VZCZCXYZ0013
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKG #0467/01 1631351
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121351Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7729
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE
RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA 0249
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2376
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0566
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0145

UNCLAS KINGSTON 000467 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CAR (DHOFFMANN) (VDEPIRRO) (WSMITH) 
WHA/EPSC (MROONEY) (FCORNEILLE) 
EEB/ESC/IEC/EPC (MCMANUS) 
SANTO DOMINGO FOR FCS AND FAS 
TREASURY FOR ERIN NEPHEW 
INR/RES (RWARNER) 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PHUM ECON EFIN EAID ASEC SOCI PGOV OAS SOCI JM
CU, XL 
SUBJECT: JAMAICA: OAS ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL SAYS CUBA MUST 
TAKE INITIATIVE TO REJOIN OAS, CALLS FOR GREATER CARICOM ATTENTION 
TO HAITI 
 
Summary 
------ 
 
¶1. (U) Summary: In an informal June 5 press conference in Kingston, 
Organization of American States (OAS) Assistant Secretary General 
(ASG) Albert Ramdin of Suriname described as "historic" the 
recently-concluded 39th General Assembly (GA) session in San Pedro 
Sula, Honduras, that saw the rescinding of Resolution 6, the 1962 
resolution that had effectively suspended Cuba from the OAS for 47 
years.  Although the obstacles to Cuba rejoining the international 
system have now been removed, Ramdin made it clear that the next 
steps toward rapprochement must come from Havana.  Ramdin also 
reaffirmed the OAS's commitment to Haiti and called on the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) to play a greater role in that country's 
development.  End Summary. 
 
Cuba and the San Pedro Sula Declaration 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) Passing through Kingston en route to the U.S., the ASG hailed 
the assembly and the "visible commitment of its members to work 
together on all issues," including Cuba, Haiti, non-violence, crime, 
drugs, and the security in the Caribbean.  Ramdin noted that the 
"positive mood" and "willing[ness] to work for consensus" 
established at April's Summit of the Americas (SOA) in Trinidad had 
provided a "mandate" and "set the stage" for what the GA had 
accomplished regarding Cuba. 
 
¶3. (U) Ramdin described the OAS's Resolution 2438 as the San Pedro 
Sula Declaration, although its formal title is simply "Resolution on 
Cuba."  Noting that the debate over Cuba's readmission to the OAS 
had been raised and faltered several times since 1962, Ramdin 
nevertheless described the resolution as "an expression of what was 
in the minds of many" in the OAS.  Ramdin pointed out that "the 
world had changed in the 47 years since Resolution 6 was adopted" 
and that Cuba needs to rejoin the OAS and the Inter-American 
community.  However, the ASG made it quite clear that the next steps 
must come from the Government of Cuba (GOC) and the Cuban people. 
 
Inside Baseball 
--------------- 
 
¶4. (U) The ASG provided considerable detail on the deliberations of 
the Cuba Working Group that hadcrafted the resolution at San Pedro 
Sula.  Although several views had been expressed, Ramdin described a 
 
"real desire for consensus" and noted that all participants, 
"including the U.S.", had made concessions.  Historically, the U.S. 
had opposed rescinding Resolution 6, but Ramdin described an 
evolution of the U.S. position from one in which the U.S. "would 
support revocation of Article 6 at the end of a process" to one in 
which the U.S. "would support revocation of Article 6 at the 
beginning of a process."  Others, most notably the member states 
(Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Honduras, Dominica, and St. Vincent 
and Grenadines) constituting the Bolivarian Alternative for the 
People of our America (ALBA), had not wanted to include any mention 
of a "process" of reintegration in the resolution.  Ramdin noted 
that CARICOM had played an "important role" independent of both the 
U.S. and ALBA in drafting the resolution, with both Jamaica and 
Belize participating in the Working Group. 
 
¶5. (U) As is the norm for the OAS, the resolution had been adopted 
by the Working Group and the General Assembly through consensus, 
without any formal vote. The direct participation of Foreign 
Ministers in the Working Group on June 2 had "lifted the discussion 
to a higher level" and had ensured that the negotiations moved 
quickly toward consensus, since they could make decisions without 
waiting for direction from superiors.  After consultations, the 
Working Group meeting had resumed the morning of June 3 and had 
approved the resolution by acclimation.  Shortly thereafter, the 
resolution had been formally approved by the General Assembly. 
Although Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had departed the 
previous evening and left Assistant Secretary Thomas Shannon in 
charge of negotiations, Ramdin said that she had played "a critical 
role" and that he had appreciated Shannon's "frankness."  The U.S. 
also compromised by not insisting that the resolution, drafted in 
Spanish, be translated before its release. 
 
¶6. (U) Ultimately, Ramdin contended, the resolution proved that the 
 
 
 
OAS is "relevant" and "can solve problems."  The ASG noted that "now 
we must wait to see how Cuba will respond.  The obstacle is gone, 
the ball is in their court, now the dialogue can start."  As a 
result, OAS representatives are now free to visit Cuba, although 
Ramdin pointed out that there had never been a formal OAS policy 
preventing this, and he expressed hope that Cuba might allow an OAS 
office to be opened in Havana.  In the meantime however, Ramdin 
hoped that the resolution would facilitate bilateral relations among 
member states and Cuba, and stressed that Cuba might benefit in some 
nonpolitical areas - educational exchanges, agricultural programs, 
disaster preparedness - without formally rejoining the OAS. 
 
The Cuban Perspective 
--------------------- 
 
¶7. (U) Osvaldo Cardenas, the former Cuban Ambassador to Suriname 
from 1980-83 and now a sociologist and businessman living in 
Kingston, was present at the press conference and offered his 
thoughts as to how the Cuban leadership might perceive the 
resolution.  While the OAS and the world may have changed since 
1962, Cardenas noted, it is important to remember that Cuba's 
leadership - Fidel and Ral Castro - has not.  As a result, the GOC 
still sees the dramatic events of the early 1960s - the breaking of 
diplomatic relations with Havana, the Bay of Pigs invasion, the 
Cuban Missile Crisis - very emotionally, and the 1962 Punta del Este 
resolution suspending Cuba's OAS membership as a personal rebuke to 
the Castros. 
 
¶8. (U) Cardenas didn't believe that the GOC had fully considered the 
potential benefits of rejoining the OAS, but would likely interpret 
the U.S.'s concurrence with Resolution 2438 as a tacit admission 
that Cuba had a right to be a member of the OAS and that 1962's 
Resolution 6 had been wrong.  Nevertheless, Cardenas didn't believe 
that serious discussions regarding Cuba's next step had yet taken 
place in the GOC and likely wouldn't any time soon, implying that 
the Castro brothers would have to leave the political scene in Cuba 
before any rapprochement with the OAS could take place.  Cardenas 
contended that the new Obama administration was a "major challenge" 
to the regime and that the GOC was uncertain as to how to deal with 
the new president.  Ramdin agreed that "biological pressure" and the 
passing of the "major ideology" of the Castros would be a major 
impetus for change, and that such change must be nurtured, not 
forced. 
 
Parsing the Language 
-------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) One audience member noted that the U.S. had initially 
insisted that the resolution include a reference to the 
Inter-American Democratic Charter, but that the final resolution 
made no mention of it: had the U.S. changed its position, and had 
the OAS rejected the charter?  Ramdin replied that "nobody wanted to 
be blamed for the failure of this resolution," and that all 
participants, including the U.S. and the ALBA countries, had been 
committed to consensus.  The ASG also maintained that the spirit of 
the Democratic Charter was evident in the resolution's language.  In 
fact, Ramdin noted, the OAS has never invoked the charter overtly in 
its resolutions and contended that, in some ways, the language of 
the OAS charter is stronger than that of the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter.  The ASG nevertheless insisted that the 
resolution's preamble was a strong statement affirming OAS 
principles. 
 
¶10. (U) The same questioner then asked if Ramdin was worried that 
some Cuban-Americans have threatened to lobby Congress to target OAS 
funding over this issue.  While Ramdin agreed that this was a 
theoretical possibility, he insisted that the OAS would not allow 
itself to be blackmailed by the U.S.  Ultimately, the ASG concluded 
that such calls for retribution did not represent official U.S. 
policy, and that he wasn't overly concerned that the U.S. would cut 
OAS funding. 
 
"Too Many Countries Say They Speak for Cuba..." 
 
¶11. (U) Cuba's process toward reintegration into the OAS community 
will of necessity be a slow and methodical one, Ramdin pointed out, 
and based on the principles in the OAS's General Declaration of 
Human Rights.  Most importantly, this process must be an expression 
 
 
 
of the "voice of the Cuban people," Ramdin noted.  "Too many 
countries say they speak for Cuba," Ramdin claimed.  "Cuba needs to 
do so."  The GOC has expressed no public interest in rejoining an 
organization that it has described as the U.S.'s "Ministry of 
Colonies," although both Ramdin and Cardenas agreed that the GOC and 
its ALBA allies had likely consulted in regard to the resolution. 
The ASG pointed out that Resolution 2438 includes no framework or 
process for Cuba's reintegration into the OAS, reaffirming that such 
a framework or process would be up to the GOC and the people of Cuba 
to initiate. 
 
Haiti 
----- 
 
¶12. (U) Ramdin noted that Haiti "has never enjoyed such solidarity 
in OAS," and expressed the desire to organize a mission to the 
country in August or September, 2009 to include representatives from 
the OAS, the International Development Bank (IDB), the Pan American 
Development Foundation (PADF), the Inter-American Institute for 
Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), as well as representatives from 
OAS member states, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), members of the 
U.S. Congress, and international media, in order to showcase 
positive projects in Haiti that each participant had sponsored. 
Ramdin also said he'd like to see the OAS work with these same 
partners to sponsor an Inter-American Program in Haiti.  "At some 
point, the U.N. mission will leave Haiti, and it will be a natural 
role for the OAS to step in and take over," Ramdin predicted. 
 
¶13. (U) The ASG also expressed the hope that CARICOM would escalate 
its engagement and provide more leadership with Haiti, a CARICOM 
member.  Although Haiti has enjoyed relative peace and stability 
recently, Ramdin expressed concern that next year's presidential 
elections might jeopardize these gains.  Although CARICOM does not 
have much available in terms of resources, Ramdin felt that much 
could be accomplished through the personal intervention of CARICOM 
leaders.  Ramdin pointed out that although Haiti has a strong 
commitment to CARICOM, many in the Government of Haiti (GOH) feel 
that the organization does not treat them as an equal member.  The 
ASG pointed out that Haiti is visited far more often by official 
visitors from the U.S., Canada, and Brazil than by CARICOM foreign 
ministers. 
 
¶14. (U) Further economic and financial assistance to Haiti is 
necessary, Ramdin said, noting that Trinidad and Tobago had called 
for the OAS to establish a Hemispheric Development Fund for Haiti. 
Although Ramdin supported the concept in principle, he said that he 
would have to study the proposal more thoroughly to determine how to 
coordinate it with existing OAS programs. 
 
Summary 
------- 
¶15. (U) Ramdin went to great lengths to downplay any suggestion of 
discord over the resolution, choosing instead to praise the 
contributions of all participants in the working group and the 
spirit of consensus that he said had prevailed there.  The ASG 
clearly felt that the next steps in Cuba's rapprochement with the 
OAS must come from the GOC and the Cuban people, although Ambassador 
Cardenas's comments suggested that those steps might be a long time 
in coming.  Furthermore, Ramdin's discussion of Haiti before an 
audience clearly more interested in the Resolution on Cuba suggested 
that he feels very strongly about the OAS initiatives that he 
proposed toward that country. 
 
Moss