agreements, noting he understood the United States 
had worked out a draft in transferring some 14 detainees back 
to the UK. He asked whether the United States had released 
any detainees into the U.S. and whether the AG had shared any 
specifics with other European governments. The AG said no to 
both questions. 

¶9. (C) In closing, Frattini underscored that there were six 
European countries (Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, 
Switzerland) ""firmly in favor"" of taking detainees. He said 
that they would continue to cooperate closely together and 
with the United States. These countries ""should set the 
example"" by expeditiously moving to individual agreements 
with the United States. once the EU framework was agreed 
upon. Frattini confirmed that ""we are ready to do so."" 

Separate Treatment of Tunisian Detainees 
---------------------------------------- 

¶10. (C) In a short aside, Frattini said he and others in the 
GOI well recognized that the case of the two Tunisian 
detainees requested by Milan magistrates for trial in Italy 
and the larger Guantanamo issue were wholly separate, and 
should be dealt with as such. 

Interior Minister Complains Publicly 
------------------------------------ 

¶11. (C) Echoing previous objections on security grounds of 
accepting Guantanamo detainees, Interior Minister Maroni told 
the press May 30 that he believes the EU must unanimously 
agree to accept the detainees and that they should ""be put 
back in jail."" Maroni argued it would not be acceptable ""for 
me"" if they are free to move within the Schengen zone. 
Maroni, speaking on the margins of the G8 meeting of justice 
and interior ministers, said the United States had not yet 
made a formal request, no detainees had been identified, and 
that Italy is considering taking ""not more than two or three."" 


ROME 00000638 003 OF 003 


Comment 
------- 

¶12. (C) In his meeting with AG Holder, Frattini was forceful 
and adamant in expressing GOI desire to work closely and 
collaboratively with the United States, both in shaping EU 
opinion and in working out future bilateral arrangements on 
individual detainee cases. Notwithstanding Frattini's 
helpful leadership on this issue within the GOI and at the 
EU, he faces some political pushback from within the 
government. The outspoken and powerful Interior Minister 
Maroni and his Northern League political party have been 
successfully pushing an anti-immigration line within the 
government. Maroni has been vocal on several occasions about 
his skepticism about the wisdom of the EU and Italy taking 
Guantanamo detainees. In his initial phone conversation 
congratulating President Obama on his election, Prime 
Minister Berlusconi offered Italian assistance in resolving 
the detainee issue. During the President's upcoming meeting 
with the Prime Minister, it would be helpful to thank 
Berlusconi for his government's efforts thus far but also 
secure his recommitment to accepting detainees. 

¶13. (C) Frattini also advised AG Holder not to attend the 
June 4 JHA ministerial because he thought those countries 
opposed to the United States on this issue would simply use 
his presence as an opportunity to criticize the United States. 

¶14. (U) The Department of Justice has cleared this cable. 

DIBBLE