VZCZCXRO3695
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHPF #0377/01 1600100
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 090100Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0797
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 0164
RUCGEVC/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PHNOM PENH 000377 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, P, D, INL, OES, S/CT, ISN 
STATE PASS TO MARITIME SECURITY COLLECTIVE 
BANGKOK FOR EXBS WILLIAM COMLEY 
SINGAPORE FOR USCG SCOTT STOERMER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS MOPS EWWT CB
SUBJECT:  Cambodia Moves to Strengthen Maritime Security 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: On May 26-27, the RGC held a workshop as a first 
step toward the creation of a much-needed maritime security central 
coordinating authority.  Prime Minister Hun Sen announced that a new 
National Committee on Maritime Security (NCMS) is expected to be 
formed within months.  Hosted by the National Counter-Terrorism 
Committee and Ministry of National Defense and supported the U.S. 
and Australian embassies, the Maritime Security Workshop begins a 
multiyear, multiagency and development partner effort to enhance 
Cambodia's maritime security domain.  Successful interagency 
coordination of this initiative could generate the political will in 
a state asserting its littoral security needs and serve as a model 
for the government to address the other significant challenges posed 
by its porous borders.  End Summary. 
 
Weak Maritime Security 
---------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Cambodia's porous maritime borders are vulnerable to 
exploitation by transnational criminal activities, including 
drug/arms smuggling, trafficking in persons, the illicit movement of 
natural resources, wildlife, and cultural objects.  Additionally, 
terrorist elements are able to capitalize on porous Cambodian 
maritime borders to exploit the area and region for their various 
goals.  Weak maritime security and the inability to exert authority 
over maritime borders and exclusive economic zones create avenues 
through which these transnational elements can operate.  Limited 
resources, weak capacity, and ineffective Royal Government of 
Cambodia (RGC) coordination mechanisms among various agencies with 
often over-lapping, and thus confused, responsibilities 
significantly undermine the RGC's ability to secure its maritime 
domain.  Strengthening Cambodian maritime security regimes is a 
priority for the Mission and the creation of a sound legal framework 
and central maritime security coordinating authority are essential 
to securing Cambodia's sea borders. 
 
PM Establishes Roadmap to Strengthen Maritime Security 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) In his keynote address to workshop participants, comprised 
of officials from the various government agencies with related 
responsibilities, Prime Minister Hun Sen acknowledged the 
significant challenges posed to Cambodia's maritime security.  He 
stressed the importance of building the capacity of the RGC to 
enhance its maritime domain, and established clear guidelines and a 
timeline for the way forward in the creation of a central 
coordinating authority. 
 
¶4. (SBU) This new authority, the National Committee on Maritime 
Security (NCMS), will be responsible for establishing an interagency 
mechanism for developing a sound legal framework and policies for 
maritime issues.  He set a deadline of 90 days for a Royal Decree to 
form the NCMS, to be headed by the Ministry of National Defense, 
with a Sub-Decree to follow which will create the implementing 
Secretariat and define roles and responsibilities of various 
agencies.  The Prime Minister also emphasized the need to harmonize 
domestic law with international law. 
 
Maritime Security:  A 3-Pronged Approach 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Improving the capacity of civilian, military, and law 
enforcement authorities to strengthen maritime security is a top 
priority for the Mission.  The creation of the NCMS is a vital first 
step in Post's multi-agency maritime security initiative, which 
seeks to build capacity within the RGC to improve security for 
Cambodia's maritime domain.  This new central coordinating authority 
will facilitate USG efforts to direct assistance to RGC entities 
responsible for maritime security.  However, given resource 
limitations within the RGC, donor support will be essential to 
develop the capacity of the NCMS. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The RGC has requested USG assistance in developing their 
legal framework.  Post is pursuing U.S. Coast Guard and Pacific 
Fleet technical assistance funded under the Title X Asia Pacific 
Regional Initiative to provide this support.  We are also 
coordinating with the Government of Australia which is also planning 
to provide technical assistance to bridge gaps in USG assistance. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The development of a legal framework is only the first step 
in our three part maritime security initiative.  Step two seeks to 
address operational effectiveness of the various civilian, military, 
and law enforcement authorities charged with strengthening maritime 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000377  002 OF 002 
 
 
security.  For example, support under Foreign Military Finance, 
Title X, Combating Terrorism Fellowships, and the Export Control and 
Related Border Security (EXBS) Program are being synchronized to 
deliver Maritime Law Enforcement and Maritime Operations Planning 
and Port Security training to the various RGC stakeholders.  Once 
the RGC and NCMS have demonstrated increased capacity to utilize 
existing resources, step three will target assistance to address 
interdiction and C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) capability gaps. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The maritime security initiative is an important part of 
the Mission's effort to address the larger issue of porous borders, 
which also includes inland waterways and land border security.  The 
coastal maritime region is the smallest and relatively easiest 
border security issue to address.  By focusing USG efforts on the 
more manageable issue of maritime borders, one which the RGC has 
demonstrated significant will to improve, we hope to maximize 
resources and create momentum and the will to address these other 
challenges.  The interagency coordination mechanisms being formed 
through the NCMS will hopefully serve as a model for RGC interagency 
coordination and lay the groundwork for expansion into larger 
security issues, and generate the political will to address the 
other more challenging porous border issues in the future. 
 
 
RODLEY