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Viewing cable 09MOSCOW1461, RUSSIAN MFA ON ASSISTANCE TO STRENGTHEN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW1461 2009-06-04 05:43 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow 
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #1461 1550543
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 040543Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3625
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0550
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD IMMEDIATE
 
UNCLAS MOSCOW 001461 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP KCRM MNUC ASEC PARM PINR
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MFA ON ASSISTANCE TO STRENGTHEN 
INTERNATIONAL FORENSICS COOPERATION 
 
REF: SECSTATE 55511 
 
(SBU) On June 3, EST Counselor delivered reftel points, non-paper 
with unofficial embassy translation, and invitation to MFA 
Office of Security and Disarmament Affairs First Secretary 
Olga Kuznetsova.  Kuznetsova read the non-paper with interest 
and promised to inform her leadership.  Drawing from reftel, 
EST Counselor explained the genesis of the proposal to create 
a nuclear forensics framework to strengthen international 
cooperation to end nuclear smuggling.  Kuznetsova began 
taking notes when EST Counselor explained that the forensics 
libraries would include a range of data, such as isotopic 
composition, and chemical form, and that exchanging material 
would be optional.  EST Counselor then suggested that the 
Russian government join the United States at the June 16-17 
plenary of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 
(GICNT) in encouraging additional governments to participate 
in the June 29 International Technical Working Group on 
Nuclear Smuggling-IAEA technical review.  She was quite 
doubtful that the MFA would be able to make a decision on 
supporting the proposed framework for nuclear forensic 
cooperation by June 16-17.  Although EST Counselor noted that 
the technical meeting is devoted largely to other topics, 
Kuznetsova demurred, saying that she was not sure if Russia 
would be ready by the GICNT plenary to encourage other 
countries to attend the briefing.  She agreed to provide the 
non-paper to Rosatom.  EST separately provided the non-paper 
to Rosatom on June 3.  (Embassy Comment:  EST does not 
believe that Russia has a nuclear forensics library with this 
information and that it will find it difficult to agree to 
participate in this initiative.) 
BEYRLE