VZCZCXRO2565
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0267/01 1811413
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 301413Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7061
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000267 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
TRIPOLI FOR SE GRATION 
STATE FOR AF/C, S/USSES 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF MOPS PHUM SU LY QA CT CD
SUBJECT: MINURCAT CAN HELP REDUCE CHAD-SUDAN TENSIONS, SRSG 
ANGELO TELLS SE GRATION, 6/29 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 264 
 
---------- 
SUMMARY AND KEY POINTS 
---------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  During the June 29 meeting with Special Envoy for 
Sudan Scott Gration, MINURCAT SRSG Victor Angelo made the 
following key points: 
 
-- MINURCAT (and likely UNAMID) could assist Dakar Contact 
group border monitoring mission, with amended mandates(s) and 
several hundred more troops, especially now that Qatar had 
agreed to fund the mission ($25 million); 
 
-- The USG could usefully approach Libya to assure Qadafi 
that we want to work with him on the border monitoring 
mission, partly because the Libyans were currently pretty 
down on Deby, after Chad's public ire at Libya's perceived 
inadequate response to the May 7 rebel attacks on Chad; 
 
-- The USG could also usefully push the Contact Group, and 
especially Sudan and Libya, to hold the long-delayed next 
Contact group Meeting in Khartoum in late September; 
 
-- Increased criminality and banditry in "pockets of 
insecurity" in the East, and delayed troop deployments, were 
MINURCAT's biggest challenges; 
 
-- The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) did not appear to 
have any camps in Chad or much overt support from the GOC, 
but GOC tolerated visits to camps and RandR by JEM in Chad; 
 
-- Chadian rebels groups were politically and militarily 
weak, with an uncertain future, after their decisive defeat 
by Chad military May 7, but they were continuing to cause 
security problems, even as some of the factions were actively 
negotiating with the GOC; 
 
-- The situation in northeastern CAR near town of Birao was 
worsening toward critical, with CAR government presence 
disappeared and all humanitarian operations suspended. 
 
END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------- 
EFFORTS TO REDUCE CHAD-SUDAN TENSIONS 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Speaking with SRSG Victor Angelo June 29, Special 
Envoy Gration said his goal was to reduce tensions between 
Chad and Sudan through visible security and 
confidence-building measures such as border monitoring.  The 
SRSG replied that he would only need a simple addition to his 
mandate to enable MINURCAT, once fully deployed, to 
participate in border monitoring.  The SRSG sketched out a 
scenario where the Dakar Contact Group -- comprised of Libya, 
Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Eritrea, Senegal, Qatar, OIC, Chad, 
and Sudan -- would provide ten officials to each of ten 
border monitoring posts, with MINURCAT, on the Chad side, and 
UNAMID, on the Sudan side, providing protection.  He added 
that MINURCAT had a well-developed understanding of cross 
border activities, enabling it to strategically position the 
ten border posts.  The SRSG anticipated that the Dakar 
Contact group would try to meet in late-September in Khartoum 
to approve this arrangement, with Qatar likely providing the 
USD 25 million in financing.  In response to the SE's offer 
of assistance, the SRSG felt that the U.S. should communicate 
clearly its willingness to work together with the Libyans. 
Angelo stated that the GOL would be instrumental in 
implementating any border monitoring mechanism.  Likewise, 
both Libya and Sudan would need a helpful USG push of 
encouragement to realize the late-September Contact group 
meeting in Khartoum. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  The SE said that he was aiming for peace in Darfur 
by the end of the year and would work on the political track, 
while the military track would likely follow the timeline 
that the SRSG had laid out.  Gration stated that the 
opportunity for progress on Darfur would be lost next year as 
 
NDJAMENA 00000267  002 OF 003 
 
 
the country then focused on the 2010 election and 2011 
referendum on the South.  He said he welcomed any ideas the 
SRSG could offer on additional confidence-building measures 
and ways to build trust between Chadian President Deby and 
Sudanese President Bashir.  The SE underscored that the U.S. 
was not operating alone, but tying its efforts closely to the 
UN and the P-5.  Gration said that he had a "new 
relationship" with the Chinese and was working with the 
Russians also. 
 
--------------------------- 
MINURCAT CHALLENGES IN CHAD 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  SRSG Victor Angelo defined MINURCAT's two biggest 
challenges as security, in three distinct pockets in the 
East, and slow troop deployment.  On the security front, 
incidents of insecurity and banditry are increasing in the 
areas of Farchana, Goz Beida, and Iriba. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Elaborating on troop deployment problems, the SRSG 
lamented that troops were arriving without necessary 
equipment.  "They need to be self-sufficient for six months, 
with vehicles, munitions, tents, everything."  Only 200 out 
of 300 Ghanaians had arrived, with the balance due by the end 
of July.  The Nepalese contingent of 150 would not be at full 
strength until the end of October.  The Malawians had been 
motivated to deploy, but had received news from the IMF that 
their budget would not support necessary equipment 
procurement, so they would not be coming at all.  The SRSG 
said he was exploring replacement options from other 
countries.  Despite these difficulties, the SRSG stressed 
that many contingents were doing relatively well, with 
African troops especially well-received by the Chadians. 
 
---------------------------- 
JEM "VISITS" AND R&R IN CHAD 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  In answer to questions from SE Gration on the 
nature of JEM's presence in Chad, the SRSG noted that JEM 
fighters cross into Chad regularly to visit relatives.  They 
often arrived fully equipped and in columns with vehicles. 
They generally stay for short periods.  Angelo made clear 
that the UN had no evidence of any JEM training camps in 
Chad.  Angelo offered that the GOC "turned a blind eye" to 
JEM's presence vice actively supporting the force.  The SRSG 
indicated that over the past three to four months, the GOC 
and JEM had seen advantages in maintaining mutual distance 
from each other.  "As the GOC feels stronger, vis a vis 
defeating Chadian rebels, it has less need for JEM support," 
he noted.  The SRSG could not speak accurately to JEM 
presence and activity much north of Bahai town and wondered 
also what was happening in Pres Deby's "home town" of Am 
Djerass. 
 
----------------------- 
WEAKENED CHADIAN REBELS 
----------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  The SRSG said that the decisive defeat of Chad 
rebels by GOC military May 7 might well have been their "Swan 
Song," having revealed their political as well as military 
weakness and vulnerability. The rebel groups were splitting 
into smaller factions; they needed "child-soldiers" to fill 
out their ranks (the GOC had captured 130 of them, some as 
youing as nine years old); and they were vulnerable to GOC 
air power, the SRSG said.  Nonetheless, Angelo indicated that 
individual rebels and small groups of rebel fighters were 
continuing to cause problems along the border in Eastern 
Chad, including engaging in banditry and selling arms to 
civilians, both of which increased instability.  SE Gration 
stated that he was putting pressure on the GOS to retract 
support from the Chadian rebels, and that he believed 
Khartoum would do so.  The SE noted that he viewed 
cross-border movements by either JEM or Chadian rebels as 
"invasions" of sovereign territory. 
 
--------------------------------- 
DETERIORATING SITUATION IN NE CAR 
 
NDJAMENA 00000267  003 OF 003 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  The SRSG detailed growing problems in the vicinity 
of Birao in northeastern CAR, stating that one of the biggest 
concerns in the wake of the June 6 and June 21 rebel attacks 
was complete loss of state authority in the area.  According 
to the SRSG, the governor and prefect, among others, had 
abandoned the area, save for one local MP.  The SRSG said he 
felt that violence in Birao was a clash between two 
communities.  FACA soldiers, who were caught in the middle of 
these clashes and left without pay or support, had aligned 
with one rebel group out of fear.  The result, according to 
the SRSG, was that the soldiers stayed in their barracks 
while the rebel group patrolled the town, hich was mainly 
deserted with up to 60 percent o houses having been torched. 
 The SRSG said he ws seeing a proliferation of rebels 
groups, by ethicity, with one group even linked with 
Darfuri-bsed militia.  Although Angelo defined the conflict 
as "local," he recognized that the groups wer well armed. 
Thus the potential for the violence to spread both across the 
border and into the CAR's diamond-mining area south of Vakaga 
was very much present. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  The SRSG said that MINURCAT forces -- fully 
deployed but insufficient for the size of the area -- were 
patrolling the town.  All humanitarian operations had been 
suspended, leaving 40,000 people without any assistance. 
Angelo underscored his concern for food supplies in the area, 
estimated at only 258 tons, in response to which the SE 
offered to raise the issue during June 30 meetings with WFP 
officials in Rome. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Angelo said that he would be in New York for the 
MINURCAT mandate renewal at the end of July.  We advised him 
to spend a day in Washington as well, consulting with 
leadership in the AF and IO bureaus. 
 
¶11.  (U)  Minimize considered. 
NIGRO