VZCZCXRO6848
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHNR #1259/01 1741401
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231401Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9945
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 6596
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3236
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3108
RUZEFAA/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 001259 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.12958: N /A 
TAGS: EAID EAGR PHUM PGOV SENV SOCI KCRM KE
 
SUBJECT: ISIOLO'S SECURITY PROBLEM, PART 3 
 
REF: A. Nairobi 1242 
¶B. Nairobi 1238 
¶C. Nairobi 551 
 
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Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) Cycles of violence centered on livestock raiding are a sad 
reality in Isiolo District, which lies in Kenya's geographic center. 
 Population, social, and environmental pressures as well as 
ineffective (sometimes damaging) government efforts to address them 
tend to intensify conflict. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Local, community-based efforts to advance conflict 
resolution mechanisms and development -- particularly District Peace 
Committees and the Northern Rangelands Trust (NRT, a rural 
development initiative centered on wildlife conservation that is 
supported in part by USAID) -- have been hampered because of the 
politics associated with development, natural resource management 
and peace-building in the area.  (Note: Because there are resources 
and power at stake, this is not an uncommon phenomenon with 
development programs.  End Note.)  While the goal of these programs 
is to support stability and peace, there are some in Isiolo who 
believe that the expansion of the NRT has exacerbated ethnic 
tensions.  In addition, the problem of commercialized livestock 
raiding also potentially affects U.S.-supported livestock marketing 
programs.  While it is indeed important to help pastoralists better 
leverage their assets, it will be important to ensure that the U.S. 
assistance does not inadvertently support trade in stolen 
livestock. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The challenges confronting the region's development and the 
fact of persistent conflict demand that all of Isiolo's residents 
work together to confront them.  As long as inter-ethnic tensions 
dominate decision-making processes, however, lasting solutions will 
remain elusive.  U.S.-supported programs have done much to help 
improve security and economic opportunities for marginalized 
populations in the Isiolo area; however, the challenges are enormous 
and powerful political and (criminal) economic interests can be 
destabilizing.  While there are no easy answers, we are working to 
ensure that U.S.-supported programs adjust to the changing situation 
on the ground by increasing their conflict-sensitivity and 
inclusiveness.   This is the last cable in a three-part series to 
describe the Isiolo region's security problems, the effect U.S. 
development programs have in the area, and what we are doing to 
promote development, conflict resolution, and stability.  End 
Summary. 
 
----------------------------- 
The Northern Rangelands Trust 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Northern Rangelands Trust (NRT) is a community-led 
initiative registered in 2004 whose members represent politically 
and socially marginalized pastoralist communities of Northern Kenya. 
 The NRT was established as an umbrella organization to assist 
pastoralist communities and other stakeholders to use biodiversity 
conservation and improved environmental management as a means of 
enhancing and diversifying livelihoods.  Forty-one percent of NRT's 
funding currently comes from USAID. 
 
¶5. (SBU) While there are members of multiple ethnic groups within 
the Trust, including Borana, Samburu, Rendille, Pokot, Njemps, 
Somali, and Boni/Bajuni, the overwhelming perception of Isiolo 
residents and local government officials is that most of the human 
beneficiaries of this large wildlife conservation program are 
Samburu.  (Note: The direct benefits of NRT participation include 
jobs and revenue from the tourism sector for member communities. 
The employment of game guards also provides rapid reaction 
capability against livestock raids, filling a gap left by the 
police.  End Note.) Some of this can be traced to the willingness of 
different communities to engage with NRT.  There are only a small 
number of Borana participants in the program, for example, and there 
is vocal opposition within parts of the Borana community to greater 
participation.  Some of this can also be explained by other 
communities' perceptions of recent Samburu livestock raiding 
patterns.  We heard a number of times from Borana and Somali 
interlocutors that inter-communal livestock raiding used to be 
played on an equal playing field.  Once the Samburu began to benefit 
from the NRT, the other communities were no longer able to compete 
because the security provided by the conservancy game guards 
protects Samburu herds from counterattacks.  (Note: There was no 
 
NAIROBI 00001259  002 OF 004 
 
 
equivalent complaint from our Samburu interlocutors that other 
groups had an unfair advantage because of the benefits brought by 
NRT.  They argued that other groups were at an advantage because of 
positions of political power and influence within the government. 
End Note.) 
 
¶6. (SBU) The presence of NRT has become a hotly debated political 
issue for local parliamentary candidates, and we were told that it 
became a campaign issue in the 2007 general elections.  While this 
was no doubt due in part to the perception other communities had 
about the unequal benefits accruing to the Samburu, the NRT's 
strategy of engaging political leaders appears to have affected the 
political leaders themselves.  A Borana elder told PolOff that 
former Isiolo MP Hajji Mokku (a Borana) had begun to lobby his 
fellow Borana in favor of NRT.  Mokku's kinsmen, the elder said, 
viewed Mokku as a sellout because they had come to resent the 
program they saw as favoring the Samburu.  Current MP Mohammend Kuti 
reportedly does not attend NRT meetings or allow his subordinates to 
do so, and so discussions with the Borana community about the 
workings of the NRT are now happening at the grassroots -- vice 
political -- level.  (Note: There are multiple requests from 
individual communities to join the NRT, including another community 
in the Borana area.  End Note.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Borana community that currently benefits from the NRT, 
the Buliqo-Bulesa conservancy, has felt some political pressure as 
well.  An NRT official told PolOff that ethnic Borana rangers have 
lost their morale and are treated as traitors for what their fellow 
Borana perceive as assisting the Samburu in their raiding behavior. 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) Any stoppage of NRT ranger activities or indeed the 
political controversy over expanding areas under conservancy 
management benefits livestock raiders and wildlife poachers. 
Indeed, NRT officials speculate that the spark that ignited the 
latest round of conflict started was the use by politically 
connected poachers of the ensuing chaos to gain a freer hand in 
operating in the area around Isiolo District's Merti Division 
(Borana territory). 
 
---------------------------- 
The District Peace Committee 
---------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The modern concept for District Peace Committees originated 
in Wajir District in the early 1990s.  Since then, the goals of 
these committees have been endorsed by the Government and 
semi-formalized under the leadership of the provincial 
administration.  The National Steering Committee on Peace-Building 
and Conflict Management (NSC) provides policy direction and support 
to District Peace Committees throughout Kenya.  USAID is one of 
several donors that have offered to provide support to the NSC and 
targeted District Peace Committees.  However, to date, the NSC's 
request for USAID support has been focused on developing a national 
peace building policy.  USAID hopes to provide the NSC and targeted 
District Peace Committees with assistance in the future. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The first Isiolo District Peace Committee by many accounts 
was an effective one.  Originally begun in 2000 to deal with a 
conflict between Borana and Dagodiyya (ethnic Somalis), its founders 
were active, committed, and not overly beholden to local 
politicians.  However, since then their influence has waned. 
 
¶11. (SBU) First, organizational inertia has set in.  The Provincial 
Commissioner told PolOff that the Peace Committee would be more 
effective if it met more frequently, especially before conflicts 
happen.  As it happens, it meets only when there has been a problem, 
and valuable time to prevent conflict is lost. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Second, the membership of the Peace Committees may not be 
appropriately representative to settle disputes legitimately.  When 
discussing meetings between the Isiolo and Samburu East Peace 
Committees to resolve the Samburu raiding issue, the Isiolo District 
Peace Committee Secretary (an ethnic Borana) told PolOff that the 
meetings would always go well: members on both sides would come to 
an agreement, but the agreements would not subsequently be 
implemented because the youth felt no obligation to abide by 
agreements reached by committee members.   Others told us that 
youth, women, and the business community are not adequately 
represented on the Peace Committees. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Finally, there are some who accuse the Isiolo District 
Peace Committee of being too closely linked with the political 
 
NAIROBI 00001259  003 OF 004 
 
 
class.  Only those who support the constituency's current Member of 
Parliament are allowed to be on the committee, we were told.  A 
Turkana businessman told us that he did not know who the Turkana 
representative was on the committee.  It had changed without notice, 
and it was possible there was no Turkana on the committee at all, he 
said.  (Note: During the 2007 elections, the Turkana community 
rallied behind their own Turkana candidate for parliament, and he 
ended up coming in second place.  The Turkana/Borana political 
rivalry appears to be continuing on the peace committee, and the 
Turkana appear to have lost.  End Note.)  Such non-transparent 
procedures benefit politicians, who appoint people loyal to them to 
serve on the committee.  (Note: To be fair, provincial 
administration officials expressed the opposite sentiment: that the 
Peace Committee members were accountable to no one.  The Provincial 
Commissioner told PolOff that some of the elders and community 
leaders on the committees "go too far" and could use some 
supervision, especially when representatives used the meetings to 
exacerbate inter-ethnic tensions.  End Note.) 
 
------------------- 
Livestock Marketing 
------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) What percentage of the livestock that appears in Kenya's 
livestock markets represents stolen property?  Given the mystery 
surrounding the fate of the Samburu cattle seized in a February 
security operation, this is a relevant question.  (Note: Ref A 
discusses the widespread speculation that some of the livestock 
seized by police was ultimately sold, not returned to their rightful 
owners.  End Note.) It is also relevant because so many 
interlocutors complained that the cycles of livestock raiding are 
encouraged and financially backed by politicians and businessmen who 
in turn sell the cattle on the open market.  It is a lucrative 
business: a single beef cow can fetch as much as $500. 
 
¶15. (SBU) U.S.-supported livestock marketing programs empower 
pastoralists to fetch better prices for their stock when they go to 
market.  In order to do this, programs build networks of marketers, 
connect them with buyers, and build infrastructure designed to 
facilitate sales and slaughter.  At a minimum, it should be possible 
to use these networks to get a better idea of the scope of the 
problem.  It may also be possible to encourage networks of marketers 
to establish mechanisms to prevent stolen goods from getting to 
market. 
 
---------- 
What Next? 
---------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) There are no easy answers to any of these problems.  It is 
difficult to separate politics from conservation initiatives, 
conflict resolution initiatives, and development projects.  Indeed, 
the support of the political class is critical to any program's 
success.  However, the first step toward addressing harmful side 
effects is identifying them. 
 
¶17. (SBU) U.S. support in the three areas discussed is meant to 
promote stability, peace, and development.  To achieve this goal, 
targeted strategic outreach to change misunderstandings and negative 
perceptions about the Northern Rangelands Trust is key.  The 
District Peace Committees are clearly a work in progress as a 
substitute for the breakdown of the traditional social fabric that 
used to manage conflict, and we are encouraging fresh thinking on 
this front -- particularly in light of Kenya's current youth bulge 
and proliferation of small arms.  Finally, an analysis of how our 
assistance can be used to enhance awareness of and then counter 
potential criminal activity, such as trafficking in stolen 
livestock, should help defuse an already volatile situation. 
 
¶18. (SBU) The NSC is currently engaged in a review of the District 
Peace Committees across Kenya, and will likely come up with even 
more examples of how the institution could be improved.  Discussions 
are also ongoing about the need to target conflict mitigation 
activities not only to post-election violence areas, but also to 
Kenya's conflict-prone arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs), which 
includes Isiolo and Samburu Districts.  However, USAID's Conflict 
Mitigation and Reconciliation program elements are underfunded. 
Finally, USAID has a potentially valuable tool in its livestock 
marketing programs to help ensure that Kenya's cattle trade does not 
suffer the same fate as Sierra Leone's diamonds or Liberia's timber: 
illegal livestock trading should not be used to fuel conflict. 
 
¶19. (SBU) We are intensifying mission efforts towards a 
 
NAIROBI 00001259  004 OF 004 
 
 
well-targeted program to advance U.S. objectives in this region.  We 
will engage with Washington as necessary to solicit support for a 
conflict-sensitive approach to development in Kenya's fragile 
center. 
RANNEBERGER