VZCZCXRO6344
PP RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1646/01 1740428
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230428Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3927
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001646 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR RS SOCI
SUBJECT: SAMARA - A CITY OF TWO TALES 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary. The economic crisis has heightened the 
divide between the Samara oblast administration's relentless 
assertions of stability and the "non-official" story of 
growing discontent among the more politically active part of 
society and within elite circles. Samara officials assured us 
that the administration has implemented a comprehensive 
anti-crisis program and has strengthened the "vertical of 
power" within the region. United Russia remains smugly 
confident in its near monopoly of power and dismissive of 
other political parties. Meetings outside of official circles 
painted a different picture, suggesting that there is more 
going on behind the scenes that the administration controlled 
press simply does not report. Samara mayor Tarkhov continues 
to spar with the regional governor and has become a rallying 
point for opposition figures, although he remains 
considerably weaker institutionally and financially in 
comparison. Inter-elite politics continues, albeit quietly, 
as local financial-industrial groups seek to regain their 
lost influence. End summary. 
 
The Official Line 
----------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The official orthodoxy in Samara oblast is one of a 
stable order, imposed by Governor Vladimir Artyakov and his 
Moscow-based team of administrators. When he came to power in 
2007, regional contacts predicted that he would create a 
"Putinesque" structure of his own to govern the region. Two 
years later, he appears to have established firm control over 
the regional media, hobbled the formerly powerful local 
"oligarchs," and marginalized any potential opponents. He has 
pushed the only contender, Samara Mayor Viktor Tarkhov, 
elected as a "Just Russia" candidate in a protest vote in 
March 2007, to the periphery of the political sphere. 
(Artyakov's office refused to schedule any meetings for the 
Ambassador with Tarkhov, saying all issues could be addressed 
at the gubernatorial level.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) Samara's officialdom sings from the same songbook, 
with a soon familiar refrain about the region's stability and 
capable leadership. Ivan Skrylnik, the Governor's press 
adviser, and Peter Korolev, the head of the administration's 
external affairs office, characterized Samara oblast as 
"stable" as the region's economy adjusts after several months 
of falling industrial production.  They blamed the economic 
crisis on the U.S. and admitted that the region had suffered 
from a sharp downturn, particularly at the giant Russian 
carmaker Avtovaz, the region's largest taxpayer. Reading from 
Prime Minister Putin's script, the two underscored that the 
administration would not cut funding for social programs 
despite lower budget revenues, even if it meant cutting 
ambitious infrastructure projects. Ultimately, the region is 
"better off than other regions" and is not beset by 
inter-elite conflict or the failures of ineffective 
gubernatorial leadership. When asked about relations with the 
center, Korolev asserted that the regions are simply part of 
the federal system, with the governor responsible for 
regional economic development. As such, both Moscow and 
Samara are pursuing the same goals -- how could there be any 
issue in their relationship? 
 
¶4. (SBU) Igor Dvurechenskiy of the regional administration's 
Department for Questions of Social Security claimed that 
Samara oblast was ahead of the curve as far as the battle 
with corruption goes, having implemented its own legislation 
even before President Medvedev announced his program. 
Although he took several occasions to underscore that 
corruption in Russia is no different than that in other 
countries, he admitted that corruption issues are slowing the 
region's economic development. Under Governor Artyakov's 
leadership, the administration has implemented a three-step 
program to train bureaucrats, to establish an anti-corruption 
internet portal, and to provide free legal assistance to 
citizens on corruption issues. When asked about Medvedev's 
characterization of Russian society as marked by legal 
nihilism, Dvurchenskiy only reiterated his mantra about 
corruption as a universal element of the human condition. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Artyakov's chief cheerleaders can be found at the 
headquarters of the local United Russia, where the head of 
the party's regional executive committee, Aleksandr Fetisov, 
described his party's political position as unassailable and 
dismissed all other political parties as weak and rudderless. 
He stated that "our brand" attracts Russians, who are drawn 
to strong leaders who can defend their interests. In that 
context he drew our attention to Artyakov's management of a 
"Pikalevo-like" situation that took place late last year, in 
which the regional administration headed off a social crisis 
caused by a shuttered cement plant. (He was referring to the 
situation in Zhigulevsk last December, where Evrotsement had 
planned to close its factory and furlough the workforce, but 
 
MOSCOW 00001646  002 OF 003 
 
 
was compelled to keep the plant open through beneficial 
government contracts.)  Fetisov's comments intimated that 
only by having a strong governor, well tied to the Kremlin, 
could such issues be resolved. 
 
A Second Opinion 
---------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Sociological polling supports the administration's 
assertions about social stability and general support for the 
government's policies. Sociologist Vladimir Zvonovskiy told 
us that society had adapted to the economic crisis by March 
and noted that there was little sign of active political 
opposition within the region. Zvonovskiy argued that most 
people acknowledged that "things were bad," but thought that 
others were far worse off. He noted that more people stated 
that they were ready to take part in demonstrations, but that 
their actions suggested a far more passive attitude of the 
broad mass of society. How long that would last, however, 
Zvonovskiy would not say. He noted that in March, polling 
showed that people generally had enough reserves to last 
10-15 months and that the general view was that the economic 
crisis was a "temporary" problem, that would be resolved in a 
couple of years. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Other contacts agreed that widespread social unrest 
remained unlikely at present, but saw the situation more as a 
simmering stew of increasing disappointment. The editor of 
Ekho Moskvy's regional office, Lyudmila Shidlovskaya, 
described the whole region as a "Pikalevo" waiting to happen, 
with the middle class particularly disillusioned by the 
economic crisis. She complained that the government's primary 
focus was to avoid unemployment, giving generous unemployment 
benefits (more than the minimum wage) rather than working to 
build an environment for more diverse economic growth. 
Independent political analyst Dmitriy Loboyko, founder and 
chief editor of the PolitSamara.ru website drew our attention 
to increasing social anger against builders who use corrupt 
connections to take over parks or other community areas for 
construction, symbolized by a small demonstration outside the 
city Duma. He used that as evidence of a changing attitude 
among urban residents, tired of ineffective government. 
 
A Stifling Environment 
---------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Loboyko and Shidlovskaya argued that little is known 
about the quiet shift in attitudes because of the regional 
administration's near total control of the media space. 
Whereas Mayor Tarkhov has a small paper (headed by former 
Novaya Gazeta editor and prominent oppositionist Sergey 
Kurt-Adzhiev) and a cable TV channel to air his views, the 
administration has created a large media holding to promote 
its views. Local financial-industrial groups have either 
closed their papers --Volgaburmash sold off Samara Sovetnik 
earlier this year and the new owners promptly stopped 
production -- or have trimmed their editorial sails to follow 
the prevailing administration winds. Zvonovskiy attributed 
Artyakov's strong showing in the region to his overwhelming 
presence in the local media. In a survey of the news media, 
an independent assessment found more than 8,000 references to 
the governor of which 4 were deemed to be "negative."  In 
contrast, he said Samara Mayor Tarkhov has had a very 
difficult time getting his f 
ace on TV, much less airing his views and thus is deemed by 
many to be doing nothing. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Two separate groups of citizen-activists sought 
contact with Embassy to complain about their inability to 
gain access to the media. Viktor Prozorov of the association, 
Officers of Russia, described his organization's work in 
providing housing and other benefits to military veterans and 
retired officers. He said that the government used merely to 
ignore his organization (providing no support for its goals) 
but now has begun to consider it an "opposition" force and is 
putting pressure on the members. Galina Yurtaeva of the 
Samara-based political party, Volya, asked Embassy officers 
to help draw attention to her organization, which she claimed 
could get no access to the media except by spending a large 
sum to get an article in the regional dispatch of Moskovskiy 
Komsomolets. Volya was founded by "alternative medicine" guru 
Svetlana Peynova and remains predominantly a party of women, 
committed to seeing the government follow the strictures of 
the constitution. (The party, which Yurtaeva claimed had 
60,000 members, was denied registration in Moscow and remains 
only a "social" organization. Shidlovskaya said that Volya 
had organized protests in Samara that drew more followers 
than that of the Communist party.) 
 
¶10. (SBU) Loboyko claimed that the administration had 
targeted him with a campaign of harassment, alleging that one 
 
MOSCOW 00001646  003 OF 003 
 
 
of the city prosecutors and a militia colonel had personally 
pressured him to stop his "muckraking" articles on the 
PolitSamara web site. He told Embassy that officials had 
raised issues about his refusal to do military service and 
started a process to refute his medical dispensation from the 
draft. Loboyko stated that the local MVD had followed him and 
pulled him over without cause to harass him. (It is difficult 
to corroborate Loboyko's allegations; the Assistant Regional 
Ombudsman for Human Rights, Aleksandr Ilyin, said that 
Loboyko had a reputation as a skilled political technologist 
and was seeking to draw attention to himself through the 
allegations of pressure.) 
 
Elite Politics Continues Underground 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶11. (SBU) There was general agreement among the independent 
observers that Artyakov's heavy-handed management has brewed 
discontent within the local elite and even among the Moscow 
players. Zvonovskiy predicted a more assertive PR effort on 
the part of Tarkhov, with support from unspecified central 
financial-industrial groups. (Shidlovskaya provided a little 
more granularity, saying that Alfa Bank and "Just Russia" 
Head Sergey Mironov were among Tarkov's supporters.) 
 
¶12. (SBU) Loboyko alleged that plans to replace Artyakov are 
beginning to emerge in Moscow (not an imminent change) and 
that is starting to embolden local elites who have been the 
"losers" in the Governor's consolidation of power. Loboyko 
gave Andrey Shokin of the Russia Business Property consortium 
as an example of this new trend in regional politics. Shokin 
had done well under former Governor Titov and had controlled 
the Samara river port (and all goods that passed through it) 
as well as the region's sand market. Artyakov forced Shokin 
to give up his stake in the port, turning it over to a 
government-controlled corporation. Loboyko claimed that 
Shokin has stepped up his support for political parties, 
giving money to the Agrarian party (now a component of United 
Russia) and backing one faction within the local Communist 
Party that is struggling for control with a second faction 
linked to Artyakov's administration. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) A three-day trip to the region cannot provide 
sufficient perspective for us to reconcile the contractions 
between the two tales told by our "official" and "unofficial" 
contacts. Indeed, the truth probably lies somewhere in 
between -- as the economic crisis puts increasing pressure on 
society and the political elite, tensions are likely to 
increase between the appointed governor, whose loyalties 
remain with the Moscow elite that appointed him, and the 
local elites who are looking for a champion to represent 
their interests. We will continue to monitor development in 
Samara closely, with a visit by the Ambassador next week 
providing a second look at this "bellwether" region in the 
midst of a challenging time. 
BEYRLE