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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 001349 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL PINR KDEM IN
SUBJECT: NAXALITES: AN EMERGING NATIONAL THREAT 
 
REF: A. KOLKATA 162 
     ¶B. KOLKATA 164 
     ¶C. 08 KOLKATA 148 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Recent violence in West Bengal has focused 
attention on India's Maoist insurgency, which has become one 
of the most violent of its domestic conflicts.  The broad 
network of Maoist cells, known as the Naxalite movement, is 
present in at least eleven of India's twenty-eight states, 
particularly in rural, impoverished and heavily forested 
eastern regions.  Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has said the 
movement is the country's most serious internal security 
threat, and the incumbent United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 
government pledged this week to step up its response to Naxal 
guerillas nationwide.  The GOI response to past uprisings, 
however, has left much to be desired. Observers, including a 
recent Planning Commission Report, have pointed out that the 
government has largely failed to address genuine grievances 
of these predominantly tribal forest dwellers -- such as land 
rights and the need for infrastructure, health and education 
-- and has relied too heavily on strong-arm tactics through 
law enforcement, which have at times back-fired and further 
fueled the movement.  Some in the government have attempted 
to address the land rights issues through the 2007 Forest 
Rights Act and the proposed National Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Policy bill pending in Parliament.  As with much 
else in India, it is enforcement that falls short.  End 
Summary. 
 
Naxalites:  A Growing Force Nation-wide 
--- 
 
¶2. (U) Maoist insurgency, which grew out of a rural uprising 
in West Bengal in 1967, has spread to more than half of 
India's 28 states.  These rebels, known as "Naxalites," 
operate across the "red corridor" stretching from the Nepal 
border to West Bengal, and through central India into the 
southern state of Andhra Pradesh.  The GOI estimates up to 
20,000 insurgents operating nationwide, in more than 180 of 
the country's 611 districts.  Indian officials also point out 
that Maoist rebels have stepped up attacks in urban centers 
in eastern India, particularly West Bengal and Orissa, which 
underscores the depth and scope of the threat. 
 
¶3. (U) The Naxalites growing influence prompted Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh in 2006 to declare the Maoist 
insurgency the most serious threat to Indian national 
security.  The GOI on June 22 banned and formally labeled the 
Communist Party of India (Maoist) a terrorist organization, 
hoping it would give security forces more powers to pursue 
rebel forces in Naxal-hit states.  On June 9, PM Singh 
explained the GOI's "two prong" approach to tackling 
left-wing extremists: to expand social development programs 
in rural areas of affected states, while improving 
interagency counter-terror operations in all Naxal-hit 
states: Chhatisgarh, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, 
Jharkhand, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.  Home 
Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram reaffirmed the GOI's 
commitment to tackling the Maoist threat noting that the 
Congress Party-led government, re-elected in May with a 
greater Parliamentary majority, would respond with "speed and 
decisiveness." 
 
Mass Violence and Instability 
--- 
 
¶4.  (U) According to government sources, Naxalite-related 
violence from 2005-2008 resulted in more than 1,900 civilian 
deaths-- more than either of India's two regional 
secessionist movements in Kashmir and the Northeast.  During 
the same time, the number of security forces killed in 
Naxalite clashes doubled, while declining in other conflict 
zones.  In April-May this year, militants attempted to 
disrupt voting in the early phases of India's parliamentary 
election by executing attacks throughout the turbulent 
eastern region killing more than twenty security personnel 
 
NEW DELHI 00001349  002 OF 005 
 
 
and civilians.  Naxals regularly attack railway lines and 
factories aiming to cripple and destabilize economic activity 
in resource-rich parts of India.  Many are following closely 
the on-going violence in Lalgarh, West Bengal -- where the 
JSW Steel Ltd USD 7 billion steel plant is located - fearing 
that a worsening security situation may scare away future 
business investment in the region (reftels). 
 
Caste and Tribal Discrimination Feeds Recruits 
--- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Little is known about the Naxals shadowy leadership 
structure, which does not court the media and seldom issues 
statements.  Indian authorities believe they are led by 
Koteshwar "Kishanjee" Rao and another individual who goes by 
the alias of "Ganapathi."  Neither has been seen in public 
and are thought to be hiding in the dense forests along the 
Nepali border.  Both militant leaders reportedly emerged as 
local organizers in eastern India, recruiting hundreds of 
poor villagers and arming them with bows, arrows and even 
rifles snatched from local police.  Naxal followers tend to 
be Dalits, lower income, tribal and feel excluded from the 
economic benefits accruing from the natural resources -- 
especially coal -- from their states. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) According to Ajai Sahni of the Institute of 
Conflict Management, a Delhi think tank, Naxal recruits are 
among India's poorest -- "the most exploited, the bottom 
rung" from the rural areas of the nation's east, center and 
south.  The GOI blames the Maoist forces for blocking 
development, such as road-building and public health and 
educational investment in desolate parts of the country.  But 
Maoists often convince the local population that public 
projects ultimately help the government/private industry 
plunder their natural resources and extract profits.  The 
Maoists take advantage of what Sahni calls "asymmetric 
expectations": since the government fails to deliver basic 
services to the people who need it most, and any good coming 
from the Maoists -- social work, land redistribution -- 
results in disproportionate gratitude from the local people. 
 
Forest Land Rights Often Key Factor 
--- 
 
¶7.  (U) Much of the region affected by Naxalites are forest 
lands inhabited by Tribal peoples, also called Scheduled 
Tribes, or adivasis.  Ownership of forest land had been 
defined until last year by two laws that declared forest land 
to be "settled" by a government forest settlement officer, 
who was supposed to process land claims by forest dwellers. 
However, recent studies indicated that more than 80% of 
forest blocks in Madhya Pradesh had not been settled as of 
2003, while all the hilly tracts of Orissa were declared 
government forests without any survey, according to press 
reports.  The central government sought to restore land 
ownership rights to tribal communities, who otherwise could 
-- and were -- often displaced from their cultivated lands by 
state agents on behalf of large industrialization or 
commodity mining projects by passing the 2007 Forest Rights 
Act (which was not notified until early 2008).  In addition, 
President Patil announced in early June that the government 
would seek to amend and pass the pending Land Acquisition Act 
Amendments and the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, both 
of which also seek to address the concerns of poorer 
agricultural workers who do not have clear land title rights 
but who would be deprived their livelihood if required to 
move off cultivated land. 
 
¶8.  (U) The government may also be influenced by the report 
last year from the Planning Commission, which examined the 
"development challenges in extremist affected areas."  The 
Planning Commission noted that in addition to disadvantaged 
social and economic conditions, including lower education and 
health indicators, that "land alienation, forced evictions 
from land, and displacement" also fueled unrest.  The report 
also pointed to the specific confluence of scheduled tribes 
 
NEW DELHI 00001349  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
living in forest areas, noting that nearly two-thirds of the 
country's forests lie in 187 tribal districts.  It calls for 
enhanced education and health, electricity, and potable water 
to these districts, as well as passage and implementation of 
the Forest Rights Act and the pending Land Acquisition and 
Rehabilitation and Resettlement bills. 
 
East India 
--- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) India's eastern region remains the epicenter of 
Naxal-related violence.  The main extremist organization the 
CPI (Maoist) and other Naxal factions - such as the Maoist 
Communist Centre (MCC) and the People's War Group (PWG) -- 
have established a "corridor" through tribal areas in East 
India.  New Delhi's Regional Security Officer met recently 
with state and police counterparts in Jharkhand to assess the 
ongoing violence.  The Inspector General of Police was candid 
about the extent and strength of the insurgency in the state, 
noting that Naxalites had infiltrated 18 of 24 districts.  He 
told us that Naxal capabilities have become more 
sophisticated over the last several years and may launch 
attacks in urban centers, including the state capital Ranchi. 
 
¶10.  (U) In the past three weeks, these groups have engaged 
in more violent and public acts in the western parts of West 
Bengal.  According to media reports, around 300 Maoists 
wearing olive green fatigues and carrying guns rampaged 
tribal settlements of Banspahari, Shilda, Binpur and Lalgarh 
in West Bengal, which has resulted in more than 25 deaths and 
countless injuries (Ref. A).  Over the last four decades, 
renegade attacks, followed by counter-attacks, have been 
employed by extremist groups and political parties to command 
support in villages.  Contacts told us that the incumbent 
government in West Bengal, led by the Communist Party of 
India-Marxist (CPM), has become too weak to address the 
impending security crisis. They worry the situation can 
spiral out-of-control and spread to neighboring Jharkhand. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) CPM state leaders are largely divided on how to 
respond to the Maoist threat.  The party faced a humiliating 
defeat in recent parliamentary elections (Ref. B), which has 
emboldened extremist and anti-CPM factions.  Naxal violence 
in Lalgarh appears focused on destabilizing the state 
government -- targeting CPM leaders' homes, party offices and 
security forces, while at least some of the local residents' 
support or neutrality seems to stem from the government's 
provision of 4500 acres of mainly forest land to JSW Steel 
for its steel plant.  Press reports indicate a generally held 
belief that the land was supposed to be redistributed among 
the local villagers.  Many believe the state police and 
district administration are unwilling to meet the challenge 
of standing up to Maoist forces; in their view, the police do 
not want to risk the collateral damage, while government 
officials have been "demoralized" by recent events and worry 
that they have lost popular support. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) According to West Bengal Inspector General of 
Police, Raj Kanojia, the GOI has sent five additional 
companies of paramilitary troops to assist local police in 
and around Lalgarh.  Contacts told us that central forces 
would strike back at Maoist militants only as a last resort 
noting government fears that any sudden action could cause 
another "Nandigram," the violent March 2007 Naxal-state 
police encounter that resulted in over 14 civilian deaths 
(Ref. C).  "If the government cracks down in Lalgarh, there 
will be gunfights and lots of dead bodies.  The government 
can't afford after what happened in Nandigram," Ajai Sahni 
explained. 
 
Western India 
--- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) While Chhattisgarh has been a traditional 
stronghold of Maoist factions, Maharashtra has also seen a 
rise in violent activity in recent years.  This is likely due 
 
NEW DELHI 00001349  004 OF 005 
 
 
to the shared borders of the two states, where remote hill 
and jungle lands harbor a large Maoist population.  The 
government and police presence in these areas is scarce to 
non-existent, enabling Maoist groups to take refuge in and 
authority over these mostly-tribal regions.  The Maoist 
threat appears so fierce, according to experts, because they 
have been countered with a haphazard and at times, a hapless 
response from the state goverments involved, who have failed 
to coordinate, train their security officials and put serious 
efforts into eliminating some of the development problems 
that allow Maoists to take root in the first place. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) In Chhattisgarh, there has been a steady drumbeat 
of Naxal-related violence from 2005-2008 with 140 reported 
deaths (Naxals, civilians and security personnel) so far this 
year.  Maharashtra, however, has seen a sudden spurt in 
violence; there have been 54 Naxal-related deaths this year, 
compared to fourteen in 2008.  In June 2009, Chhattisgarh and 
Maharashtra state governments met with the Home Ministry to 
discuss opportunities for improved state-central government 
coordination in combating Naxals..  Following the Home 
Ministry meeting, the Maharashtra State Home Minister told 
local media that his government would focus on improved 
intelligence sharing with other Naxal-affected states and 
consider deployment of the Central Reserve Police Force 
(CPRF) in Maharashtra.  (Note:  Chhattisgarh already has a 
CPRF presence.  End note.) 
 
South India 
--- 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Maoists are most active in Andhra Pradesh (AP), 
with a noticeable presence in Karnataka as well.  Their 
activities in Tamil Nadu and Kerala are negligible, and 
incidents of Maoist violence in these two states are 
extremely rare.  AP has the most heralded anti-Maoist unit in 
India, which has been effective at putting the Maoists on the 
run in the state and in training similar units from other 
states.  In general, state governments in the South appear to 
cooperate well on this issue and appear to devote sufficient 
resources to keep violent Maoist activity largely in check. 
Southern states, with the partial exception of Karnataka, are 
generally positive about the level of support they receive 
from the central government. 
 
¶16.  (U) Incidents of Maoist violence in AP have declined 30 
percent in 2008 over the previous year.  During the first 
five months of 2009, Maoist violence resulted in seven deaths 
compared to 40 in 2008.  AP police have been successful in 
pinpointing movements of armed Maoist violent activity.  As a 
result, more than 1600 Maoists surrendered to local law 
authorities since the beginning of 2005.  Maoist activity in 
Karnataka is generally low, concentrated in the rural, 
central areas of the state.  Police contacts in Karnataka 
claim that the Maoists in the state are those who fled AP 
after intensified police operations. 
 
¶17.  (U) AP has emerged as the national standard bearer for 
countering Maoist groups by creating a special unit known as 
the "greyhounds.".  Police sources tell us that AP units are 
fully equipped and adequately resourced to counter renegade 
forces, and they are currently focused on strengthening 
border protection with Orissa and Chhattisgarh.  Karnataka's 
Anti-Naxal Force (ANF), formed in May 2005, has made 
significant gains tracking down and capturing Maoists across 
the state.  ANF and state police on June 13 apprehended 
Kanyakumari AKA Viyayabai, a most-wanted Maoist suspected of 
killing a police constable in 2007.  Improved human 
intelligence also led to the arrest of two Maoist leaders in 
April this year, which led to the recovery of more than 100 
kilograms of explosive material. 
 
Comment: Poverty, Powerlessness and Dispossession:  Naxals' 
Bread and Butter 
--- 
 
 
NEW DELHI 00001349  005 OF 005 
 
 
¶18.  (SBU) The Naxal movement threatens the GOI in one of its 
weakest spots: delivery of basic services and redress of 
socially disadvantaged groups.  While Naxals do not directly 
threaten the government in Delhi, they have the power to 
deter investment and development in some of India's poorest 
regions, which also happen to be rich in vital resources such 
as iron and coal.  The predominance of Naxalite activity in 
mostly forested, tribal inhabited areas points to the 
importance of land titles and transparent and fair 
compensation for officially landless poor, who are deprived 
of livelihood and culture when their communal lands are doled 
out by state governments.  End Comment. 
 
BURLEIGH