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Viewing cable 09MOSCOW1599, RUSSIAN RESPONSE TO U.S. NONPAPER ON AN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1599 2009-06-18 08:42 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO1960
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDBU RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHIK RUEHJO RUEHLN RUEHMA RUEHMR
RUEHPA RUEHPOD RUEHRN RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHTRO RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1599/01 1690842
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 180842Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3863
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001599 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EWWT MARR PGOV PHSA PHUM PREL RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN RESPONSE TO U.S. NONPAPER ON AN 
INTERNATIONAL PIRACY COURT 
 
REF: STATE 58579 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  On June 16, MFA Legal Department Section 
Chief Titushkin provided a response to reftel nonpaper laying 
out U.S. opposition to an international piracy court.  He 
explained that the GOR considered an international tribunal 
an appropriate forum to prosecute suspected pirates, 
especially high level pirate leaders and financiers.  A 
tribunal could be established quickly through a UNSC 
resolution that included a "trigger" for a temporary hiatus 
if the number of piracy prosecutions declined.  A tribunal's 
jurisdiction should be limited to the region off the Somali 
coast, and should not preclude a state from trying piracy 
suspects in its own courts.  As the GOR was skeptical that 
courts in the region could handle many piracy prosecutions, 
it was delaying an agreement to turn piracy suspects captured 
by Russian ships over to regional governments.  Titushkin 
stressed that Russia would consider every legal option to 
fight piracy, and expressed appreciation for the level of 
detail on the U.S. position provided by the nonpaper.  End 
Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) On June 16, MFA Legal Department Section Chief 
Vasily Titushkin provided the following responses to specific 
points raised in the U.S. nonpaper: 
 
-- Propriety of an international tribunal:  Titushkin 
questioned the U.S. argument that an international tribunal 
was inappropriate for piracy.  He conceded that the 
application of an international tribunal in the case of 
piracy in no way compared to the use of such a forum to try 
those accused of genocide, but argued that an international 
tribunal had certain advantages over national courts that 
could face difficulty prosecuting high level leaders and 
financiers of pirates.  Titushkin posited that prosecuting 
piracy should be divided into two categories:  the 
prosecution of persons captured while engaging in individual 
acts of piracy, and the investigation and prosecution of 
pirate leaders, which was necessary to eliminate the crime of 
piracy.  The GOR believed that while national courts could 
handle the former, only an international tribunal could 
tackle the latter. 
 
-- Establishing a tribunal:  The GOR thought it possible to 
rapidly establish a tribunal through a UNSC resolution 
adopted under Chapter 7.  Titushkin argued that previous 
resolutions regarding piracy had been adopted quickly under 
Chapter 7, and could be done so again. 
 
-- Cost:  Titushkin offered that the international community 
could "work harder" to raise funds for an international 
tribunal from the shipping industry, insurers, and businesses 
impacted by piracy.  A method to collect funds from UN member 
states could also be used if the tribunal was established 
through the UNSC.  Furthermore, a tribunal could be made cost 
effective if regional capabilities, such as judges and 
existing court facilities, were adapted for the tribunal's 
use. 
 
-- National prosecutions vs. international tribunal:  The GOR 
was skeptical that national courts in the region affected by 
Somali piracy could handle a large number of piracy 
prosecutions.  Russia recognized Kenya, Tanzania, and Eritrea 
as the three states with adequate legislation to prosecute 
piracy suspects; the Kenyan courts had the greatest capacity, 
but had already reached their limit to try additional piracy 
cases.  Titushkin explained that the GOR was discussing with 
Kenya, Tanzania, and Eritrea a formal agreement to turn over 
to these countries suspected pirates captured by Russian 
ships, but doubted that they could effectively prosecute 
large numbers of suspects.  He added that these states' 
demonstrated lack of capacity meant that a national or 
regional piracy tribunal would require extensive 
international assistance. 
 
-- Switching off a tribunal:  The GOR thought that a UNSC 
resolution, or other agreement, establishing an international 
tribunal could include language establishing a "trigger" to 
switch off the tribunal when necessary, such as a numerical 
drop in the number of piracy cases.  This could mean a 
temporary hiatus for the tribunal, or, if piracy in the 
region was in serious decline, could become permanent. 
 
-- Jurisdiction:  An international piracy tribunal's 
jurisdiction should be limited to the region off the Somali 
coast, which was where the piracy crisis necessitated such a 
course of action.  Furthermore, China and Southeast Asian 
countries would be reluctant to have their piracy cases 
 
MOSCOW 00001599  002 OF 002 
 
 
turned over to a tribunal.  Titushkin added that the GOR 
thought that an international tribunal should not limit a 
state's ability to prosecute suspected pirates in its own 
courts.  Rather, a state would have the option to turn to the 
international tribunal if it so wished. 
 
-- Defendants would mount legal challenges to a tribunal: 
Titushkin pointed out that this would not be unique to an 
international tribunal, and reminded us of the case of a 
suspected pirate challenging the German government's decision 
to transfer him to Kenya for prosecution, arguing that Kenya 
would violate his human rights. 
 
3. (SBU) Titushkin stressed that the GOR was open to "every 
effective option" to fight piracy, would consider "any form" 
of regional or international tribunal, and did not require 
the creation of the "monster" tribunal established for the 
former Yugoslavia .  He expressed appreciation for the amount 
of detail included in the U.S. nonpaper, which demonstrated 
the U.S. commitment to addressing the piracy challenge. 
BEYRLE