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Viewing cable 09RABAT527, MOROCCO'S EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE ITSO DIRECTOR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09RABAT527 2009-06-18 15:36 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Rabat
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #0527 1691536
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 181536Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0298
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3694
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 4639
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
UNCLAS RABAT 000527 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG - S WILLIAMS AND EEB/CIP/TS - S LETT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECPS PREL KTIA MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO'S EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE ITSO DIRECTOR 
GENERAL 
 
REF: A. RABAT 420 
     B. STATE 52173 
 
1.  (SBU) Charge and EconOff consulted with the Secretaries 
General of Morocco's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and 
Department of Post-Telecommunications (DPT) on June 11 - 12 
regarding the Government of Morocco's efforts to facilitate a 
resolution to the disagreement between the International 
Satellite Telecommunications Organization (ITSO) Director 
General and the Government of United Kingdom (HMG) and USG 
(reftels).  The Charge thanked MFA Secretary General Youssef 
Amrani for the interest of Morocco's Ambassador in Washington 
in seeking to find a solution, and noted the strong USG 
interest in cancelling the planned Extraordinary Assembly, 
and particularly in avoiding arbitration of the dispute. 
Amrani took note of the USG interest, and indicated that 
Ambassador Mekouar is still engaged in seeking a solution, 
despite the lack of any particular Government of Morocco 
(GOM) responsibility for the issue. 
 
2.  (SBU) DPT Secretary General Taieb Debbagh told EconOff 
that, based on his recent conversations with ITSO Director 
General Ahmed Toumi, the DG is "flexible" and willing to 
compromise with the USG and HMG.  ITSO's interest in the 
dispute, Debbagh stated, is to return the information sharing 
arrangements to the status quo before the sale of Intelsat in 
2005.  Since that sale, according to Toumi, satellite system 
coordination information that was previously provided to ITSO 
had been cut off.  Since the new owners of Intelsat decline 
to provide information that relates to the "Common Heritage" 
under ITSO's responsibility, ITSO seeks to obtain those 
details from the USG and HMG as Notifying Administrations. 
However, Debbagh insisted, Toumi does not seek to obtain 
"confidential information" from private operators.  "If there 
is something that Toumi needs to give up, he'll give it up," 
Debbagh predicted. 
 
3.  (SBU) Debbagh pointed to Item 5.1 in the report of the 
Ninth Meeting of the ITSO Advisory Committee, recommending 
the use of a "mutually agreed facilitator" to define an 
agreed procedure for the Notifying Administrations and ITSO, 
and proposed that the two sides agree on such a facilitator 
who could draw up an agreement identifying which information 
would be passed to ITSO, and which would remain confidential. 
 It would be in everyone's interest to have such a document 
prepared before the July Extraordinary Assembly, Debbagh 
suggested, at which point it could be signed by the Notifying 
Administrations and the incoming Director General to serve as 
the basis for future information sharing.  It is too late to 
try to cancel the Rome Extraordinary Assembly, stated 
Debbagh, arguing that the Assembly is the option prescribed 
by the ITSO Parties should the DG and Notifying 
Administrations fail to reach an agreement. 
 
4.  (SBU) Comment: The GOM has likely done all that it can to 
influence Toumi to reach an agreement with the USG and HMG on 
this issue, but has no authority over him.  While Debbagh was 
initially very open to USG perspectives on the dispute 
following our first interaction with him (Ref A), his 
position appears to have aligned more with Toumi's as he has 
researched the subject more closely.  The Mission does not 
believe that further demarches to the GOM will change Toumi's 
course of action.  End Comment. 
 
 
***************************************** 
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco 
***************************************** 
 
Jackson