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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM752, THREE AREAS JOINT COMMUNIQUE NOT OUT OF THE GATES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM752 2009-06-15 12:31 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO8824
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0752/01 1661231
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 151231Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3943
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0072
RUEHSUN/USUN ROME IT
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000752 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/E 
NSC FOR MGAVIN 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
BRUSSELS FOR PBROWN 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
UN ROME FOR HSPANOS 
NEW YORK FOR DMERCADO 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID KPKO SOCI ASEC AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: THREE AREAS JOINT COMMUNIQUE NOT OUT OF THE GATES 
 
REF:  KHARTOUM 631 
 
1. (U) This is an action request - See paragraph 11. 
 
2. (SBU) SUMMARY: On June 2, Emboffs met with Clarke Soriano, head 
of the UN Resident Coordinator's Office, to discuss the Three Areas 
assessment and establishment of Joint Communiques (JCs), as well as 
an associated High-Level Committee, for the Three Areas.  The JCs 
will put in place an improved operational environment for assistance 
programs in the Three Areas, including greater access and 
streamlined bureaucratic procedures and regulations, and set up a 
body to monitor an address issues related to effective 
implementation.  The need for JCs was negotiated between the U.S. 
Special Envoy and the National Congress Party (NCP) in early April. 
UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and UN 
Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator Ameerah Haq agreed to facilitate 
the negotiation of the agreement among relevant parties.  While the 
SE agreement mentioned a separate joint communique for each region, 
the UN and others are considering one JC for the entire Three 
Areas. 
 
3.  (SBU) The UN has been working with state-level Sudan People's 
Liberation Movement (SPLM) officials and National Congress Party 
(NCP) representatives from the Humanitarian Assistance Commission 
(HAC) to conduct an assessment on the impact of NGO expulsions on 
the states.  The UN was considering the completion of the ongoing 
assessment as a prerequisite for negotiations on the JC.  Soriano 
agreed to wrap up the assessment quickly, while simultaneously 
discussing operational issues with Three Areas officials in order to 
gain consensus on key components of a draft JC.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------ 
THREE AREAS ASSESSMENT STALLED 
------------------------------ 
 
4.  (SBU) The UN SRSG office appointed Soriano to represent the 
office on the Three Areas assessment team and facilitate the 
development of a Three Areas Joint Communique.  According to 
Soriano, ongoing disagreements between the NCP and the SPLM on the 
content of th draft assessment continue to stall the release of 
assessment results.  NCP members insist that no statements critical 
of Sudanese President Omar al Bashir's decision to expel 
international organizations be included, while Sudanese People's 
Liberation Movement (SPLM) members argue that such findings must be 
included in the final assessment report, since the negative outcomes 
of this decision are clearly evidenced.  This point of contention is 
particularly problematic in regards to Abyei. 
 
5.  (SBU) Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan SPLM officials agreed to 
watered-down language that does not contradict the President's 
expulsion decision and permits the resumption of expelled 
organizations' programs and the negotiation of a new operational 
environment in these states.  However, Abyei Administrator Arop 
Mayak still refuses to watere down findings that the expulsions have 
had significant negative impacts on the Abyei population, were 
unconstitutional, included organizations working outside Darfur, and 
therefore should be reversed. 
 
6. (SBU) Emboffs explained to Soriano that Vice President Taha had 
insisted that an assessment be conducted before he would discuss 
with GOSS Vice President Riek on how to deal with the expulsions' 
impact on the Three Areas and how to improve the operational 
environment for implementing programs.  Emboffs suggested to Soriano 
that the assessment team finalize the assessment results immediately 
and pass the report to Vice Presidents Taha and Riek before making 
the results public.  The two party leaders could thus begin their 
discussions on the programs' operational environment, which would 
form the basis of a Three Areas Joint Communique. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
JOINT COMMUNIQUE: DIFFERENCES OF UNDERSTANDING 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
7. (SBU) Prior to Emboffs' meeting with Soriano, Blue Nile State 
Governor Malik Agar told Emboff that he favored establishing a "two 
door policy" for the Three Areas, allowing organizations registered 
in either Khartoum or Juba to access and work in any of the Three 
Areas. Professor Idriss, whom Agar appointed to negotiate a new 
operational environment for the Three Areas on his behalf, later 
 
KHARTOUM 00000752  002 OF 002 
 
 
presented six starting points that did not include the two door 
option.  Instead, Idriss favors a more inclusive operational 
process, facilitating Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) and SPLM 
state officials' direct involvement in HAC in Khartoum, including 
establishment of a co-commissioner. 
 
8. (SBU) Idriss was unaware that the Special Envoy and the National 
Congress Party (NCP) had agreed to a Three Areas Joint Communique, 
and he stated that the UN should not be involved in the mechanism, 
but rather that the SPLM and the NCP should negotiate an improved 
operational framework in the region.  Idriss cited the NCP's ability 
to manipulate the UN through stalling and potential conflicts of 
interest as reasons to exclude the UN from the process, given that 
some UN offices had expressed interest in assuming the programming 
of expelled NGOs.  Idriss prefers that the assessment recommend a 
new operational environment be established and then leave it to Vice 
Presidents Riek and Taha to negotiate that outcome, using the 
assessment committees to monitor the agreement. 
 
-------------------- 
STEPS FORWARD ON JC 
-------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) Emboffs emphasized to Soriano the importance of having an 
improved implementing environment in place prior to the resumption 
of suspended development programs in the Three Areas.  (Note: Mercy 
Corps/Scotland was registered by HAC on June 7 and AECOM 
International signed their Implementation Protocol with the Ministry 
of International Cooperation on June 8.  End note.)  Soriano agreed 
to push finalization of the assessments and to engage simultaneously 
with state officials to clarify their perspectives on key issues in 
order to jumpstart the Three Areas JC process. 
 
10. (SBU) In a June 8 meeting with Ahmed Haroun, current Governor of 
Southern Kordofan state and ex-HAC Commissioner, Jason Matus, the 
Strategic Advisor for the Three Areas Steering Group, presented a 
set of essential considerations for a future joint communique 
provided by donors.  Haroun agreed to address all the considerations 
(i.e. multiple-entry permits for implementing partner and donor 
staff, and mandatory technical agreements only with state 
government).  He did not agree to access to the state using 
registrations from Juba.  [Note: As state Governor, Haroun is 
seeking increased development support for Southern Kordofan.  His 
previous position as head of HAC, the organization that has been the 
major impediment to assistance programs, gives him continued 
influence in that organization.  This could lead to greater success 
in creating an improved platform for assistance programs.  End 
note.]  Emboffs have previously discussed these considerations with 
SPLM VP Riek Machar, Arop Mayak, the Abyei Administrator and Malik 
Agar, the Blue Nile state Governor, who have all agreed to an 
operational framework to address the essential points. 
 
11. (SBU) Comment and action request:  A timely manner mechanism to 
improve the Three Areas' implementing environment is crucial to 
avoid the delays, impediments, and harassment experienced by USAID 
partners and staff pre-expulsion.  As the elections and 2011 
referendum near, these volatile regions will be critical to peaceful 
transition in Sudan and should not be closed to international 
assistance.  Donors have taken the lead in informally building 
consensus around a potential framework for the Three Areas joint 
communique(s).  Unless the UN takes the lead to formally push this 
process forward, finalizing a joint communiqu could take 3-5 
months.  Post requests that the SE raise this issue at the 
appropriate level so that the JCs are in place within a month. 
 
WHITEHEAD