VZCZCXRO8915
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0786/01 1761422
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251422Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3992
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000786 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI ASEC AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: JMST SHIFTS FOCUS TO TRIPOLI GROUP, CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 729 
B) KHARTOUM 372 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  With peace talks in Doha suspended due to the 
impasse between the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the 
Government of Sudan (GOS), the UN/AU Joint Mediation Support Team 
(JMST) is shifting its immediate focus to the so-called "Tripoli 
Group" of rebel factions.  JMST is also reaching out to Darfur civil 
society groups, according to George Zachariah, Special Assistant to 
Joint Chief Mediator Djibril Bassol.  Bassol plans to continue his 
approach of establishing parallel tracks with JEM, the Tripoli 
Group, Abdul Wahid and other constituencies, emphasizing flexibility 
and pursuit of progress rather than any particular sequential 
approach.  "At the end of the day, it's whatever works," said 
Zachariah.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) In Zachariah's view, the Doha talks broke down because "JEM 
simply didn't want to move."  They were clearly not ready to discuss 
a cessation of hostilities, he said, though their motives remain 
unclear.  Perhaps Chadian President Idriss Deby will not allow them, 
Zachariah speculated, or they believe they can gain additional 
military victories in coming weeks.  Regardless, the JMST believes 
that JEM cannot afford to let go of the Doha process, which has 
given it prominence and put it in the good graces of the 
international community.  In the meantime, the JMST plans to broaden 
the scope of the Doha process by reaching out to other rebels and 
civil society. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In the coming weeks, the JMST plans to travel to Libya to 
meet with the so-called "Tripoli Group" (Ref B). The JMST has made 
little headway with SLA/Unity's Abdallah Yehia and the other 
marginal factions since the signing of the Tripoli Agreement on 
March 15, but Bassol hopes to bring them to Doha to establish a 
parallel track to discussions with JEM.  While the military strength 
of the Tripoli Group is highly suspect, and its popular support 
questionable, Zachariah stated that it nonetheless contains 
Darfur-based movements, while the Chad-based JEM does not. In 
addition, with JEM licking its wounds in Chad (Ref A), he maintained 
that bringing the Tripoli Group to Doha means that the remaining 
insecurity in Darfur, most notably banditry, falls under the purview 
of the GOS. 
 
¶4. (SBU) With regard to SLA/Abdul Wahid, Zachariah reported that the 
JMST will continue to make overtures to the recalcitrant leader 
despite being stood up several times by him in Paris.  It does not, 
however, plan any outreach to his commanders, many of whom have 
shown a greater willingness to negotiate than does their Chairman. 
"That's not a road we're going to go down," said Zachariah, 
recalling Ahmed Abdulshafie's failed attempt to bypass Abdul Wahid's 
leadership of the Fur.  "It's something that's been tried in the 
past, and failed."  The JMST nonetheless recognizes the need to 
include the Fur (Darfur's largest ethnic group) in the Doha process 
through civil society, he said, and would like to invite such groups 
to Doha for consultations. The JMST has not yet come up with a 
strategy for such outreach, he added, noting that input from the USG 
on how best to do this would be most welcome. 
 
¶5. (SBU) With regard to SLA/Minni Minnawi, the JMST has not changed 
its view that Minnawi ought to attend the Doha talks as part of the 
GOS (versus an independent status.) Zachariah noted that the JMST's 
mandate is to deal with the non-signatories of the DPA, not to 
revise or compromise that document.  Minnawi himself has also been 
sending mixed messages, alternately expressing frustration and 
satisfaction with his relationship with the GOS. As for the GOS, 
Zachariah noted that in his view its behavior in Doha was 
"impeccable."  Unlike JEM, he said the GOS was constructive, 
responsive to requests and "generally played the game well."  As 
usual, however, whether the GOS intends to fully implement 
agreements or take forward-looking action on Darfur remains in 
question. If the GOS does make commitments and follows through, 
Zachariah thought that "progress on the ground is possible." 
 
¶6. (SBU) Zachariah also emphasized the need to "harmonize" 
the Darfur peace process with the upcoming 2010 elections, and urged 
the USG to pressure the NCP and especially the SPLM in this regard. 
He expressed disappointment with JEM, which for all its military 
might has yet to make an impact in the political arena.  Though 
security on the ground is an important prerequisite and the timeline 
to elections is shrinking, "it is too soon to write them off," he 
asserted. 
 
¶7. (SBU) In conclusion, Zacharia remarked that the JMST was 
ultimately focused on remaining flexible and open-minded toward 
achieving a breakthrough in the mediation process. In contrast with 
the previous AU mediators Salim and Eliasson, who made public 
 
KHARTOUM 00000786  002 OF 002 
 
 
pronouncements of their strategies only to watch them fail, Bassole 
is focused on adapting to changing dynamics and pressures, a style 
Zachariah characterized as "diplomatic judo."  Bassol will remain 
flexible in his approach because "at the end of the day, it's about 
whatever works," said Zachariah. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Comment:  While the JMST characterizes its approach as 
flexible, reactive might be a more apt description. Before the 
Government of Qatar's desire to flex its newfound diplomatic muscle, 
the JMST appeared rudderless; the success of getting JEM to Doha had 
more to do with JEM's desire for exclusivity in peace talks - and 
intensive efforts by Special Envoy Gration - than any particular 
effort of the JMST.  The Tripoli Group, meanwhile, was hatched by 
Libya and Qatar.  Bassol has certainly proven himself adept at 
leveraging the actions of others and demonstrating he is a competent 
behind-the-scenes-negotiator.  But he has also shown remarkably 
little initiative in advancing the peace process on his own accord. 
With the rebel movements in shambles, no formal outreach has been 
made to civil society groups. This is true despite the JMST's lip 
service to engaging this critical constituency and its also having a 
knowledgeable senior advisor on the subject.  Despite the failure of 
last year's GOS-sponsored Sudan People's Initiative (which included 
civil society  representatives) to produce any results, ultimately a 
solution for Darfur could be a package of internationally-brokered 
and monitored concessions by the GOS in areas such as compensation 
for IDPs, land rights, development, and political participation for 
Darfuris.  Apart from Abdel Wahid al Nur, who appears at this point 
to be more of a symbolic figure for the Fur than an actual leader, 
other rebel groups have no broad, popular constituencies.  For this 
reason, government concessions linked to talks with respected civil 
society leaders may represent an alternative path forward while 
efforts to broker a ceasefire continue. 
 
ASQUINO