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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM788, GOS RESUMES BOMBING IN DAR ZAGHAWA AMID RUMORS OF JEM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM788 2009-06-28 05:19 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO0725
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0788 1790519
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 280519Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4000
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0029
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000788 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS ASEC SOCI KPKO AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: GOS RESUMES BOMBING IN DAR ZAGHAWA AMID RUMORS OF JEM 
REARMING 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 729 
B) KHARTOUM 684 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: GOS aircraft bombed several remote areas around 
Furawiya on June 23-24 amid rumors that JEM is regrouping for 
another offensive, according to the UN Department of Safety and 
Security (UNDSS).  UNDSS Officer Frazer King told poloff that the 
GOS aircraft sporadically bombed four to five locations over a 
two-day period across the vast swaths of uninhabited land in far 
North Darfur. It was unknown whether JEM sustained any damage or 
losses, as attempts to reach JEM field commanders were unsuccessful. 
 UNDSS and other sources also reported that the GOS is mobilizing 
both conventional SAF troops as well as Arab militia fighters to 
deploy to the area in anticipation of future JEM attacks.  End 
Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) On June 25, King told poloff that GOS authorities 
instructed a UN team bound for Furawiya to delay its departure on 
June 23, and on the following day ordered the trip cancelled 
entirely.  UNDSS subsequently received reports of GOS aircraft 
bombing areas north and northwest of Furawiya on June 23-24. 
According to King, these were not targeted attacks.  The bombings 
were spread out among well-traveled land routes along the vast, 
empty area around Furawiya, he said, and it was unclear whether JEM 
had sustained any damage or losses. 
 
3. (SBU) Attempts to reach Suleiman Sandal, JEM's Deputy 
Commander-in-Chief and chief military spokesman, were unsuccessful, 
and other rebel and civil society actors were unable to confirm the 
bombings in this desolate area.  But an Egyptian political officer 
told poloff on June 25 that in a meeting last week Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs U/S Mutriff Siddiq freely admitted that the SAF has 
been bombing JEM positions near Furawiya. 
 
4. (SBU) In addition to recent bombings, UNDSS Officer King stated 
that significant GOS troop movements have been observed both from El 
Fasher and the UNAMID Team Site (TS) in Um Barro, as the GOS 
positions its forces in anticipation of a future JEM attack.  King 
also reported that although UNDSS has been denied access by the GOS 
to certain areas along the Main Supply Route (MSR) between Kutum and 
Um Barro, villagers told UNDSS that Arab militia are camped in the 
area near Al Dur (approximately 50 kilometers north of Kutum.)  King 
believes that Arab militia would be used along with conventional 
forces to fend off future JEM attacks in Dar Zaghawa. 
 
4. (SBU) On June 23, a statement appeared on JEM's website accusing 
the GOS of preparing a military campaign against JEM.  It asserted 
that a column of SAF soldiers, Chadian rebel fighters and Janjaweed 
militiamen had moved north from Geneina towards Kulbus, and would 
soon target JEM positions. It dismissed as "propaganda" rumors of 
JEM preparations to attack the SAF, along with reports of a Khalil 
Ibrahim visit to Israel. 
 
5. (SBU) Civil society activist Ahmed Adam Yousif, recently returned 
from Disa and Birmaza area along the along the MSR between Kutum and 
Um Barro, affirmed to poloff on July 25 that there was significant 
GOS troop mobilization towards Um Barro and Karnoi.  He said that 
the GOS troops there had come from South Kordofan, Blue Nile State, 
and other areas outside of Darfur.  He expected that fighting 
between JEM and the GOS would commence "in the coming days." 
 
6. (SBU) Comment:  JEM's reluctance to agree to a cessation of 
hostilities in Doha, which resulted in the suspension of bilateral 
talks with the GOS, could very well be motivated by hopes of 
achieving additional military gains in Dar Zaghawa through a renewed 
offensive.  The mobilization of SAF troops and resumption of aerial 
bombing there show that the GOS certainly is expecting one.  JEM's 
attacks on Karnoi and Um Barro last month reportedly have emptied 
the area of much of its civilian population, so future clashes might 
have little effect on civilians.  But renewed attacks by JEM would 
certainly derail any potential progress on the prisoner release 
issue in the now-moribund Doha talks.  JEM should be made aware that 
the USG is strongly opposed to the renewal of such attacks, and 
would view JEM military actions as threatening the peace process and 
potentially endangering the well-being of the Darfuri people, whom 
JEM claims to represent. 
 
ASQUINO