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Viewing cable 09OSLO384, NORWEGIAN IRANIANS: A MODEL IMMIGRANT COMMUNITY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09OSLO384 2009-06-10 11:24 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Oslo
VZCZCXRO5185
RR RUEHDH
DE RUEHNY #0384/01 1611124
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 101124Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7557
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0100
RUEHDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
RUEHDI/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0021
RHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 OSLO 000384 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC CVIS IR KCRM NO PINR PTER
SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN IRANIANS: A MODEL IMMIGRANT COMMUNITY 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  Iranian immigrants in Norway are some of 
the country's most successful and best-integrated non-Western 
minorities.  There are currently over 15,000 first and second 
generation Iranians in Norway, making them the tenth largest 
immigrant group.  The community is highly educated, secular, 
and has many examples of successful and prominent individuals 
but is split into various segments and does not possess a 
coherent identity.  Any risk of radicalization is considered 
to be minimal, although there are indications that the 
Iranian embassy in Oslo has significant negative influence on 
other Muslim immigrant communities.  END SUMMARY. 
 
WHO ARE THEY AND WHERE ARE THEY FROM? 
------------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) Norway's 15,000-strong Iranian population is one of 
its longest-resident non-Western immigrant populations, the 
majority arriving in Norway over 10 years ago.  The first 
wave fled from the Islamic Revolution, followed by those 
fleeing the Iran-Iraq War.  Today the vast majority of 
immigrants are either family reunifications or refugees.  The 
Iranian-Norwegian population is growing quickly, mostly in 
the form of a large number of second generation immigrants 
born in Norway, although a steady flow of asylum seekers and 
family members continues to arrive from Iran every year.  It 
is estimated that 20-30% of Iranians in Norway are of Kurdish 
descent.  There are also small numbers of Zoroastrians and 
Baha'i.  Approximately 70% of Iranians have Norwegian 
citizenship. 
 
3. (U) Norwegian Iranian society is composed of several 
disparate groups including those who fled the Islamic 
Revolution, Kurds, other minority groups, members of the 
People's Mujahadeen and traditional economic migrants. One 
rough way of looking at these groups is to characterize 
Iranian immigrants either as those who retain some ties to 
Iran (primarily economic immigrants), those who oppose the 
current government of Iran (members of the People's 
Mujahadeen) and those who have completely adopted a new 
identity as a Norwegian-Iranian and become secular (more 
established immigrants, many refugees from the Shah's 
regime.) 
 
4. (U) Having left the Islamic Republic for Scandinavia, the 
majority of Iranians resident here are of the more educated, 
secular variety.  Their families are well-off with modern, 
largely Western value systems.  They are also less interested 
in events in Iran than other groups. 
 
5. (U) A small but vocal element in the Norwegian Iranian 
community are the approximately 2,000 Iranians who are either 
members of the People's Mujahadeen or MEK or are sympathetic. 
 This group is perhaps the most organized of all of the 
Norwegian Iranian subgroups and they are active in protesting 
against the government of Iran.  They have been successful in 
engaging several prominent Norwegian politicians to champion 
the cause of the residents of Camp Ashraf in Iraq. 
 
6. (U) An additional category of Iranian immigrant can be 
described as those who left Iran to escape the Iran-Iraq War 
or for economic reasons.  This group still retains at least a 
cordial relationship with the Iranian government, as they may 
occasionally require consular assistance from its embassy. 
Because these Iranians sometimes travel back to their home 
country, many are cautious of contact with the embassy due to 
threat of arrest or harassment by Iranian authorities when 
they return to Iran. 
 
7. (U) As would be expected, the various groups of Iranians 
are not fond of each other and do not intermingle, despite 
their common cultural background. Differences in politics and 
religion prevent the Iranian community from acting 
cohesively.  The non-religious individuals (who are quite 
numerous) have little in common with their more conservative 
and religiously observant counterparts, and vice versa. 
 
Education as an Indicator of Integration 
---------------------------------------- 
 
8. (U) The Iranian community is a very successful and highly 
integrated group in Norway.  Most Iranian-Norwegians have 
lived here for 15-20 years or longer and can be said to 
contribute more to the fabric of Norwegian society than 
Norwegian immigrant society.  There are numerous examples of 
high-profile, successful individuals, and many have married 
Norwegians and others outside of their nationality. 
 
OSLO 00000384  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
9. (U) Iranians are some of Norway's most educated 
immigrants.  A remarkably low 16% have just a primary school 
education or less (including those with no education at all), 
making it the lowest of any immigrant group.  Only the 
Chileans have a similarly low percentage of those with such a 
minimal education, at 18%.  The average across all immigrants 
is over 30%.  Turks, for example, have a staggering 51% 
getting by with only a primary school education or less. 
 
10. (U) University education is very high among Iranians, 
with an average of 43.5% either currently in school or having 
already attained a university degree (including those with a 
degree from Iran).  This percentage dwarfs that of all other 
immigrant communities with the exception of the Chinese, who 
post numbers above 50%.  The total immigrant average is only 
around 26%. 
 
11. (U) Second generation Iranians in Norway do even better, 
though curiously, not as well as other second generation 
immigrants.  Thirty-two percent of second generation 19-24 
year old Iranian-Norwegians are enrolled in university; 
higher than the first generation, who, at 25.2%, are around 
seven points above the average of 18.3%, but slightly lower 
than the 34.7% total immigrant average for second generation 
individuals.  The point here is that, although Iranians do 
improve their education numbers, they have not quite improved 
at the same rate as other groups have. 
 
Employment as an Indicator of Integration 
----------------------------------------- 
 
12. (U) Employment is an area where Iranians might be 
described as under-performing, even if only slightly.  With 
58.3% of first generation individuals aged 15-74 years 
employed, they post higher numbers than any other immigrants 
from Muslim countries, yet compared to the total immigrant 
average of 63.3%, they are relatively unimpressive.  It is 
worth noting that a much higher percentage of Iranian women 
are employed than any other immigrants from a Muslim 
background, with 54% working.  For comparison, employment 
among Turkish, Pakistani, and Somali women is much lower, 
with only 42%, 31%, and 24% in jobs, respectively.  Iranian 
women are even doing relatively well among all female 
immigrants, whose average is only a slightly higher 57%.  The 
women employed tend to earn among the highest salaries of 
immigrant groups, ranking highest among Norwegian Muslim 
populations. 
 
Religion 
-------- 
 
13. (U) Immigrants from Iran are the least religious group of 
any in Norway.  When first and second generation Iranian 
immigrants were asked if they still belonged to the religion 
they were brought up with as children, only 50% answered 
"yes," while the combined number for all other immigrants is 
closer to 90%. 
 
14. (U) Not surprisingly, the importance most Iranians grant 
religion in their lives is correspondingly low.  When asked 
to rate this on a scale of 1 - 10 with "1" being "not 
important at all" and "10" being "very important," the 
Iranians' average score is around 3.9--again, the lowest of 
any immigrant group. The total immigrant average is a much 
higher 6.9.  Forty percent of Iranians actually answered this 
question with a "1," meaning religion is not at all important 
to them.  This is telling, as it reveals that not only have 
most Iranians left the religion in which they were raised 
(Islam), but that they have also not converted to another; 
religion simply is not a part of their lives. 
 
 
Is Radicalization a Risk? 
------------------------- 
 
15. (U) Reflecting their overall successful integration into 
Norwegian society, there appears to be very little risk of 
radicalization among most Iranian immigrants.  There are 
several possible trouble spots worth mentioning.  The first 
is discrimination, which is unusually high for such a 
successful and well-integrated population.  When asked if 
they have experienced discrimination of any kind and, if so, 
how many instances, only 36.3% say they have encountered none 
at all.  The average across all immigrants is 55.6%.  Only 
the Somalis (who have been the subject of considerable 
 
OSLO 00000384  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
negative media attention and are considered by many to be an 
at-risk community) say they have experienced more 
discrimination, with only 33.9% reporting that they have had 
no problems with discrimination.  Perhaps more worrisome, 
Iranians have the highest percentage of individuals of any 
immigrant group that say they have experienced discrimination 
in "four areas or more," at 4.1%.  Here, 3.6% of Somalis say 
the same, while the total immigrant average is a much lower 
1.6%.  Discrimination can be considered the main cause for 
concern over radicalization (even if mild) for the Iranian 
community. 
 
16. (U) The second possible area of concern is the close 
contact some members of the community maintain with the 
Iranian government.  There is no evidence yet of this being 
any major cause for alarm, although it could potentially 
become one in the future.  This is particularly so if the 
individuals who have close contact with conservative elements 
in Iran are also the same individuals who say they experience 
higher instances of discrimination.  If there were a 
simultaneous rise in discrimination and an increase in the 
number of visits to (or contact with) Iran, this could point 
to a greater risk of radicalization among the Iranian 
community. 
 
Activities of the Iranian Embassy 
--------------------------------- 
 
17. (SBU) Post has been told that the Iranian embassy 
observes individuals in the secular group, especially those 
who publicly protest Iranian activities (human rights abuses, 
policy, etc.).  The Iranian embassy is also active in 
tracking those who are members of the People's Mujahadeen. 
Most of these individuals are unable to return to Iran for 
fear of imprisonment and/or death threats.  The Norwegian 
government has told these individuals to be cautious even if 
traveling near the Turkish-Iranian border. 
 
18. (SBU) Mazyar Keshvari, a prominent Iranian-Norwegian 
politician in the conservative Progress Party, confirmed this 
and believes that the Iranian embassy in Oslo carries out 
significant outreach activities to Norway's Muslim 
immigrants, funding mosques and encouraging more conservative 
elements in Islam.  Keshvari believes Iranians here are in 
little or no danger of being influenced by the embassy's 
efforts because most are too educated, secular, and 
integrated to be attracted to a conservative Islamic message. 
 There is an Iranian mosque in Oslo which, Keshvari says, the 
Islamic Republic's embassy uses as a tool to exert some 
amount of influence on the observant Iranian Muslims here, as 
well as any other nationalities that also happen to attend. 
Keshvari (who, it should be noted again, is a regular and 
vocal critic of Iran) showed particular concern about the 
Iranian embassy's activities and influence in Norway and was 
alarmed that the Norwegian government tolerates their actions. 
 
19. (SBU) Keshvari also mentioned his suspicion that the 
Iranian government uses exchange student visas to send 
intelligence agents to Norway.  These people allegedly 
monitor the Norwegian-Iranian population and at times use 
Norway as a sort of a safe house useful for raising money and 
for planning operations in other parts of the world. 
Keshvari did not believe that the Norwegian police were 
willing, or perhaps were not able to effectively monitor 
these individuals. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
20. (SBU) Iranians are arguably Norway's most successful 
group of immigrants and certainly the most successful among 
those with Muslim backgrounds.  Despite high discrimination, 
Iranian-Norwegians have managed to become educated, 
reasonably well-employed, and quite well-integrated. 
Norwegian-Iranians appear to be a population that is not 
prone to radicalize, but which could serve as a model for 
future immigrant integration.  Keshvari's description of the 
Iranian embassy's efforts to negatively influence the Muslim 
community in Norway seems--although potentially troublesome 
for other Muslim immigrants--unlikely to affect Iranians 
themselves. 
WHITNEY