VZCZCXRO6451
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0742 1621353
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 111353Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3931
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000742 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI ASEC AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: DDR IN DARFUR: A TANTALIZING POSSIBILITY FOR PEACE 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: UNAMID is preparing its plan for a disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DRR) program in Darfur.  With a 
budget of $3 million USD for 18 months, UNAMID DDR staff will expand 
up to 30 officers and operate in all three Darfur states.  UNAMID 
DDR will develop its plan in concert with the Government of Sudan 
(GOS), but DDR requires a ceasefire in Darfur before programs can 
begin.  UNAMID will conduct DDR for combatants aligned with Darfuri 
rebel groups, but DDR for any combatants armed by the GOS, including 
the janjaweed, will remain the responsibility of the GOS.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Despite the lack of an all-inclusive peace agreement in 
Darfur, UNAMID has recruited staff to develop a plan for DDR in 
Darfur, Deputy Joint Special Representative (DJSR) Henry Anyidoho 
told donors at a Sudan-wide DDR meeting hosted by UN SRSG Ashraf 
Qazi on May 28.  "Combatants have been surrendering weapons at our 
team sites in Kebkabiya, Shagil Tobay and Nyala," Anyidoho said. 
"This is unexpected and we know that we need to prepare for DDR in 
Darfur."  In coordination with UNDP in Khartoum, UNAMID will draw up 
the requirements for participation and engage with the Northern 
Sudan DDR Commission (NSDDRC) to build capacity for promoting DDR 
for all ex-combatants in Darfur.  The Government of Sudan (GOS) has 
pushed UNAMID to develop a DDR strategy, and DJSR Anyidoho noted 
that while the NSDDRC lacks expertise or a comprehensive strategy to 
disarm Arab militia in Darfur, UNAMID remains hopeful that their 
budget projection for the initial stages of the project 
(approximately $3 million USD for 18 months) is realistic enough to 
lay a durable foundation for DDR programming in Darfur. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Meeting with poloff in El Fasher on June 3, Aderemi Adekoya 
and Istvan Papp said UNAMID's DDR office will expand to 30 
international and local staff by the end of the year.  UNAMID's 
approach will not mirror the programs currently underway in Southern 
Sudan or in Somalia, according to Adekoya, who recently transferred 
from Mogadishu after overseeing a $5 million USD grant from the 
Department of State to speed the integration of Somali armed 
militias.  UNAMID will not pay cash for weapons, but instead will 
spearhead a program to encourage armed actors to surrender their 
arms in exchange for participation in DDR programs.  "Politics drive 
DDR, and not vice versa, so we must wait for a ceasefire and peace 
agreement to be in place before we proceed with DDR," Adeyoka 
added. 
 
¶4. (SBU) UNAMID has not yet estimated the numbers of current or 
ex-combatants who would be eligible for DDR in Darfur, but Adekoya 
said that UNAMID DDR would only cover combatants aligned with Darfur 
rebel groups.  The Government of Sudan would be responsible for 
disarming and demobilizing all armed actors it had previously armed 
and mobilized, including the notorious janjaweed, non-janjaweed Arab 
militia, and the Popular Defense Forces (PDF).  UNAMID would provide 
technical assistance to the GOS for such groups, and would assist in 
developing reintegration programs as well. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Comment: DDR in Darfur remains a tantalizing possibility 
for peace.  As Darfur's rebel movements disintegrate, and with all 
parties to the conflict suffering from conflict fatigue, the current 
climate in Darfur suggests that UNAMID's proposal is timely and 
appropriate.  Although the U.S. is not a financial donor to the 
perpetually underfunded DDR effort in Sudan, the start of a 
successful program in Darfur could complement the work done by all 
parties to reduce the violence in Darfur.  While we predict that the 
Khartoum regime would support DDR for the rebel movements, UNAMID's 
success in DDR will depend on the GOS's willingness to reign in its 
violent and ruinous Arab militia. 
 
WHITEHEAD