VZCZCXRO1724
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0264/01 1801741
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 291741Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7050
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000264 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF, AF/C AND S/USSES 
TRIPOLI ALSO FOR A/S CARSON 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL -- LORD 
PARIS FOR POL -- KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS ASEC AU UNAUS SU CT CD
SUBJECT: DEBY-GRATION MEETING:  DEBY WANTS TO HELP USG 
ACHIEVE REGIONAL STABILITY 
 
------------------ 
SUMMARY/KEY POINTS 
------------------ 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Meeting with Special Envoy Scott Gration June 29, 
Chad's President Deby Idriss Itno made the following points: 
 
-- Resolving the Darfur crisis is a key goal for Chad. 
 
-- Chad is committed to implementing the Doha agreement of 
May 3 and views the recent decrease in tensions in South 
Sudan as a positive development. 
 
-- Chad deeply distrusts Sudan in the wake of the early-May 
Sudan-backed rebel attacks on Eastern Chad, and in the face 
of continuing evidence that Sudan is supplying Chadian 
civilians with land mines and other military equipment, which 
in Deby's view could spark a civil war. 
 
-- The U.S. should keep the pressure on Sudan and not take 
the Bashir regime at its word. 
 
-- Lack of resolution of the situation between Sudan and 
Chad, coupled with significantly increasing fragility in CAR 
and lack of clarity on succession in Gabon, could result in a 
dangerously destabilized sub-Saharan region.  The U.S., 
Europe and Arab nations should pay attention to developments 
and encourage negotiating processes to decrease tensions. 
 
-- Chad would cut off assistance to anti-Sudan rebels, 
including the JEM, and pressure the JEM to return to the 
negotiating table, if the GOS ceased supporting Chad rebels 
in Sudan, and if the U.S. strengthened its bilateral 
relationship with Chad. 
 
-- Deby does not intend to meet with President Bashir at the 
AU Summit in Tripoli, "unless Sudan shows good will and stops 
recruiting mercenaries."  Deby does not rule out meetings at 
a lower level between members of the Chad and Sudan 
delegations. 
 
END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------ 
S/E GRATION URGES SEIZING THE MOMENT 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Special Envoy Gration thanked President Deby for 
his relatively restrained response to the early-May Chadian 
rebel incursions in the vicinity of Am Timan, expressed 
appreciation for Chad's efforts to lower regional tensions 
and welcome refugees, and made clear that now was the time to 
attempt to pursue normalized relations with Sudan.  Gration 
described the previous week's conference in Washington to 
raise international support for the CPA, as well as progress 
on trilateral talks with the Sudanese parties over 
outstanding issues such as the Sudan census, North-South 
border demarcation and Abyei.  He made clear that the 
leadership in Khartoum was committed to resolving differences 
with Chad and hoped to meet with the Chadian delegation at 
the AU Summit in Tripoli in the coming days.  The U.S. had 
pressed the Sudanese to limit support for Chadian rebels and 
would continue to do so, Gration indicated.  Chad now needed 
to take parallel steps to withdraw support from rebel 
movements, including the JEM, who were attempting to 
destabilize Sudan. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
DEBY CALLS FOR GREATER PRESSURE ON SUDAN, 
INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION TO REGIONAL CONTEXT 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Deby praised recent developments related to South 
Sudan and the CPA, but advised against overestimating their 
impact.  He expressed commitment to the Doha Accord of May 3 
between Chad and Sudan and urged the U.S. to continue 
pursuing its implementation.  Regarding Darfur-specific 
negotiations in Doha, he noted that "some countries, for 
 
NDJAMENA 00000264  002 OF 003 
 
 
example Qatar, might be too small" to bring about real 
progress on a conflict with the magnitude of the Darfur 
crisis.  "Some states do not respect the Doha process," Deby 
continued, implying dissatisfaction with Egypt's role.  Thus 
the U.S. needed to remain involved, in order to move things 
forward and keep the pressure on Sudan to fulfill its 
pledges.  "Sudan has a lot to gain by implementing the Doha 
accords and not letting Darfur split off," he added.  "But 
the Sudanese do what they want, and only listen when they 
want to."  Asked whether he planned to meet with President 
Bashir at the AU Summit in Tripoli, Deby said that "nothing 
is on my agenda.  I won't do anything with Sudan unless it 
shows good will and stops recruiting mercenaries who fight 
against Chad." 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Deby then described the "price that Chad has been 
paying for the misdeeds of others," in terms of hundreds of 
thousands of refugees from Sudan, tens of thousands from CAR, 
instability in refugee camps as rebel groups recruited there, 
attacks on MINURCAT and the Chadian national Detachement 
Integree de Securite (DIS) that was policing the camps, and 
theft by Chadian rebels of NGO and IO equipment and vehicles. 
 With respect to the situation in CAR, Deby said, "No one is 
helping.  Can you get President Obama to help?"  Deby then 
noted that with Gabonese President Bongo gone, and no clear 
way forward on succession, that nation "might explode."  Deby 
called for "open support" from the U.S. to prevent Chad and 
the Southern Sahara from being destabilized, adding that 
"instability is what Sudan wants."  He stressed that the 
U.S., Europe and Arab nations should work together at the 
present moment for peace to try to resolve the constellation 
of regional problems. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
S/E ENCOURAGES PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  S/E Gration made clear that the U.S. shared Chad's 
concerns about CAR and Gabon, and that we viewed Chad as a 
friendly state in a troubled region making progress toward 
democratic transition.  What was lacking in the region was 
trust, continued Gration.  The U.S. trusted Chad.  We were 
presently trying to build a relationship with Sudan that 
would allow us to negotiate bilaterally into the future.  In 
order to increase trust between Khartoum and N'Djamena, the 
two sides needed to cease support for rebels across the 
border.  Sudan had not behaved in a trustworthy manner in the 
wake of the signing of the May 3 Doha accord, in that the 
rebel attacks on Chad had begun a day later.  Our mode was to 
verify Sudan's claims and offer trust afterward.  Even amid 
broken promises and distrust, Chad and Sudan should look to 
the future and try to identify confidence-building measures. 
If Sudan kept its word to the U.S., our bilateral relations 
would develop in a positive direction.  If Sudan broke its 
promises, we would use sticks rather than carrots. 
 
----------- 
DEBY ON JEM 
----------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Gration emphasized that the U.S. needed Chad's 
help in encouraging regional trust, and in particular in 
making sure that the Sudan rebel Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM) made itself a part of the solution and ceased 
military operations that were only increasing the numbers of 
refugees from and IDPs within Darfur.  If the JEM were 
willing to lay down its arms and work as a political force 
along with other groups, there was room for it. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Deby said that he appreciated Gration's efforts to 
get the GoS to cease support for Chadian rebels, and to allow 
those rebels who wanted to lay down their arms and return to 
Chad to do so without interference.  But he added that "what 
the janjaweed used to do, the Sudanese military is now 
doing."  Chadian civilians were being killed by land-mines 
provided to Chadian rebels by Sudanese armed forces, 
continued Deby.  As for U.S. concern that Chad was sustaining 
the JEM, Deby asked, "Why would I use my own army to fight in 
 
NDJAMENA 00000264  003 OF 003 
 
 
Sudan if the JEM answered to me?"  The JEM were "close 
relatives" of Chad, but Chad was not training, equipping or 
giving them vehicles as was the case with Sudan's support to 
Chad rebels.  Chad would cut off assistance to the anti-Sudan 
rebels, including the JEM, and pressure the JEM to return to 
the negotiating table, if the GOS would cease supporting Chad 
rebels in Sudan, Deby said. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Gration acknowledged that Chad had a right to 
protect its people, but he reiterated that Chad also needed 
to take steps to reduce tensions, and this would involve 
reducing support for the JEM.  "I trust that you will do the 
right thing," he said.  Deby replied that he hoped he could 
count on President Obama to help restore peace.  "I'll 
continue to advise JEM to stop fighting and return to the 
negotiating table to try to find a lasting political solution 
to the crisis." he offered.  "Chad needs peace.  We want to 
focus on development, not on fighting." 
 
------------- 
BECHIR ON JEM 
------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  In a preparatory session June 28 with Chadian 
Ambassador to the U.S. Mahamoud Adam Bechir, S/E Gration 
emphasized the destabilizing nature of Chad's support for the 
JEM, particularly now that other Sudan rebel movements 
appeared committed to negotiations.  Gration then sketched 
out U.S. efforts to convince Sudan to cease support for the 
Chadian rebels.  Bechir, who responded in a more direct 
manner than Deby, endorsed the notion of international border 
monitoring, perhaps through a joint MINURCAT-UNAMID 
mechanism, to make sure that rebels on both sides of the 
border were better contained.  He then asserted that although 
Chad's standard line about the JEM was that the force was 
independent, in reality it did receive some "support" from 
Chad, as part of Chad's "strategy of self-defense."  With 
Sudan having accused Chad of being a puppet of the U.S. and 
Israel, thus causing all Arab assistance to dry up, Chad felt 
very much isolated.  If the U.S. really were to offer a hand 
to Chad, then Sudan's efforts to destabilize the nation would 
end and Chad would have no need for JEM.  Bechir recalled 
that just several years before the current low in relations 
with Khartoum, Chad had actually fought the JEM in support of 
Sudan.  "You are the only country that can pressure Sudan," 
he continued.  "We need assurances from you that the U.S. 
will not allow Sudan to make us into a religious state.  We 
would give up Khalil in a minute in exchange for your open 
support.  We know him to be a bad guy."  "On the other hand," 
said Bechir, "if we withdrew all assistance to Khalil, and we 
didn't have your backing, Khalil would turn against us -- he 
is that sort of person.  Unless you promise to be there for 
us, I doubt that we will want to take such a risk." 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Speaking about U.S. goals for the AU Summit, 
Bechir offered that "we are ready to work on human rights, 
trafficking, all your other initiatives."  He continued: 
"Deby is thinking about his legacy.  He wants to move toward 
democracy, and improve Chad's reputation.  We have long had 
help from French troops, but a show of U.S. interest -- in 
the form of a high-level visit to N'Djamena, or a high-level 
meeting in Washington -- would be worth much more to us.  A 
C-130 full of uniforms would raise our morale.  In any case, 
"we want strategic allies, and we are not threatening Sudan." 
 
NIGRO