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RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 2443
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 MUMBAI 000233 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ECON PGOV IN PINR PREL
SUBJECT: SIX MONTHS AFTER THE ATTACKS, NOTHING'S CHANGED IN MUMBAI 
 
REF: 08 MUMBAI 560 AND PREVIOUS 
 
MUMBAI 00000233  001.2 OF 006 
 
 
¶1.   (SBU) Summary:  On November 26, 2008, gunmen attacked 
Mumbai and killed 166 people during three days of violence.  The 
Indian public and press were highly critical of the state and 
central government's response and the effectiveness of security 
forces and emergency services.  After the attacks, India's Home 
Affairs Minister resigned, along with the Chief Minister and 
Home Minister of Maharashtra, and the government promised 
changes to better defend against another such attack.  Six 
months later, however, interlocutors agree that the state 
government has made little progress on implementing the promised 
reforms.  With national and state elections impeding major 
course changes for the state government, this inaction is likely 
to continue for the foreseeable future.  Meanwhile, the people 
of Mumbai do not appear motivated to take political action, as 
Mumbai saw a record low voter turnout in the national elections. 
 There continue to be opportunities for U.S. security and 
technology sales, but unclear procurement practices will hamper 
the involvement of U.S. companies.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
THE MUMBAI ATTACKS 
 
 
 
¶2.   (U) On the evening of November 26, 2008, ten well-trained 
gunmen from Pakistan entered Mumbai on small boats and attacked 
high-profile targets with automatic weapons and explosives.  By 
the time the attack ended 62 hours later, 166 people, along with 
nine terrorists, had been killed and hundreds more injured.  The 
sites that were attacked included two luxury hotels, the Taj 
Mahal Palace and the Oberoi-Trident, the main railway terminal, 
a Jewish cultural center, a cafe frequented by foreigners, a 
movie theater, and two hospitals.  Six American citizens were 
killed and 20 other foreigners died.  Several senior policemen 
were killed, including the chief of the Mumbai Anti-Terrorism 
squad, Hemant Karkare.  One gunman was captured and is currently 
on trial in Mumbai.  When the attacks began, the Mumbai police 
responded quickly, but were widely criticized for not being 
equipped or trained to deal with the situation, and for lacking 
a coherent command structure, both within the force, and with 
other security agencies.  Moreover, the Mumbai police's response 
was hindered by the lack of a SWAT team or the equivalent, a 
notable absence in a city of more than 15 million people, 
forcing the city to rely on commandos based in New Delhi to 
eliminate the attackers. 
 
 
 
¶3.   (U) After the attacks, the press and the general public 
launched vociferous attacks against the state and central 
governments for the lack of readiness, and lamented the poor 
coordination that characterized the response.  Thousands of 
candle-bearing mourners marched near the Taj Hotel to protest 
the attacks and demand improved security.  Around the city, 
billboards and signs mocked the use of commandos for VIP guard 
duties and openly attacked the performance of the police.  Some 
of the criticism was constructive and detailed: for example, a 
citizen's group called Bombay First published a lengthy report 
on how to improve crisis management in Mumbai.  The report's 
recommendations focused on improving the command and control 
systems of the police and emergency response units, upgrading 
police equipment and training, communicating more effectively 
and coherently with the public through the media, and raising 
public awareness about security. 
 
 
 
¶4.   (U) Maharashtra's Chief Minister, Vilasrao Deshmukh, and 
Home Minister, R.R. Patil, resigned in the aftermath of the 
attacks.  In New Delhi, Home Affairs Minister Shivraj Patil 
resigned after taking "moral responsibility" for the situation. 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh apologized to the Indian people 
for being unable to prevent the attacks, and promised to improve 
India's domestic security.  New Home Affairs Minister P. 
Chidambaram announced reforms including a new national 
investigative agency, a new Coastal Command, 20 new 
counterterrorism schools, and new regional NSG commando bases. 
Maharashtra's new Chief Minister, Ashok Chavan, declared that 
security was the government's "top priority." 
 
 
MUMBAI 00000233  002.2 OF 006 
 
 
 
 
CONDITION OF POLICE AND REFORM PLANS 
 
 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Last week marked the six month anniversary of the 
Mumbai attacks, and local media and observers used the occasion 
to evaluate whether the state and central governments have 
implemented their promises to upgrade the safety and security 
infrastructure of Mumbai.  The media highlighted serious 
problems with the Indian police, which coincides with the larger 
problem of weak governance and corruption at all levels of 
government.  Overall, India is heavily under-policed, with a 
police to population ration of 1:694.  This is well below the UN 
recommended ratio of 1:400.  (Note:  For comparison, Mexico's 
ratio is 1:492 and Saudi Arabia's is 1:387. End Note.)  Looking 
specifically at Maharashtra, a credible media source reported 
that spending on police modernization in the state drastically 
decreased, from $42 million in 2001 to $19 million in 2008.  The 
state government has not yet appointed a head for the Mumbai 
Anti-Terror Squad to replace its fallen chief.  Over the last 
year, the state High Court invalidated the appointment of the 
head of the state police, forcing the state to appoint a new 
head who, due to retirement rules, will have only a six month 
term.  Moreover, during this time, a strict pre-election code of 
conduct - which limits any major policy changes or procurements 
-- was in place in the two months before the April-May national 
elections.  There will be similar restrictions in the two months 
before the Maharashtra state elections scheduled for September 
¶2009. 
 
 
 
¶6.   (SBU) Despite these reports, Prem Krishan Jain, Principal 
Home Secretary for Maharashtra State, presented an optimistic 
view of the police force.  He said Maharashtra added 33,000 
police officers in the last three years.  Jain described 
ambitious plans to arm more policemen, many of whom carry only 
lathis (cudgels).  Currently, 33 percent of police have 
firearms; the state plans large purchases so that 60 percent of 
police will have at least a revolver by 2011, he said.  (Note: 
Congenoffs confirmed that the Maharashtra police placed an order 
for 1,000 Smith and Wesson 9mm pistols in April 2009.  End 
Note.)   However, Jain said police armed with revolvers would 
not have been able to stop terrorists with assault rifles and 
grenades.  (Comment:  While this argument has some merit, it 
should be noted that the one terrorist captured alive was taken 
after his companion was killed at a checkpoint by police armed 
with revolvers.  This illustrates that even revolvers can help 
police incapacitate or kill well-armed attackers, if luck is on 
their side.  End comment.)  Jain acknowledged the media reports 
about procurement, but said that states were given wide latitude 
to make specific purchases and there were no major obstacles. 
According to Jain, the greatest needs are for better 
bomb-detection and disposal equipment, as well as bullet-proof 
vests capable of stopping AK-47 rounds. 
 
 
 
¶7.   (SBU) By contrast, non-governmental sources painted a much 
more negative view of the police force, describing serious 
shortcomings in equipment, training, and command structure. 
Sources said plans for better weapons, equipment, and training 
remain mostly on paper.  Chitkala Zutshi, the former Home 
Secretary who was trapped in the Taj Hotel during the first of 
the attacks, said a Quick Response Team was formed after 9/11, 
but was not functional at the time of the attacks, and played no 
role in relieving the hotels.  V. Balachandran, a retired senior 
policeman and intelligence official who is heading an official 
inquiry into the attacks for the state government, also noted 
that the Quick Response Team had been neglected and was not in a 
position to respond to the attacks; for instance, the unit 
hadn't had any target practice since August 2007 due to lack of 
ammunition, he claimed.  This highlights the need for proper 
training and follow-through to maintain operational 
effectiveness, not just setting up commando units on paper, he 
argued.  Zutshi and Balachandran shared concern over purchasing 
problems, noting that buying weapons and equipment was very 
cumbersome because of an October to March purchasing cycle. 
Balachandran pointed out that if the state Home department fails 
to spend the money by March, the funds revert back to the 
 
MUMBAI 00000233  003.2 OF 006 
 
 
central government.  His report will recommend a two-year buying 
cycle and giving state police forces the ability to make their 
own purchases without permission from the center.  Zutshi said 
the timely purchase of equipment was also hindered by corruption 
in the bureaucracy. 
 
 
 
¶8.   (SBU) Mr. Vikram Mahurkar, CEO of the security company 
Checkmate, which has provided private guard services in 
Maharashtra for 20 years, said the Mumbai police have gotten 
much worse during that time.  The police are demoralized, with 
extremely low pay, lack of equipment and training, bad housing, 
and poor working conditions.  In the last 20 years, they have 
been given more duties with fewer resources.  He was on site at 
the Taj Hotel on the night of the attacks and noted that there 
was no clear command structure.  In a separate conservation, 
Satish Sahney, the former Mumbai Police Commissioner, agreed 
that the command structure was completely ineffective due to 
political interference in the police force.  Sahney said not 
much has changed since attacks, although there are some plans 
for better training and equipment.  He said the Indian police 
need a complete overhaul, starting with recruitment. 
Balachandran said that his report will emphasize the need for 
better command and control during crises.  (Note:  For example, 
the Taj Hotel Security Director told Conoff that the police in a 
station near the first attack at Leopold's Cafe were unable to 
access their weapons for several hours because the officer with 
the key to unlock the storage cabinets was visiting relatives 
outside the city.  End Note.) 
 
 
 
¶9.   (SBU) Raghu Raman, CEO of the Mahindra Special Services 
Group, said the central government gave the Maharashtra police 
$75 million after the attacks, but it wasn't clear what happened 
to the money.  The police made some improvements to their 
reactive capabilities by buying new vehicles, but did nothing to 
increase their preventative capabilities, such as improving 
intelligence.  Raman, a former army officer with experience 
fighting terrorists in Kashmir, said the police were "not so 
much outgunned as out-trained" by the terrorists.  He said the 
Mumbai police used to be among the best in India, but have 
deteriorated.  The police are highly politicized and operate in 
an atmosphere of corruption and organized crime, made worse by 
smuggling since Mumbai is a port city.  He noted the connection 
between corruption and the opportunities for terrorists to 
operate.  Former Commissioner Sahney highlighted the same issue: 
 he claimed that organized crime is linked to terrorists in 
Mumbai. 
 
 
 
FORCE ONE / NSG COMMANDOS 
 
 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Local army units and Marine commandos were on the 
scene of the attacks within five hours, but were pulled out 
without being used.  Units of the central government's National 
Security Guard (NSG) commandos took more than ten hours to reach 
the scene from New Delhi because of difficulties in procuring an 
airplane, despite the fact that a plane was supposed to be on 
standby at all times.  Recognizing the need for some kind of 
rapid reaction force, the Maharashtra government announced plans 
to establish a new state-level commando unit, called Force One. 
Force One has begun training in nearby Pune with the goal of 
being stationed in Mumbai for rapid reaction to crises, but is 
not yet ready for action.  In May, the Indian Express reported 
that 100 out of 350 recruits, who are taken from the regular 
police force, had washed out due to the strenuous training. 
This might indicate that Force One will be well-trained and 
effective, but it does not bode well for the unit being ready in 
the near future. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (SBU) According to Balachandran, his report will state that 
NSG commandos took far too long to arrive at the site of the 
attacks; as a consequence, the report recommends that such units 
should be in every major city.  Jain said Force One commandos 
will start the next phase of training in Pune in June, but the 
 
MUMBAI 00000233  004.2 OF 006 
 
 
location of the Mumbai base has not yet been determined. 
Recruitment of physically fit men for the unit has not been a 
problem, per Jain.  The Maharashtrian government has also not 
agreed on a local base for the NSG commandos.  Balachandran said 
young police officers should be taken into commando units, 
rather than regular police who were more interested in "earning" 
extra money (bribes) from normal police work in the city. 
Elements of Force One should be placed at two or three different 
locations throughout Mumbai, he recommended, because it can take 
several hours to reach different parts of the city from any 
single location.  Zutshi, however, said there would only be one 
base for Force One. 
 
 
 
INTELLIGENCE 
 
 
 
¶12.  (SBU) On the issue of intelligence, Home Secretary Jain 
said the newly-established National Investigation Agency (NIA) 
will improve sharing of intelligence among state police forces. 
He noted that there had been resistance in the past to a central 
agency because policing is a state responsibility, but now that 
it has been established it is moving forward.  Rakesh Maria, 
Joint Police Commissioner for Crime in Mumbai and the lead 
investigator for the attacks, told Congenoffs that there has 
been better intelligence sharing between the states and between 
individual states and the center since 26/11.  Balachandran's 
report will find that police had no specific advanced 
intelligence information about the attacks, although they did 
have some general intelligence in August and September 2009 
about an impending attack, which they expected to be a bombing 
(fitting with the recent string of bombings across India).  The 
report will recommend better sharing of intelligence at all 
levels of police and security forces, including the use of 
open-source intelligence to trace patterns of terrorist activity. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Former Commissioner Sahney characterized the 
establishment of the NIA as a mistake, since India already has a 
Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).  The government should 
have strengthened the CBI's intelligence capabilities rather 
than starting a new agency, because it will take five years to 
set up the new agency and make it effective.  Sahney said 
intelligence was the key to fighting terrorism, with a 
particular need to know if there is local support.  The police 
force in Maharashtra is only 3-4 percent Muslim, which hampers 
the police's ability to develop intelligence information about 
possible cooperation with terrorists within the local Muslim 
community.  The police are not the agency best placed to deal 
with terrorism because their training and focus doesn't give 
them "the right reflexes."  There should be a specially-designed 
agency of non-uniformed anti-terror specialists, whose only job 
is to cultivate intelligence contacts, he argued.  While 
intelligence bureaus share information, actions suffer due to 
poor follow-up.  The Mumbai police must react to daily 
developments, such as strikes, unrest, or festivals, and aren't 
prepared for more focused policing. 
 
 
 
COASTAL PATROL 
 
 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Since the attacks, the central government has 
confirmed that the navy will be responsible for coastal 
protection, Jain said, with assistance from the police and coast 
guard.  Balachandran's report will find that coastal patrol was 
ineffective before the attacks due to confused and overlapping 
responsibilities, allowing the terrorists to enter from the sea 
undetected.  Sahney said the coast guard and navy have not 
explained the failures that allowed the terrorists to enter, or 
whether these agencies had seen the intelligence about a 
potential landing from the sea.  Several interlocutors claimed 
that smugglers commonly bribe the coast guard to be able to land 
in Mumbai and the surrounding coast; Raman said that local 
fisherman commonly encounter smuggling boats with gunmen in the 
seas off Mumbai, and would not have raised an alarm to 
authorities.  Authorities curbed pleasure boating off the coast 
 
MUMBAI 00000233  005.2 OF 006 
 
 
for a time, but with little impact. (Comment:  A Times of India 
article on May 26, 2009, said the state had so far failed to 
acquire speedboats to patrol the coast, and that local police 
patrols were still taking place in fishing trawlers). 
 
 
 
IS CHANGE AND REFORM POSSIBLE? 
 
 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Local sources agreed that the Maharashtra government 
was not strongly committed to pushing through effective reform 
of the police and emergency response forces.  Regarding his 
forthcoming report, Balachandran said he hopes the state 
government will follow the recommendations, but the perennial 
problem in India is that "people forget about the past too 
quickly."  According to Mahurkar, there is a widespread feeling 
that it will take Maharashtra a long time to change.  His 
company anticipates problems whenever they have to work with the 
Maharashtra government, particularly over the issue of licenses 
for armed guards.  States like Gujarat, Delhi, and Punjab are 
much easier to deal with, he said. 
 
 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Mahindra's Raman believed it would take another 
attack for real change to occur.  He said the Maharashtra 
government was focused on the just-concluded national elections, 
leading to little progress on security issues.  Now that the 
elections are over with the Congress Party returned to power, 
there will be at least continuity in government at the center. 
However, Maharashtra suffers from weak leadership and Mumbai is 
neglected because it is possible to win power in the state while 
ignoring Mumbai and the industrial belt due to the electoral 
weight of rural voters.  Mumbai is simply a cash cow for the 
state and for India, he said.  Sahney said there was a feeling 
that little had changed at the ground level.  The police force 
needs continuity to gain expertise and experience.  However, 
police leaders are selected purely by seniority, and short-term 
chiefs often serve for just a few months because it's "their 
turn" before retirement.  The central government has been 
preoccupied with the Indo-American civilian nuclear agreement, 
and has neglected security issues such as the Naxalite 
insurgency.  He hoped the central government would take a 
stronger line on security now that the Left parties are 
marginalized after the elections. 
 
 
 
PUBLIC PRESSURE FOR CHANGE? 
 
 
 
¶17.  (SBU) According to Raman, the average Mumbaikar's life is 
so full of difficulties that three days of terrorist attacks 
were not markedly worse than the other 362 days of the year.  He 
pointed out that despite all the outrage after the attacks, 
there was a record low turnout in Mumbai for the just-concluded 
national elections.  (Note:  Turnout in Mumbai was 41% in 2009, 
compared to 47% in 2004; the national turnout rate in 2009 was 
57%.  Some point to the holiday weekend timing of the Mumbai 
polls as a second reason for low turnout.  End Note.)  Raman 
said the local and international business community has to 
demand better security for all of India before real change will 
happen.  S.N. Desai, National Coordinator of the 
right-of-the-center Forum for Integrated National Security, said 
his group is hoping to raise awareness among the general public 
about security.  They have reached out to college and university 
students, and are advocating that the National Cadet Corps 
(similar to ROTC but not necessarily leading to military 
commissions) be re-established at every college and university. 
 
 
 
REAL CHANGE ELUSIVE 
 
 
 
¶18.  (SBU) Comment:  By all accounts, the security situation has 
not improved in the six months since the Mumbai attacks.  Plans 
exist on paper, but an unfocused bureaucracy and the lack of 
 
MUMBAI 00000233  006.2 OF 006 
 
 
political will to push through reforms have stymied progress. 
With a "caretaker" state Chief Minister, and successive rounds 
of national and state elections, interlocutors don't expect any 
improvements until at least next year.  The public outrage 
against the government's failings has faded, as evidenced by the 
low voter turnout in Mumbai, and, so far, the absence of the 
attacks as an election issue.  One thing is for certain:  the 
state and central governments have a lot of history and inertia 
to overcome if they are to make any real progress in protecting 
Mumbai against future attacks.  End Comment. 
KAUFFMAN