VZCZCXRO0576
RR RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #1469/01 1551340
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 041340Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3636
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001469 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PINR MCAP MARR RS
 
SUBJECT: CSTO RAPID REACTION FORCE BECOMING A REALITY 
 
REF: Moscow 281 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Leaders of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) will gather in Moscow on June 14 to create a 
Moscow-based CSTO rapid reaction force (KSOR).  MFA officials and 
experts agree that Russia's principal motivation for creating KSOR 
is to counter a possible northern influx of terrorists across 
Russia's porous southern border should the U.S. be defeated in or 
prematurely withdraw from Afghanistan.  They contend CSTO partners 
support creating KSOR with the understanding that Russia will not 
only be responsible for the majority of materiel and expenditures, 
but also provide the diplomatic support should international 
opposition to KSOR arise.  While KSOR represents an assertion of 
Russia's influence in Central Asia, Russian MFA officials are quick 
to clarify that KSOR poses no threat to NATO or U.S. interests.  In 
practice, significant political-military hurdles constrain the 
force's consolidation.  End Summary. 
----------------------------------- 
The CSTO Rapid Reaction Force (KSOR) 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) Leaders of CSTO member states will meet in Moscow on June 
14 to officially create a CSTO collective rapid reaction force 
(KSOR) (reftel).  The agreements to be signed will include the 
creation of KSOR, the creation of a Moscow-based multi-national 
force command (details of its structure and decision-making process 
are still being discussed), and details on where KSOR troops will 
come from, how they will be deployed, and what weapons they will 
use. 
 
¶3. (SBU) CSTO SYG Nikolay Bordyuzha stated that KSOR will include 
10,000-20,000 elite, rapidly-deployable soldiers.  The core of KSOR 
will be based on the already existing CSTO Collective Rapid 
Deployment Forces (KSBR).  Unlike this ad-hoc arrangement, the 
larger KSOR will be a standing force with a permanent command 
structure.  To be able to act effectively on an inter-operable 
basis, it is expected that the military units put forth by CSTO 
member countries for KSOR have compatible armaments, technology and 
means of communication. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Russia is shouldering the bulk of military materiel and 
political capital needed for creating KSOR.  KSOR will be largely 
composed of Russian troops:  Russia intends to contribute an 
airborne division and a land assault brigade (approx. 8,000 
soldiers).  Kazakhstan plans to contribute a land assault brigade 
(approx. 4,000 soldiers), while the remaining CSTO states plan to 
limit their contributions to the battalion-level.  Local press argue 
that CSTO partners support Russia's creation of KSOR with the 
understanding that Russia will both be responsible for the military 
materiel and expenditures for KSOR and provide the diplomatic 
support should international opposition to KSOR arise. 
 
¶5. (SBU) A permanent KSOR command structure will be based in Moscow. 
 The day-to-day decisions of KSOR's development and coordination 
will fall to CSTO's joint staff.  Deploying KSOR troops will require 
a consensus-based decision among the leaders of CSTO Members, and 
will require a resolution from the CSTO's Collective Security 
Council (SKB).  Russian experts speculate, however, that KSOR's 
consensus-based decision-making process may render KSOR ineffective 
in the face of crises.  The Commander of a KSOR operation will be 
chosen on a case by case basis, and will most likely come from the 
country in which the operation is carried out, as it is expected 
that the Commander will be more familiar with the country and crisis 
context.  Some states had to pass laws to allow the armed troops of 
other CSTO member states onto their soil. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Preparing for U.S. Failure in Afghanistan 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) MFA officials argue that Russia's principal motivation for 
creating KSOR is countering terrorism and extremism in Central Asia. 
 They said Russia needs to be prepared to stop a potential northern 
influx of terrorists and extremists from Afghanistan in case the 
U.S. withdraws prematurely.  Experts added that the GOR fears that 
U.S. failure in Afghanistan could spread instability to Central 
Asia's corrupt, authoritarian regimes.  This could cause an influx 
of refugees and terrorists across Russia's porous southern border. 
 
---------------------------- 
KSOR: A Russian-Led Endeavor 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) According to some local press, Moscow's objective with KSOR 
is the creation of a Russia-centric military force comparable to 
 
MOSCOW 00001469  002 OF 002 
 
 
NATO.  Russia envisions KSOR being able to cover all regions of 
strategic interest to Russia by building off existing contingents, 
where possible: a pentagonal group including Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan covering Central Asia; an 
existing Russian-Belarusian joint military contingent within the 
CSTO framework that covers Europe; and an existing Russian-Armenian 
joint contingent within the CSTO framework that covers the 
Trans-Caucasus. 
 
-------------------------- 
With Central Asian Caveats 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) While official Russian announcements imply that momentum is 
building behind KSOR, the lack of Central Asian enthusiasm for the 
project is evident.  Uzbekistan reiterated on June 4 that it will 
participate in KSOR operations on an ad hoc basis and further 
stipulated that Uzbekistan does not accept the KSOR provision 
requiring that all special services, including emergency services, 
be part of KSOR. 
 
 
 
------- 
Comment 
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¶9. (SBU) CSTO consultations on the creation of KSOR began long ago; 
though penning its creation will give it political impetus, in 
practice, KSOR is a long-term project that could still prove 
still-born.  It remains to be seen how the archaic, bureaucratic and 
corrupt militaries of CSTO states will coalesce to create KSOR. 
 
--------------- 
Biographic Note 
--------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) The CSTO Secretary General is Nikolay Nikolayevich 
Bordyuzha, a former Russian Colonel General.  Born in 1949 in Oryol 
(south-western Russia), Bordyuzha graduated from the Perm Military 
School of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces in 1972.  Between 1989 
and 1991 he attended KGB intelligence courses in Novosibirsk and was 
head of KGB human resources.  Bordyuzha later served as First Deputy 
Chief and later Chief of Russia's Federal Border-Guard Service 
(1992-1998).  In 1998 he was appointed Secretary of the Russian 
Security Council and also Chief of the Russian presidential 
administration.  During this time he was considered by some analysts 
as a possible successor to former President Boris Yeltsin.  In 1999 
he was appointed Russian Ambassador to Denmark.  In April 2003 
Bordyuzha was appointed Secretary General of the CSTO. 
 
BEYRLE