R 160841Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6998
INFO AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
DARFUR COLLECTIVE
HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000232 
 
 
STATE FOR AF/C, S/USSESS AND PRM/AFR 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL -- LORD 
PARIS FOR POL -- KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM CD
SUBJECT: UN POLICE ASSESSMENT MISSION TO CHAD REPORTS 
GENERALLY POSITIVE RESULTS 
 
¶1.  Charge d'affaires and Refugee Coordinator received an 
outbriefing from members of the DPKO Mid-Term UN Police 
Assessment Mission to Chad June 13, including a generally 
positive assessment of performance by the DIS (Detachement 
Integree de Security, the special police force established to 
provide security for humanitarian operations in and around 
refugee camps and IDP sites) to date.  New York-based DPKO 
Assessment Team leaders Ingrid Hayden and Walter Wolf told 
Charge that the original concept of how the DIS would be 
deployed to the field required some adjustment, given 
difficult security conditions in eastern Chad and the delay 
in full MINURCAT troop deployment.  Wolf said that his 
assessment team had observed a clear need for further 
training for DIS officers with a particular emphasis on basic 
police procedures and proper weapons handling.  He said 
recent disciplinary problems in various field locations 
involved less than five percent of the force, which was 
considered an acceptable average in police organizations 
worldwide.  Wolf added that his team had observed a good 
working relationship between the DIS and UN Police colleagues 
providing mentoring and continued training in the field. 
Wolf acknowledged that closer supervision of DIS officers by 
UNPOL trainers could improve future performance. 
 
¶2.  The DPKO team offered that misunderstanding of the DIS 
mandate by humanitarian actors had led to inflated 
expectations and an overly critical review of DIS performance 
in the field.  According to the assessment team, 
humanitarians sometimes mistakenly expected DIS officers to 
perform the same escort services for daily convoys to refugee 
camps and IDP sites that the prior protection force (CNAR) 
had performed before the creation of the DIS.  Prior to the 
DIS, CNAR, the Chadian National Commission for the Welcome 
and Reintegration of Refugees, was responsible for both legal 
activities such as refugee status determination and security 
services such as protection in and around the camps.  (Note: 
Because UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations worked 
closely with CNAR on legal and assistance issues related to 
the refugee population, they were able to develop a 
relationship with the Commission which eased coordination of 
CNAR escort activities in the field.  In most cases, MINURCAT 
military troops are now tasked with escorting humanitarian 
convoys for distances longer than 10 kms.  Coordinating 
escort logistics thus has recently involved a greater number 
of military and civilian actors than in the past, resulting 
in less time for aid organizations to spend in the camps on a 
daily basis.  This has contributed to impatience with the DIS 
on the part of some humanitarian organizations.  End note.) 
 
¶3.  In response to a request from Charge for regular lists of 
DIS accomplishments, the team reported consistent DIS success 
with arrests of perpetrators targeting humanitarians for 
carjackings and office invasions.  DIS officers have 
increased security for women in many camps through increased 
patrols and deployment of female officers to assist women 
refugee victims of crime.  Charge emphasized that UNPOL and 
MINURCAT needed to do a better job of educating humanitarians 
and donors as to the limits of the DIS mandate.  Charge 
called for more concerted UN efforts to publicize DIS success 
stories and explain chain of command relations between the 
DIS and MINURCAT/UNPOL mentors, so as to demonstrate the 
degree to which the UN exerted influence over the DIS.  She 
specifically asked that UNPOL distribute to donors a periodic 
accounting of DIS officers' actions in various field 
locations. 
 
¶4.  In turn, the team requested diplomatic assistance in 
encouraging the GoC to provide DIS officers with promised 
equipment and weapons.  The team said it would share a 
written report on its mission once the document was released 
in New York. 
 
 
BREMNER