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Viewing cable 09NAIROBI1244, SOMALIA - TFG SIGNS COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09NAIROBI1244 2009-06-22 11:57 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXRO5651
OO RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #1244/01 1731157
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 221157Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9926
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA  IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 001244 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PTER MARR PINR SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - TFG SIGNS COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH 
ASWJ; SURVIVES AL-SHABAAB OFFENSIVE.  PRESIDENT DECLARES 
STATE OF EMERGENCY 
 
REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 1442 
     B. NAIROBI 1337 
     C. NAIROBI 1236 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  As predicted (ref a), Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) Prime Minister Sharmarke and Ahlu Sunna Wal 
Jama'a (ASWJ) representatives on June 21 formally concluded 
an agreement to cooperate.  The Prime Minister told us after 
the signing ceremony that military cooperation would begin 
immediately, and that ASWJ forces in Mogadishu would join 
efforts with TFG forces in the fighting there. 
 
2. (SBU) Control of key parts of Mogadishu seesawed wildly in 
fighting over the weekend.  The TFG, after losing control of 
the towns of Galgalato and Keysaney (on the outskirts of 
Karan District) on June 17, then abandoned virtually all of 
Mogadishu's Karan District in fighting on June 19. TFG 
forces, aggressively assisted by AMISOM, rallied to recapture 
lost territory June 20, only to see part of their gains 
eroded in subsequent fighting. The June 19 fiasco prompted 
the TFG Council of Ministers to appeal for urgent foreign 
intervention and to the Somali public to defend the TFG 
against extremists.  In a June 22 press conference, President 
Sharif declared a state of emergency.  End summary. 
 
TFG, ASWJ Agree 
to Cooperate 
--------------- 
 
3. (SBU) On June 21, the Somalia Unit attended the signing of 
a declaration at the Somali Embassy in Nairobi that committed 
the TFG and ASWJ to immediately cooperate on "political, 
security, humanitarian, and development" matters (ref a). 
Present at the ceremony were some of the ASWJ representatives 
who have been in regular contact with Embassy Addis Ababa. 
One of them, Abdulkadir Moallin Noor, signed for ASWJ and 
noted unenthusiastically in his remarks that "any government 
is better than no government at all." (Note:  Prime Minister 
Sharmarke signed for the TFG.) 
 
4. (SBU) In a conversation following the signing, TFG Prime 
Minister Sharmarke told us that ASWJ had agreed to begin 
immediate military cooperation with the TFG.  ASWJ was to 
provide the TFG with a roster of its troops for incorporation 
into the TFG.  Sharmarke noted that ASWJ (or at least the 
faction the TFG was negotiating with) is strongest in 
Galgaduud Region and the towns of Mahaday, Jowhar, and the 
capital of Mogadishu. 
5. (SBU) Sharmarke predicted that ASWJ would "come into the 
government and gradually" increase its influence.  Both sides 
were appointing small teams to negotiate ASWJ's entry into 
the government, in particular what ministries it would 
receive, he said. The PM thought that ASWJ's need for 
consensus would slow that process. (Note: Somalia Unit will 
follow up with ASWJ in the next two days for their take on 
the agreement.) 
 
Wild Swings in 
Mogadishu Fighting 
------------------ 
 
6. (SBU) The signing was good news against the background of 
the assassination of TFG Minister of National Security Omar 
Hashi (ref b) and the near rout of TFG forces in Mogadishu on 
June 19.  Most TFG interlocutors believed that Hashi's June 
18 murder had emboldened al-Shabaab's June 19 rampage into 
the strategic Karan District of Mogadishu.  (Note:  The 
al-Shabaab occupation of Karan, even if temporary, is 
significant for three reasons: it was not taken from the TFG 
while Abdullahi Yusuf was President, it is home to current 
President Sharif's Abgal sub-clan, and it is an elevated area 
from which it is easier to mortar both Villa Somalia and the 
seaport.) 
 
7. (SBU) The June 19 al-Shabaab conquest of Karan had been 
preceded by the taking of the town of Galgalato on June 17, 
followed immediately by incursions into the Karan outskirts 
of Keysaney (ref c).  Sources tell us that a significant 
number of TFG forces were killed in the Galgalato fighting, 
and a few were captured and executed by al-Shabaab. 
 
8. (SBU) In dozens of frantic telephone calls from Mogadishu 
during the June 19 fighting, a clearly unnerved TFG described 
its security forces as fleeing without a fight as al-Shabaab 
troops advanced into Karan District. By early evening, 
 
NAIROBI 00001244  002 OF 002 
 
 
al-Shabaab troops had surged past the Global Hotel, the 
"safe" home for TFG parliamentarians at the Karan - Shibis 
border. A key TFG figure told us that at one point escape 
routes to the seaport and airport from Villa Somalia had been 
completely cut off. One prominent MP, Mohammed Hussein 
"Engineer" Addow, was killed while fighting and, according to 
the Prime Minister and others, beheaded by al-Shabaab forces. 
(Note:  Addow was an Abgal warlord turned MP who had actively 
rallied clan militia in support of the government.) 
 
9. (SBU) When fighting resumed on June 20 the TFG, after 
repelling al-Shabaab attacks in Yaqshiid District and at the 
Sana'a junction, seemed to have the upper hand. It quickly 
pushed al-Shabaab from Shibis District, then won control of 
Karan.  TFG advances seemed to be thanks to the fighting of 
the original, Ethiopian-trained troops and members of Yusuf 
"Indha Adde's" militia. AMISOM at a minimum provided mortar 
cover for some of the TFG's successes and some sources 
suggest AMISOM was perhaps doing even more for the TFG. 
There were rumors of comparatively large al-Shabaab losses at 
June 20 fighting near the Sana'a junction area. 
 
10. (SBU) The TFG's June 20 successes were somewhat undercut 
on June 21, with an al-Shabaab re-incursion into the Mareno 
area, in Karan District (near the old seaport).  We are told 
that AMISOM shelling of the Sana'a junction, following a TFG 
tipoff, resulted in the deaths of a number of al-Shabaab 
combatants.  There were no reports of fighting on the morning 
of June 22. 
 
11. (SBU) The June 19 rout catalyzed an emergency session of 
the TFG's Council of Ministers which produced a resolution 
requesting immediate foreign intervention, asking President 
Sharif to declare a state of emergency, petitioning for 
humanitarian assistance, and appealing to Somalis to defend 
Somalia against "extremists."  TFG Speaker "Madobe" followed 
the resolution with an appeal urging Somalia's neighbors to 
intervene within twenty-four hours.  (Note:  Ethiopia is 
reported in the media to have rejected the appeal.  We 
understand that the governments of Kenya and Djibouti are 
actively considering some form of participation.) 
 
12. (SBU) Hisbul Islam Chairman Hassan Dahir Aweys told the 
media that the TFG's appeals only confirmed that it was a 
creation of foreign governments.  "If (the TFG) can't 
perform," he said, "it should cease to exist." 
 
13. (SBU) In an early afternoon June 22 press conference, 
President Sharif heeded the Council of Minister's appeal and 
declared a state of emergency. He also condemned 
international terrorist groups operating in Somalia. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
14. (SBU) It is difficult to judge from a distance what 
exactly happened during the June 19 - 21 fighting, but the 
near rout of the TFG on June 19 appears to confirm that its 
forces are still handicapped by an absence of training, 
sufficient logistical capabilities, and capable battlefield 
tactics.  AMISOM most likely played a significant role in 
reversing the TFG's near disappearance from Mogadishu, and it 
appears that AMISOM forces were in no danger of being overrun 
by al-Shabaab at any point during the fighting.  The 
weekend's events make it clear that the TFG needs urgently to 
be supplied with military advisors, communications, and a 
program of on site training if it is to have a chance of 
becoming a significant force on the ground in Mogadishu. 
ASWJ troops in Mogadishu in the near term will show the same 
reluctance to cooperate that plagued the February merger of 
TFG and ARS forces following the election of Sheikh Sharif. 
RANNEBERGER