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RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0234/01 1671626
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 161626Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7000
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000234 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/C, S/USSES, IO/PKO, AND PRM/AFR 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL -- LORD 
PARIS FOR POL -- KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PREF PHUM SU CT CD
SUBJECT: MINURCAT CHIEF DESCRIBES POST-EUFOR TROOP 
CONTRIBUTION GAPS, INCREASING CHALLENGES IN CAR 
 
REF: N'DJAMENA 223 
 
This message is sensitive but unclassified.  Not for Internet 
dissemination. 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary:  On June 16, UN Special Representative 
Victor Angelo da Silva chaired a meeting of diplomatic reps 
in N'Djamena to address concerns about MINURCAT's 
peacekeeping activities, including the inability of some 
contributing states to deploy fully-equipped peacekeeping 
contingents in a timely manner to Eastern Chad.  Angelo was 
flanked by MINURCAT Force Commander Elhadji Mouhamedou Kandji 
of Kenya, who described shortfalls in manpower, armaments, 
equipment and transport, which Kandji said were becoming 
particularly acute as the last EUFOR units drew down in 
preparation for July departure.  Additional MINURCAT 
officials, including the Acting UNPOL Commander and the Head 
of the Human Rights Section, reported on activities within 
their purviews.  Angelo noted that the security situation in 
CAR was rapidly reaching a point where MINURCAT would have 
neither the mandate nor the military capability to respond, 
potentially leaving 40,000 CAR IDPs without international 
assistance.  End summary. 
 
--------------------- 
MINURCAT PEACEKEEPING 
--------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  MINURCAT SRSG Victor Angelo devoted much of his 
monthly meeting for N'Djamena's diplomatic corps to a 
discussion of force generation and troop contribution 
matters.  Force Commander Elhadji Mouhamedou Kandji made 
clear that with one-third to one-half of expected 
international peacekeeping units yet to be deployed, or 
deployed without proper equipment, MINURCAT was having to 
make very targeted decisions about where to conduct patrols. 
As the rainy season approached, peacekeepers were focused on 
prepositioning supplies.  Beyond that task, they were making 
a priority of humanitarian escorts and liaison with the NGO 
community.  A mechanism for centralized escort requests had 
recently been established and seemed to be functioning well, 
said Kandji.  The arrival of Russian experts deployed to 
CONAFIT (Chad's own Coordination national d'appui a la force 
internationale) was improving MINURCAT's coordination with 
the GoC, and Russia's provision of helicopters had increased 
the UN's lift and medevac capacities (which had previously 
depended on two Italian-provided C-130s and additional Polish 
assets). 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Kandji expressed concern that some newly-arriving 
international peacekeeping units had appeared without force 
protection equipment, meaning that they were for the time 
being "camping in Abeche," unable to perform duties 
independent of property-equipped peacekeepers, some of these 
holdover troops from the previous EUFOR deployment.  Kandji 
noted that ensuring the rapid deployment of the remaining 
one-third of MINURCAT's promised troops before the final 
departure of EUFOR units would require considerable pressure 
in New York.  In the course of June, Ghanaian and Nepalese 
units were set to arrive, but unless they brought suitable 
force protection gear, they would "just take up space." 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  According to MINURCAT's Administrative Section 
Head, the chief problem facing the UN in Chad in addition to 
inadequate troop deployments was the failure of an ICAO team 
to complete preparation of the "apron" around the airfield at 
Abeche.  The team would arrive later in the week, he noted, 
so the problem appeared to be on the road to resolution.  The 
French Ambassador offered that although EUFOR troops might 
appear better-equipped than some non-European newcomers to 
MINURCAT, the reality was that repayment and financing 
problems were proving so difficult for the EU to handle that 
the entire concept of a separate European Security and 
Defense Policy had come in for questioning. 
 
--- 
DIS 
--- 
 
 
NDJAMENA 00000234  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  The Acting Commander of MINURCAT's UN Police units 
(responsible for advising and training the Chadian 
Detachement integree de securite (DIS), which provides police 
protection in refugee camps) reported on the visit of a New 
York-based assessment mission sent to advise on how to 
overcome start-up problems with the Chadian force.  The 
Acting Commander indicated that the assessment team had 
concluded that the DIS was functioning effectively despite 
certain well-publicized incidents.  (See reftel for the 
assessment team's debrief to Embassy N'Djamena.) 
 
-------------------------------------- 
CHILD SOLDIERS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  The Head of MINURCAT's Human Rights Section 
described initiatives to address violence against women, 
noting that the phenomenon had most recently been reported in 
significant numbers in May, at the time of the Chadian Army's 
victory over Chadian rebels, following which soldiers from 
the Armee Nationale Tchadienne (ANT) had been accused of 
carrying out several rapes.  The UN and DIS were involved 
with helping victims find means to bring charges and deal 
with the problem of impunity, as some soldiers claimed they 
were immune from prosecution. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Impunity also remained a challenge with respect to 
the hiring of child soldiers, said the Human Rights Section 
Head, particularly among JEM commanders.  The ANT, for its 
part, had essentially stopped the practice of recruiting 
children, he continued, but had not yet fulfilled its 
promises to demobilize those who were already a part of the 
force.  MINUCAT had active programs of "sensitization" on the 
subject, and had found Chad's MoD quite receptive, to the 
point where the MoD had agreed to set up a transition center 
for child soldiers in Abeche.  But desire at the higher 
levels of the Chadian government to end use of children in 
combat had not yet transferred into willingness on the part 
of some lower-level commanders to free minors in their 
charge.  Meanwhile, Chadian rebels seemed to be continuing to 
recruit children, and were suspected of making sweeps through 
some villages in Eastern Chad in an effort to round up 
youngsters and take them to Sudan for training before the 
seasonal rains began.  Some parents seemed inclined to show 
support for the rebel cause by offering up their children, 
said the Human Rights Section Head.  Additional sensitization 
work was clearly needed among rebel groups and sympathizers. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  As for humanitarian demining, one major project in 
the vicinity of Am Dam was now completed, the Human Rights 
Section Head noted.  The EU Ambassador to Chad added that his 
organization was engaged in a demining project in the 
vicinity of Goz Beida. 
 
-------------------------------- 
SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION IN CAR 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Victor Angelo concluded the meeting with a 
description of the precarious situation in Northern CAR, 
where many NGOs had suspended operations in the course of the 
previous several days due to security concerns.  MINURCAT was 
far from having the military capacity to deal with the 
security needs of northern CAR, Angelo continued, which was 
now characterized by a proliferation of ethnically-based 
militias on both sides of the Chad-CAR border, as well as 
rampant banditry in CAR.  MINURCAT's relations with the CARG 
remained good, but Bozize's long-term ability to hold onto 
power in Bangui was far from certain, and had evaporated in 
the North.  Under the circumstances, MINURCAT was considering 
airlifting supplies to vulnerable populations along the 
border, 40,000 of whom were on the CAR side and 70,000 of 
whom were in Chad. 
 
---------------------------- 
CHAD-SUDAN BORDER MONITORING 
---------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Charge d'affaires spoke briefly with Victor 
 
NDJAMENA 00000234  003 OF 003 
 
 
Angelo about the possibility of better coordination between 
MINURCAT and UNAMID, including through joint surveillance of 
the Chad-Sudan border (an idea originally proposed in the 
course of the visit of U.S. Special Envoy Scott Gration to 
Chad in May.)  Angelo recommended making a proposal in New 
York, as he said that neither he nor UNAMID's SRSG was 
well-placed to approach the other about a new joint mandate. 
BREMNER