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DE RUEHNR #1171/01 1621431
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FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
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INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 6572
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3213
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3084
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RUZEFAA/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 001171 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/E:SUSAN DRIANO; INR:MOZELLA BROWN; S/CT:ZACHARY 
ROTHSCHILD; S/CRS:NADIA BLACKTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2019 
TAGS: PTER PREL SOCI PGOV KE SO
SUBJECT: A PORTRAIT OF AL-SHABAAB RECRUITMENT IN KENYA 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael Ranneberger, reasons 1.4 b,d 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C//REL TO USA, KEN, GBR//) There are a number of factors 
that make Kenya a fruitful source for recruiting young men to 
join such extremist groups as the Somalia-based al-Shabaab 
militia.  While we have been focused on Nairobi's Eastleigh 
suburb and the North East Province as particular areas of 
concern, new information indicates that al-Shabaab 
recruitment efforts may have also reached Isiolo, located in 
Kenya's geographic center.  An Isiolo businessman claims that 
60 young Kenyan Somali men have disappeared from Isiolo since 
January 2008 to fight in Somalia, and that two he knew 
personally recently died while conducting suicide bomb 
attacks in Mogadishu.  Recruitment in Isiolo, he said, is 
directed from a radical mosque in Eastleigh but carried out 
by members of four radical mosques around Isiolo.  Parents of 
these missing youth are grieving in private but are afraid of 
speaking out, he said.  Even if the Kenyan Government becomes 
actively involved in rooting out the recruitment network, 
there are no easy answers to this problem.  We will continue 
to actively explore ways the United States can be of 
assistance.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Kenya: A Good Source of Recruits 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C//REL TO USA, KEN, GBR//) There are a number of factors 
that make Kenya a fruitful source for recruiting young men to 
join such extremist groups as the Somalia-based al-Shabaab 
militia.  Kenya's close proximity to Somalia, its sizeable 
population of ethnic Somalis, high levels of poverty and 
unemployment, a history of poor governance, and a worrisome 
youth bulge all contribute to the risk factors.  Kenya's 
ethnic Somali population in particular suffer from lower 
levels of development and education than their fellow 
Kenyans.  Idle, unemployed youth are at particular risk.  The 
continuing legacy of the Shifta Wars in the 1960s, certainly 
a contributing factor to Kenyan Somalis' lower level of 
development, also leaves them feeling like outsiders in their 
country of birth.  We have focused our attention for some 
time on Eastleigh, a well-known Somali-majority suburb of 
Nairobi, and the North Eastern Province, which directly 
borders Somalia, as possible recruitment locations.  We also 
have reason to believe that some limited recruitment by 
al-Shabaab has occurred in Dadaab refugee camp (septel). 
 
¶3. (C//REL TO USA, KEN, GBR//) New information indicates, 
however, that al-Shabaab recruitment efforts also have 
reached Isiolo.  Located in Kenya's geographic center, Isiolo 
has a mixed population but was originally settled during the 
colonial period by members of the Isaq and Harti clans from 
Somaliland who fought for the British in the First World War. 
 The area has become a center for cattle rustling and is 
awash in small arms (septel).  As in Muslim majority areas 
(Coast Province and North Eastern Province) and other urban 
areas throughout the country, traditionally moderate, 
pro-establishment Sufi mosques have gradually been overtaken 
by more activist, sometimes extremist, Wahhabi-led 
institutions whose clerics bring much-needed cash into the 
Isiolo area.  These Wahhabist clerics may have direct links 
with radical mosques in Eastleigh, and may be acting as 
recruitment agents for extremist groups in Somalia. 
 
¶4. (C//REL TO USA, KEN, GBR//) As the battle in Somalia 
becomes more clan-based and Somalis increasingly join 
clan-based militias instead of al-Shabaab, some have 
postulated that al-Shabaab is increasingly in need of foreign 
fighters to keep up its numbers.  Frustrated and aimless 
Kenyan Somali youth, therefore, are a prime target.  In 
Isiolo, this recruitment effort is reportedly targeted 
specifically at members of the Somali Isaq and Harti clans. 
 
----------------------------- 
Residents Concerned in Isiolo 
----------------------------- 
 
 
NAIROBI 00001171  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶5. (C//REL TO USA, KEN, GBR//) On June 3, an Isiolo-based 
Kenyan Somali businessman told PolOff that he was extremely 
worried about the Islamic extremists' reach into Isiolo and 
what it means for his family and his home.  Since January 
2008, 60 youth have gone missing from Isiolo, he said, 
presumably to fight in Somalia.  Two suicide bombers who 
recently struck in Mogadishu were from Isiolo, he claimed, 
and the businessman said that he knew the boys personally. 
 
¶6. (C//REL TO USA, KEN, GBR//) The businessman said that the 
first suicide bomber -- a friend of XXXXXXXXXXXX -- was a 
25-year-old man named Tawakhal Ahmed.  Ahmed, he claimed, was 
responsible for the February 22 bombing of the African Union 
compound in Mogadishu (a blast that killed 11 Burundian 
peacekeepers and injured 15 others).  Ahmed was originally 
recruited in 2006 to fight in Somalia against the Ethiopian 
occupying forces after getting involved with a Wahhabi 
mosque.  According to the businessman, Ahmed grew his beard, 
found religion, came into good money, and disappeared into 
Somalia to fight the jihad.  When he came back, Ahmed 
reportedly told the businessman how he had travelled to 
Somalia: the journey started at the Garissa Lodge in 
Eastleigh, then four to five boys at a time would go on a bus 
to Doble and onto Kismayo, where they trained in a camp for 
three weeks.  After that, recruits received mobile phones, 
which is how they subsequently received their orders.  When 
the Islamic Courts Union fell in late 2006, they reassembled 
in Doble and Ahmed returned to Kenya, but not before his 
commanders destroyed his (and others') mobile phones, which 
had sensitive numbers programmed in them.  On Ahmed's return, 
the businessman said that he tried to convince Ahmed that 
Somalia was not his war and that he should stay home.  By 
that time, Ahmed agreed and said that he wanted to get 
married and start a madrassa (Islamic religious school) in 
Isiolo.  However, a few months ago, the men from Isiolo's 
radical mosques returned with some men from Eastleigh to 
re-recruit Ahmed, the businessman said.  The men from 
Eastleigh gave Ahmed USD 6,000, which Ahmed in turn 
distributed among his relatives and friends.  After a 
three-day prayer ritual, Ahmed left once again for Somalia, 
this time to carry out the February 22 suicide bombing. 
 
¶7. (C//REL TO USA, KEN, GBR//) The businessman said that the 
second local man was named Yusuf Mohammed Warsame, who was 25 
or 26 years old and who, like Ahmed, finished secondary 
school in Isiolo.  The businessman said that he did not know 
when Warsame left for Somalia, but claimed that he was 
responsible for the May 24 suicide bombing in Mogadishu. 
(Note: The May 24 blast killed 10 people, including six 
soldiers, but an al-Shabaab spokesman has claimed that the 
bomber was a Somali, not a foreign fighter.  End Note.) 
 
¶8. (C//REL TO USA, KEN, GBR//) The businessman said that four 
Isiolo area mosques have been taken over by radical Islamists 
who are not originally from Isiolo and are being used as 
underground recruiting centers for al-Shabaab.  The mosques 
are: Masjid Hidaya and the County Council Mosque, both in 
Isiolo Town; Masjid Noor in Bula Besa; and Masjid Taqwa in 
Bula Oda.  The businessman said that these mosques act as 
satellites of Eastleigh's Sixth Street Mosque, which directs 
recruitment operations. (Note: Isiolo's most prominent 
mosque, the Grand Mosque, is run by a moderate imam who has 
presided over the mosque for years and has resisted the 
overtures of Wahhabist clerics.  The businessman opined that 
the radicals may be waiting for the imam to pass away before 
they make their move for the Grand Mosque.  End Note.) 
 
¶9. (C//REL TO USA, GBR//) The businessman expressed 
frustration at what he perceived as a lack of concern or 
follow-up by Kenyan officials, with whom he has already 
shared these concerns.  (Note: He claimed that he had spoken 
with Isiolo's District Commissioner, Isiolo's Member of 
Parliament, and representatives of the National Security 
Intelligence Service to no avail, which is why he approached 
the Embassy.  End Note.) He said that he has been following 
up on the stories of missing children himself, as he is 
frequently accosted by family members who tell him that they 
have not seen their sons.  Parents who lose their children 
mourn in private, and are afraid to speak out about what is 
happening.  One mother, he said, actually travelled to 
Kismayo, Somalia to look for her missing 12-year-old son and 
 
NAIROBI 00001171  003 OF 003 
 
 
she found him in a training camp.  The son reportedly told 
her to return to Isiolo and leave him there, or else she 
would be killed by the camp organizers. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Concerns from Other Interlocutors 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C//REL TO USA, KEN, GBR//) While it would be difficult 
for us to confirm that the two men from Isiolo are indeed the 
suicide bombers responsible for attacks in Mogadishu, the 
story of the recruitment process and the disappearance of 
young men is plausible and matches concerns reported by 
Kenyan District Child Protection Officers from Nairobi and 
Garissa to UNICEF's Kenya office. 
 
¶11. (C//REL TO USA, KEN, GBR//) Comment: If true, the reports 
about a possible al-Shabaab recruitment network that reaches 
all the way to Isiolo is disturbing.  There are no easy 
answers to this problem, even if there were Government of 
Kenya involvement.  To date, much of U.S. counter-terror 
support has focused on helping to secure Kenya's borders: we 
are providing assistance to Kenya's army to help them better 
react to major security incidents along the porous 
Kenya-Somali border and we are initiating a program to help 
the Administration Police and Wildlife Service to provide the 
first line of security along the border according to their 
mandate.  In the maritime arena, we provide support to the 
Navy and the Maritime Police Unit to better police Kenya's 
territorial waters.  We also work with the Kenya Civil 
Aviation Authority and the Kenya Airports Authority to 
enhance aviation safety and security throughout the country. 
Recently, however, USAID began a youth employment/youth 
inclusion program in Garissa with 1207 funding specifically 
aimed at reducing the vulnerability to recruitment of young 
Kenyan Somalis.  We hope that it can serve as a model for 
reaching Kenyan Somalis and youth who are at risk in other 
areas of Kenya as well.  We will continue to follow up on the 
recruitment issue and explore other ways the United States 
can be of assistance.  End Comment. 
RANNEBERGER