VZCZCXRO6463
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0743 1621401
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 111401Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3932
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000743 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/E 
NSC FOR MGAVIN 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI ASEC AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: YASIR ARMAN: NCP/SPLM RELATIONS WORSE THAN EVER 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY: In a courtesy call with Charge d'Affaires Whitehead 
on June 10, Deputy Secretary General of the Sudan People's 
Liberation Movement (SPLM)'s Northern Sector Yasir Arman discussed 
his party's deteriorating relationship with the National Congress 
Party (NCP) and outlined the biggest challenges Sudan will face in 
the upcoming two years.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Arman began the meeting by asserting that the SPLM was 
"still strong" four years after the signing of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA), noting that the NCP sees the SPLM's 
operations in northern Sudan as "dangerous," especially since the 
NCP has very little representation in southern Sudan.  Arman also 
proclaimed that tensions have caused the SPLM and NCP's alliance in 
the Government of National Unity (GNU) to be at its weakest level 
since 2005.  He said this tension recently culminated in former 
Foreign Minister Lam Akol's formation of a "break-away SPLM 
faction," a "plot" Arman attributed to the NCP to "confuse SPLM 
supporters." 
 
¶3. (SBU) Discussing the upcoming Sudanese national elections, Arman 
said he views them as particularly important to the NCP because an 
electoral win by Bashir would provide the president with political 
"protection" and credibility.  Arman went on to suggest that the NCP 
does not act like a traditional political party, but rather 
exercises a total grip on power, especially in rural areas.  He 
suggested that if this situation continues, Sudan could "end up like 
Zimbabwe or Kenya." 
 
¶4. (SBU) Moving beyond elections, Arman insisted that a law is 
needed soon on the referendum scheduled for 2011 on Southern 
self-determination, and "without the preconditions" proposed by the 
NCP linking the referendum itself with post-referendum arrangements. 
 Arman claimed that if Sudan does split into two countries, the 
North/South border will be "the longest in Africa," "with no natural 
division and many different peoples along it." 
 
¶5. (SBU) Concluding the meeting, Arman noted without irony that 
Abyei remains the "other burning issue" in Sudan.  He stressed the 
need for a ruling on Abyei's boundaries to come from the arbitration 
panel in The Hague, but said that to put the issue "to rest" a joint 
NCP/SPLM team, perhaps involving both the Presidencies of the 
Government of Sudan and the Government of Southern Sudan, may need 
to be deployed to the region.  On "advice for the U.S. Special 
Envoy," he made vague reference to the NGO expulsion and warned that 
the "NCP is expert at creating tactical issues" for people like the 
Special Envoy to "waste time solving." 
 
¶6. (SBU) COMMENT: Constantly a thorn in the NCP's side, Arman 
continues to openly jab at the SPLM's biggest rival.  While he is 
certainly correct that the NCP appears to be a master at delaying 
anything that threatens its grip on power, his near-sighted views on 
a post-referendum strategy for Sudan are troubling and could spell 
chaos in the years ahead. 
 
WHITEHEAD