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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 MANAMA 000371 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN PTER BA
SUBJECT: MENAFATF PLENARY - MAY 2009 
 
MANAMA 00000371  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
------------------------ 
Introduction and Summary 
------------------------ 
 
¶1. The Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task 
Force (MENAFATF) held a plenary session (MENAFATF IX), and 
working group meetings from May 17-21, 2009 at the Crowne 
Plaza Hotel in Manama, Bahrain.  Treasury Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes Daniel 
Glaser headed the U.S. interagency delegation.  The 
delegation included representatives of the Departments of the 
Treasury, State, and Justice. 
 
¶2. During this Plenary, the MENAFATF adopted the mutual 
evaluation reports (MERs) of Egypt and Jordan and the 
follow-up reports of Mauritania, Bahrain, and Syria; adopted 
the budget for 2010; approved the proposal to establish a 
special account for training; approved the schedule for 
MENAFATF country mutual evaluations; approved the proposal to 
train assessors; agreed to discuss the automatic publication 
of mutual evaluation reports in the next Plenary; adopted the 
Technical Assistance and Typologies Working Group Reports, 
approved the MENAFATF Private Sector Dialogue (PSD) 
mechanism; approved the proposal to hold a Ministerial-level 
meeting; adopted the report on cooperation with the Council 
of Arab Interior Ministers; and, discussed training seminars 
and workshops to include enhancing the roe of FIUs in the 
MENA region and holding a jointFATF-MENAFATF Plenary. (End 
introduction and sumary.) 
 
------------------------- 
Mutual Evaluaion Reports 
------------------------- 
 
¶3. Mutul Evaluation of Egypt: The Plenary discussed and 
dopted the World Bank (WB)-drafted MER of Egypt.  he 
evaluation was conducted using the FATF 2004 ethodology and 
summarizes the AML/CFT measures i place in Egypt at the time 
of the on-site visit(October 2008).  Egypt received a rating 
of eithe compliant (C) or largely compliant (LC) on 25 out 
of 49 Recommendations and received ratings of eiher 
partially compliant (PC) or non-compliant (N) on 23 of the 
Recommendations. 
 
¶4. During thePlenary discussions, Egypt argued for upgrades 
on 
 
-- Recommendations 2 (LC), 3 (PC -> LC), and 1 (PC): With 
regards to Recommendation 2, Egypt agued for an upgrade 
stating that its law in factallows for the prosecution of 
legal persons.  Wih regards to Recommendation 3, Egypt 
argued that ts law allows for confiscation if a person gets 
riminally prosecuted and presented examples to demonstrate 
effectiveness of the system.  While the WB team agreed that 
Egypt's general framework is strong, the team argued that the 
number of cases tat go to court for prosecution is 
disproportionae with the number of cases where funds and 
otheritems are confiscated.  The WB stated that it gave 
Egypt a PC on Recommendation 3 based on the factthat the 
framework is not fully tested for effectveness.  Egypt 
argued that it did not think effetiveness could be assessed 
iven that the law had only been in effect for about a year 
prior to the mutual evaluation on-site visit.  The MENAFATF 
Plenary supported an upgrade from PC to LC on Recommendation 
¶3.  Recommendations 2 and 17 were not upgraded. 
 
-- Special Recommendation IX (PC): Egypt argued that Article 
12 of its AML law stipulates that travelers need to disclose 
and declare currency or other monetary instruments if they 
are carrying USD 10,000 or more.  Egypt explained that should 
travelers fail to declare currency, customs authorities have 
the ability to seize currency and monetary instruments, in 
particular if they suspect money laundering or terrorist 
financing.  The WB team responded by noting that its 
assessment was based on three issues of concern: 1) the 
declaration/disclosure system is intermittently implemented; 
2) there is no evidence of suspicious declaration forms 
reporting from customs to the Egyptian FIU; and, 3) there is 
a lack of proper safeguards.  The Plenary supported the 
assessment team and Egypt did not receive an upgrade on this 
recommendation. 
 
-- Recommendation 39 (LC -> C): Egypt argued for an upgrade 
on Recommendation 39, stating that it has the legal basis for 
extradition of nationals and that it is outlined in the 
Egyptian constitution.  The WB team stated that the basis for 
 
MANAMA 00000371  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
its grade was based on the fact that the team found that no 
citizen could be deported or prevented from returning to 
Egypt and that there is a low number of extradition cases 
related to money laundering and terrorist financing despite a 
high number of cases involving other crimes.  Egypt presented 
a table indicating a clear legal basis for extradition of 
nationals and the WB team indicated that given the 
information put forth in the table, it was comfortable with 
an upgrade.  The Plenary agreed to upgrade Egypt on 
Recommendation 39 from LC to C. 
 
-- Recommendations 5 (PC), 6 (PC), 7 (PC), 8 (LC), 11 (PC), 
and SR VII (PC) and Recommendations 15 (PC), 23 (PC), 28 
(LC), and 29 (PC): Egypt received grades on these 
recommendations based on the finding by the WB team that 
there are key weaknesses regarding enforceable implementing 
regulations for three institutions, Arab International Bank 
(AIB), Nasser Social Bank (NSB), and Central Bank of Egypt as 
a financial institution, which carry out banking activities 
although they are not supervised by the Central Bank of 
Egypt.  These weaknesses are compounded by the fact that the 
FIU cannot enforce any obligatory measures over these three 
institutions.  Egypt argued for upgrades on these 
recommendations stating that their requirements for customer 
due diligence apply generally to these banks and that there 
are punitive measures for noncompliance.  Egypt also argued 
that because of these punitive measures, the FIU does indeed 
have supervisory authority over these institutions.  The WB 
team explained that these financial institutions pose risk 
for financial crime and offered examples such as the fact 
that AIB advertises its bank secrecy, NSB offers no 
information on its balance sheets, and the Central Bank 
offers banking services to the Egyptian government lending it 
vulnerable to corruption.  In addition, the team found no 
legal basis and a lack of effectiveness for requirements 
related to customer due diligence, PEPs, correspondent 
banking, new technologies, and unusual transactions.  The 
MENAFATF Plenary supported the assessment team and Egypt did 
not receive an upgrade on these recommendations. 
 
-- Recommendation 18 (PC -> LC): Egypt argued for an upgrade 
on Recommendation 18 stating that its law states that 
financial institutions are prohibited from having 
correspondent relationships with shell banks and that the 
three institutions mentioned above also follow this law and 
are subject to sanctions for noncompliance.  The WB team 
explained that it did not find that the three banks are 
regulated on this issue and highlighted that these 
institutions have extensive correspondent bank relationships. 
 Although the team is unsure of whether these relationships 
include shell banks, the team stated that it could not find a 
legal framework or enforceable regulations preventing the 
institutions from developing these relationships.  The 
Plenary supported Egypt for an upgrade from PC to LC on this 
recommendation. 
 
-- Recommendation 1 (LC): The IMF, in conjunction with the 
United States and the FATF, raised a concern with the team's 
assessment of Egypt's compliance with Recommendation 1.  The 
IMF explained that Egypt's definition of the money laundering 
offense is not in line with the Palermo and Vienna 
conventions because the definition of money laundering crime 
in Egypt's law requires the purpose of concealment or 
disguise.  The IMF explained that this requirement narrows 
the scope of money laundering offense and could contribute to 
low effectiveness.  This presents a significant shortfall in 
Egypt's implementation of Recommendation 1 and the IMF 
recommended that at the least, the WB identify this problem 
and note it in the report, to which the WB team agreed.  The 
WB team highlighted this deficiency and explained that if the 
text of the report is amended, it would have an effect on the 
rating.  The Plenary chose not to downgrade Egypt on this 
recommendation and to leave the grade as it is. 
 
¶5. Mutual Evaluation of Jordan: The Plenary discussed and 
adopted the MENAFATF-drafted MER of Jordan.  The evaluation 
was conducted using the FATF 2004 Methodology and summarizes 
the AML/CFT measures in place in Jordan at the time of the 
on-site visit (July 6 ) 17, 2008).  Jordan did not receive a 
favorable assessment overall. Jordan received a rating of 
either compliant (C) or largely compliant (LC) on just 12 out 
of 49 Recommendations and received ratings of either 
partially compliant (PC) or non-compliant (NC) on 36 of the 
Recommendations. 
 
¶6. During the Plenary discussions, Jordan argued for upgrades 
 
MANAMA 00000371  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
on: 
 
-- Recommendations 5 (PC), 10 (PC -> LC), 13 (PC): Jordan 
argued that its laws and authorities regarding anonymous 
accounts and customer identification measures are imposed by 
secondary legislation and not other enforceable means, as 
assessed by the team.  Jordan's argument for supporting this 
statement is that its AML law gives authority to the Central 
Bank of Jordan to pass provisions and regulations related to 
AML/CFT controls and procedures.  FATF's standard for these 
Recommendations 5, 10, and 13 requires that regulations 
regarding anonymous accounts, customer identification 
measures, record keeping, and suspicious transaction 
reporting be mandated by secondary legislation.  While the 
MENAFATF team agreed that the Central Bank of Jordan is fully 
authorized to create measures, supervise institutions and 
sanction them, the regulations are neither mandatory nor 
enforceable, rendering them as other enforceable means rather 
than secondary legislation.  The MENAFATF team also noted 
that regardless of the regulations falling under secondary 
legislation or other enforceable means, there are other 
significant shortcomings.  The FATF representative explained 
that the methodology does define the distinction between 
primary/secondary legislation and other enforceable means. 
Both the FATF and the United States recommended that the 
procedure for obtaining the grades must follow the current 
methodology.  The Plenary agreed to upgrade Jordan from PC to 
LC on Recommendation 10 because fewer deficiencies were found 
in Recommendation 10 than Recommendations 5 and 13.  Jordan 
did not receive an upgrade on Recommendations 5 and 13. 
 
-- Recommendation 1 (PC): Jordan argued that the reason the 
conviction for the predicate money laundering offense is 
required to prove that funds are illicit is in order to 
clarify a course of action for Jordan's law enforcement 
agencies.  The MENAFATF team stated that this policy is not 
in line with the FATF standard and in addition, the money 
laundering crimes punishable by law neglect many categories 
of offenses, which should be considered predicate offenses 
for money laundering crime according to the methodology.  The 
MENAFATF Plenary supported the assessment team and Jordan did 
not receive an upgrade on this recommendation. 
 
-- Recommendation 25 (NC): Jordan argued its feedback 
mechanism is apparent by its electronic SAR system.  Jordan 
explained that upon receiving a SAR, an automatic response is 
sent to the sender confirming receipt.  The MENAFATF team 
explained that his form of feedback is not related to AML/CFT 
and that additionally, supervisory bodies in Jordan do not 
provide any guidance to financial institutions in this 
regard.  The MENAFATF Plenary supported the assessment team 
and Jordan did not receive an upgrade on this recommendation. 
 
-- Recommendation 26 (PC): Jordan argued that its FIU does 
not fall under the auspices of the Central Bank ) the 
Central Bank only allocates a budget for the FIU ) and the 
FIU has its independent bylaws.  The MENAFATF team explained 
that during the on-site visit, the FIU could not state that 
it was entirely autonomous.  The team also highlighted that 
regardless of this deficiency, the FIU's competence is 
limited to money laundering and does not include terrorist 
financing, and the FIU has insufficient financial, human, and 
technical resources.  The MENAFATF Plenary supported the 
assessment team and Jordan did not receive an upgrade on this 
recommendation. 
 
-- Recommendations 27 (PC) and 36 (PC): Jordan argued that if 
the public prosecutor in Jordan receives an international 
request for information, the public prosecutor replies with 
information immediately.  The MENAFATF team explained that 
the grades were based on the lack of effectiveness of law 
enforcement agencies in Jordan and on the fact that the 
authorities of the public prosecutor are ambiguous and that 
the prosecutor does not seem autonomous or unbiased.   The 
MENAFATF Plenary supported the assessment team and Jordan did 
not receive an upgrade on this recommendation. 
 
------------------ 
Follow-up Reports 
------------------ 
 
¶7. Follow-up Report of Mauritania: The MENAFATF Secretariat 
explained that major gaps remain in Mauritania's AML/CFT 
regime since its ME in 2005, including:  remaining 
deficiencies in Mauritania's implementation of its AML law; 
no guidance or clarification to sectors with regards to 
 
MANAMA 00000371  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
customer due diligence; DNFBPs largely not covered under 
AML/CFT regulations; no proper implementation of suspicious 
activity reporting; and, an FIU has not been established. 
Mauritania has tried to work on some aspects of its regime by 
working on legislation to create an FIU and having Central 
Bank examiners conduct on-site visits to financial 
institutions.  Given the remaining deficiencies, it was 
decided that Mauritania would remain in the follow-up process 
and submit a report again in November 2009. 
 
¶8. Mauritania explained that it criminalized money laundering 
and is working to criminalize terrorist financing. 
Mauritania also explained that it has worked on explaining 
due diligence and customer identification procedure 
requirements to financial institutions and has established a 
database to store SARs, among a few other enhancements. 
Given the country's work-in-progress, Mauritania requested a 
delay of two years to submit another report.  The Plenary 
supported the Secretariat's assessment and agreed that 
Mauritania should submit a report again in November 2009. 
The report was adopted. 
 
¶9. Follow-up Report of Bahrain: The MENAFATF Secretariat 
explained that Bahrain has addressed many deficiencies 
identified in its ME.  For example, Bahrain has criminalized 
terrorist financing and the act of terrorism finance.  It has 
also amended its money laundering law to uphold the 
definition and scope of the FATF standard and established a 
declaration/disclosure mechanism for cross-border currency 
and monetary instruments.  Given deficiencies that remain and 
the legislation needed to address those shortfalls, the 
MENAFATF Secretariat recommended Bahrain remain in the 
follow-up process and submit a report again in the fall of 
¶2010.  The Plenary agreed with the Secretariat's 
recommendation.  The report was adopted. 
 
¶10. Follow-up report of Syria: The MENAFATF Secretariat 
highlighted Syria's improvements in its AML/CFT regime 
including passing legislation that covers the banking and 
insurance sectors under its AML/CFT laws.  For items in 
progress, the Secretariat noted that Syria has drafted 
legislation to monitor and regulate moneychangers and is 
working to implement a mechanism for disclosure and 
declaration of cross-border currency and monetary 
instruments.  Given the deficiencies that remain, the 
Secretariat recommended Syria remain in the follow-up process 
and submit a report again this fall.  The Plenary agreed with 
the Secretariat's recommendation.  The report was adopted. 
 
------------------- 
Miscellaneous Items 
------------------- 
 
¶11. Budget for 2010: The budget was agreed to, though several 
member countries expressed a desire to add a 5 percent 
reserve to the budget for incidentals or in the case that a 
member country is unable to fulfill its financial 
obligations.  A paper on the proposal for a 5 percent surplus 
will be distributed to the member countries for written 
comments. 
 
¶12. Proposal to Create a Separate Account for Training: The 
proposal to create a separate account for training was 
approved; however, details of how to fund the account will be 
decided at a later point. 
 
¶13. Timeline of the Mutual Evaluation Process: The schedule 
of MENAFATF country mutual evaluations was approved.  The ME 
of Algeria will take place in September/October 2009 and will 
be discussed at the April 2010 Plenary.  The ME of Sudan has 
been postponed to June 2010.  The MERs of Lebanon and Saudi 
Arabia will be discussed at the November 2010 Plenary. 
 
¶14. Automatic Publication of Reports and Mutual Evaluation 
Working Group (MEWG): The Plenary adopted the practice of 
automatic publication of ME reports on the MENAFATF's 
website.  The Plenary also adopted the Working Group proposal 
to enhance the quality of MENA assessment teams and an 
assessor's training will be held in Bahrain from June 28 ) 
July 2, 2009.  Tunisia will host a MEWG meeting in July, the 
goal of which is to finalize the review of mutual evaluation 
procedures. 
 
¶15. Technical Assistance & Typologies Working Group: The 
Technical Assistance and Typologies Framework Reports were 
adopted by the Plenary. 
 
MANAMA 00000371  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
 
¶16. Private Sector Dialogue Mechanism: The Plenary accepted 
the proposal to establish a MENAFATF Private Sector Dialogue 
(PSD).  The format of the mechanism will be such that the 
MENAFATF President and Executive Secretary will hold an 
informal direct dialogue with private sector representatives 
from MENAFATF Member countries.  Plenary representatives of 
MENAFATF members and observers will not participate in this 
dialogue, the goals of which are to raise awareness and 
exchange ideas regarding AML/CFT issues of concern and 
implementation of AML/CFT controls. 
 
¶17. Proposal to hold a Ministerial Meeting:  It was agreed 
that the MENAFATF would organize a Ministerial meeting and 
would invite Ministers of MENAFATF member countries.  The 
meeting will only take place if all the Ministers accept the 
invitation and agree to attend. 
 
¶18. Cooperation with the Council of Arab Interior Ministers: 
The Plenary adopted the proposal to cooperate with the 
Council of Arab Interior Ministers. 
 
¶19. Enhancing the Role of FIUs in the MENA Region: It was 
decided that the MENAFATF Secretariat would draft a paper on 
a proposal to establish a committee focused on enhancing the 
role of FIUs in the MENA region.  This proposal will be 
discussed at the next Plenary. 
 
¶20. Discussion to host a joint Plenary with the FATF: Member 
countries supported the idea of hosting a joint FATF-MENAFATF 
Plenary.  The MENAFATF Secretariat is corresponding with the 
FATF Secretariat regarding this proposal. 
 
¶21. The next MENAFATF Plenary meeting will be held the week 
of November 8-12, 2009 in Beirut, Lebanon. 
 
¶22. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Treasury Terrorist 
Financing and Financial Crimes Daniel Glaser has cleared this 
message. 
 
¶23. Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
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HENZEL