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OO RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #1298/01 1800412
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 290412Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0011
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0198
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0134
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
RUZEFAA/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMCSUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 NAIROBI 001298 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S CARSON 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID ECON KWMN AE SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - Diaspora in Dubai Meets DAS Wycoff 
 
Ref: A) Nairobi 1173 
B) 08 Nairobi 2618 
C) 08 Nairobi 2619 
 
NAIROBI 00001298  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Between June 3 and 6, visiting Acting Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs (DAS) Karl Wycoff met with 
representatives of Somalia's dispora community residing in Dubai. 
DAS Wycoff held a series of small group discussions with community 
organizers, business leaders, industry groups and a question and 
answer session for 50 participants hosted by the Somali Consulate in 
Dubai.  DAS Wycoff highlighted U.S. policy toward Somalia, focusing 
on our humanitarian and security priorities.  Common themes 
expressed by the Somali representatives included: U.S. leadership is 
fundamental to achieving success in Somalia; the TFG and President 
Sharif must be supported; willingness to contribute to peace-making 
and reconstruction; public-private partnerships could allow the U.S. 
to work in inaccessible areas; business remains a uniting factor 
that trumps regional and clan differences.   The Dubai-based 
diaspora also offered several recommendations for U.S. engagement on 
Somalia and for more regular exchanges with this influential 
community.  DAS Wycoff announced that he would ask USAID 
representatives to return to Dubai to lead a training session on the 
certification process to become a grantee or contractor to enable 
partnerships with new organizations.    End Summary. 
 
------------------------------- 
Outreach to UAE Somali Diaspora 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) Between June 3 and 6, DAS Wycoff visited the United Arab 
Emirates and met with representatives of Somalia's diaspora 
community residing in Dubai.  Another key aspect of the visit was 
DAS Wycoff's meeting with UAE officials who expressed their 
government's support for the TFG (ref a).  In order to interact with 
representatives of this influential UAE-based Somali comunity, DAS 
Wycoff held a series of small group discussions with community 
organizers, business leaders, industry groups and a question and 
answer session for 50 participants hosted by the Somali Consulate in 
Dubai. 
 
¶3.  (U) One of the unique features of this community is that its 
representatives maintain strong business ties with Somalia, and have 
significant control of the commercial traffic in and out of the 
country (ref b).  Because of their critical role in supplying basic 
goods and services in all regions of Somalia, as well as to the 
transitional government and other groups, these business leaders 
also have significant influence in the political arena (ref c).  DAS 
Wycoff's visit enabled us to hear perspectives from this group and 
gave us the opportunity to explain U.S. policy toward Somalia. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) During his visit, DAS Wycoff met with approximate 100 
Somalis living and working in the UAE.  DAS Wycoff focused on our 
humanitarian and security priorities while encouraging increased 
engagement with Somali diaspora communities worldwide.  He detailed 
U.S. initiatives, emphasizing the greater role that the United 
States can play when Somalia is ready for post-conflict 
stabilization.  With representatives of Somalia's Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG), including TFG Ambassador to UAE Ahmed 
Mohamed Egal and TFG Consul General in Dubai Abdul Kadir Al-Hatimi, 
DAS Wycoff spoke of our effort to generate significant regional 
support for Somalia from the Gulf States.  The TFG officials 
welcomed our initiative, stating that with U.S. encouragement, 
countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE would surely release 
promised donations and push the Arab League for a greater supportive 
role. 
 
------------------------------------ 
U.S. Leadership Fundamental to Success 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Our interlocutors overwhelmingly welcomed U.S. commitment 
in Somalia, with one stating, "There is no better partner than the 
U.S."  Another said, "As leader of the international community, the 
U.S. has a moral obligation to help Somalia."  The most salient 
point made during all of the meetings was that increased U.S. 
 
NAIROBI 00001298  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
involvement in Somalia will be critical to achieving peace, 
establishing stability and supporting a sustainable government in 
the country.  Many told us that U.S. engagement was long overdue and 
encouraged increased financial and material support to the TFG, and 
more support directly to the people of Somalia. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) While they encouraged greater U.S. involvement, many in 
the diaspora also acknowledged that Somalis themselves are the 
problem.  One Puntland-based businessman said that Somalis initially 
supported piracy and now they are paying the price.  In several 
sessions, the participants told us they accept responsibility for 
the current state of affairs in the country and are committed to 
helping the situation.  DAS Wycoff cautioned that while the U.S. is 
engaged in Somalia, no conflict can be solved by the U.S. and that 
ultimately, it is up to the Somalis to fix the country.  He invited 
our interlocutors to think about what the U.S. can do with them, not 
for them. 
 
------------------------ 
TFG and President Sharif 
Must be Supported 
------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Many Somalis and seasoned Somalia-watchers identify the 
business community as being at the root of Somalia's political 
upheavals and violence.  They charge that business leaders benefit 
from an operating environment with no government intervention and 
are profiting in the chaos.  When we asked the Dubai representatives 
about these critiques, they all shot back that these charges could 
not be farther from the truth.  The business leaders said that in 
the absence of government, it is they who have helped the people, 
providing all the public goods and services that have sustained 
Somalia over the last two decades.  Many maintained that in the 
current environment, they pay taxes to the government, but are also 
forced to pay other "taxes" to various groups in areas where they 
seek to do business, pay exorbitant security costs, incur 
prohibitive insurance fees to ship goods into Somalia, and other 
unforeseen fees which make it impossible to accurately estimate 
transaction costs.  All the business leaders agreed that their 
interests would be better served with a stable government. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) While they voiced certain critiques of President Sharif 
and his cabinet, all agreed that this TFG was the best opportunity 
that Somalia has enjoyed in a long time and they are committed to 
its success.  When DAS Wycoff discussed the financial and material 
support the U.S. has given the TFG, many representatives voiced 
concern over transparency and accountability.  They said that while 
they believed that President Sharif was honest, "those around him 
are corrupt."  Many made the case that while Sharif may not be 
ideal, al-Shabaab is not a viable alternative.  They were highly 
critical of al-Shabaab, Hassan Dahir Aweys, and the "radical" 
influence taking hold in Somalia to "foment violence and recruit 
Somali youth to support terrorism." 
 
¶9.  (SBU) DAS Wycoff underscored U.S. commitment to the TFG while 
emphasizing that, at the same time, the spoilers must be prevented 
from undermining the TFG.  He asked for the cooperation of the 
business leaders in helping us identify these spoilers by providing 
actionable information. 
 
------------------------------- 
Accepting Responsibility for 
Peace-making and Reconstruction 
------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Many of the participants complained that the TFG does not 
reach out to them.  (Note: Several of the businessmen we met were 
active during the Djibouti Process.  They came to Djibouti to 
support favorite candidates and provided financial backing for their 
campaigns.  End Note.)  While many were very close to  Sheikh Sharif 
during his days with the Islamic Courts Union, now, they said, 
Sharif no longer comes to us.  "We only see ministers when they come 
through Dubai for money."  They said that while they have many areas 
of expertise, the TFG does not ask for advice or call on them for 
strategic assistance.  Instead, our contacts maintained that they 
only receive ad hoc requests for funds and to pay for the hotels, 
meals, and the expenses of TFG representatives when they come 
through Dubai. 
 
 
NAIROBI 00001298  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
¶11.  (SBU) When we emphasized that there must be more open lines of 
communication between the business leaders and the transitional 
government, they acknowledged that both sides share the blame.  One 
businessman frankly stated that politicians and business people are 
sharing commercial successes while "living on the blood of the 
people."  He acknowledged that all of them are guilty of selling to 
people on all sides of the conflict and that they own (and profit) 
from the hospitals where others are treated.  One stated, "If we do 
not do something now, Somalia as we know it will cease to exist." 
 
---------------------------------- 
Public-Private Partnerships and 
New Paradigms for U.S. Engagement 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) When we emphasized the U.S. priority toward the 
humanitarian crisis, and that the U.S. was the largest donor in this 
area, the Dubai-based community was unimpressed.  While they stated 
an appreciation for U.S. efforts, many believed that the benefits of 
our enormous humanitarian investment did not reach the people who 
need it most.  Several made the point that humanitarian assistance 
would be better used in more sustainable development projects where 
Somalis could "see" U.S. efforts on the ground.  They recommended 
infrastructure projects like school renovations, repairs of fields 
and courts for youth to engage in sports activities, and other 
initiatives they claimed would better serve their communities.  They 
insisted that because they know how to operate in these inaccessible 
environments, they are well-placed to help implement these 
initiatives. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Several of the Dubai-based leaders with whom DAS Wycoff 
met were also present at the workshop for private sector leaders in 
Djibouti that took place on April (ref d).  They re-iterated their 
commitment to help provide opportunities for youth employment and 
engagement.  They raised the idea of establishing public-private 
partnerships in some of the more stable areas of the country where 
they could launch employment-generating activities.  They indicated 
a strong desire to work directly with the United States on these 
efforts.  Our interlocutors heavily criticized the "Nairobi mafia" 
of UN agencies, NGOs and donors, who have grown too accustomed to 
the status quo.  They invited us to think more creatively and to 
support new ideas coming from Somalis themselves. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) DAS Wycoff emphasized that we are indeed not interested 
in "business as usual" and are actively looking for new partners to 
help us implement projects and programs.  Responding to the critique 
that Somali and international NGOs working with the international 
community in Somalia have made it impossible for new entrants, DAS 
Wycoff announced that he would ask USAID representatives to return 
to Dubai to lead a training session on the certification process to 
become a grantee or contractor.  The Dubai-based interlocutors 
positively responded to the idea of a workshop on this subject. 
 
------------------ 
Business Remains a 
Uniting Factor 
------------------ 
 
¶15.  (SBU) The industry-specific groups emphasized that operating 
businesses inside Somalia forces them to work in all regions.  The 
shipping companies told us that they bring commodities (including 
U.S.-funded humanitarian assistance) into all markets, and therefore 
negotiate and interact with all the authorities on the ground.  They 
asserted that while politicians benefit from clan differences, the 
role of the clan is limited by profit and loss calculations in the 
world of business.  The TFG Consul General told us that for the 
Somalis in Dubai, money comes first, then clan alliances, and then 
religion.  He did note that the majority of the community tends to 
closely adhere to Islamic practices and beliefs.  (Note:  During all 
of our meetings, the participants took a break for prayers.  End 
Note.) 
 
¶16.  (SBU) The participants in one group agreed with the assertion 
by one of the most prominent representatives that each has achieved 
individual success, but that they have been a collective failure. 
They acknowledged that in some cases, money has been at the root of 
conflict.  The group of business leaders from Somaliland volunteered 
to provide technical guidance for Sharia-based investment options 
for Somalis in the diaspora and others from Gulf states seeking to 
 
NAIROBI 00001298  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
invest in Somalia.  They discussed starting an umbrella organization 
and developing a mechanism to ensure accountability for smaller 
local NGOs to provide direct benefits in their communities. 
 
-------------- 
Women's Voices 
Are Silenced 
-------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) In all of the meetings, only men were present.  The 
business leaders and the TFG officials recommended a separate 
meeting for women to engage with DAS Wycoff in a setting where "they 
would feel more comfortable sharing their ideas."  Two outspoken 
women leaders from the Somali diaspora community ended up 
representing a larger group, many of whom could not attend the 
session due to prior commitments.  (Note: Many of the Somali women 
in Dubai own or work in shops and are involved in smaller-scale 
trade.  Some of these women have become very successful and like 
their male counter-parts, are highly diversified, operating 
companies across industry.  End Note.) 
 
¶18.  (SBU) The women expressed frustration with events and 
opportunities targeting the "business community," where they are 
given no role.  One said that all of the men fuel and are involved 
in the conflict and should not be trusted with any money from the 
U.S.  They lamented that the international community has focused too 
much on warlords and businessmen without consideration for Somali 
intellectuals.  They also cautioned us not to make decisions on 
clan-based criteria, emphasizing that the 4.5 formula for clan 
representation should be abolished. 
 
¶19.  (SBU) The women community leaders asked that we encourage the 
Somalis to build civil society in Dubai and in other diaspora 
communities.  They said that Somalis are willing to work hard for 
the benefit of their country, but that the transitional government 
is only giving a selected few the opportunity to serve.  They 
recommended that President Sharif outline a clear agenda for his 
government and said the Dubai-based community is willing to help him 
in this effort.  Other ways that the women felt they could 
contribute include:  empowering local organizations by providing 
oversight and accountability for aid, encouraging other groups who 
have remained outside of the political process to participate, 
bringing a focus on women in Somalia and the diaspora. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Recommendations for Future Engagement 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶20.  (U) During the course of the discussions, the representatives 
shared with us the following recommendations for U.S. engagement on 
Somalia: 
 
-- Significant U.S. financial support needed, especially for 
security sector assistance and reform 
-- Support the development of a national military through training 
and equipment 
-- Demand transparency and accountability for any financial 
resources provided 
-- Sustained political and diplomatic support 
-- Open a Somali embassy in Washington as an important signal of 
U.S. support to the TFG 
-- Continue a Somali-led reconciliation process, where the U.S. and 
others are not attempting to "pick winners" 
-- International organizations and diplomatic missions must 
re-locate to Somalia 
-- Shift to more small-scale development projects, instead of 
focusing on large long-term initiatives which inevitably stall 
-- Focus on public-private partnerships with business leaders in 
areas difficult for the U.S. and others to access 
-- Reward Somaliland for embracing democratic norms and processes 
-- Shift development efforts to areas where there are effective 
regional administrations 
-- Communities living in peace should receive "peace dividends" to 
encourage other areas to work toward peaceful settlements 
-- Expand secular education, including vocational and technical 
schools 
-- Provide opportunities for teacher training and exchanges with 
U.S. universities 
-- Involve Somali intellectuals in the nation-building process 
 
NAIROBI 00001298  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
-- Create quick impact opportunities for youth in all regions to 
reduce violence and stop flow of illegal migration 
-- Support the media, educational organizations, and 
non-governmental institutions 
-- Strongly address the negative role that Eritrea is playing in 
Somalia 
 
¶21.  (U) Post appreciates the assistance of Embassy Abu Dhabi and 
Consulate General Dubai in arranging DAS Wycoff's visit. 
 
RANNEBERGER