VZCZCXRO9047
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0719/01 1540704
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 030704Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3904
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000719 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/C 
NSC FOR MGAVIN 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU KPKO
SUBJECT: UNAMID DEPLOYMENT UPDATE, JUNE 1, 2009 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 697 
B) KHARTOUM 544 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: UNAMID deployment stands at approximately 69 
percent, with 13,485 mission staff already deployed to Darfur. 
UNAMID officials predict, however, that the mission may not reach 
full deployment until early 2010.  With the rainy season 
approaching, progress on deployment will slow over the summer months 
and not pick up again until September.  Senior UNAMID leadership in 
El Fasher remains disappointed that key logistical units have not 
yet been pledged (such as critically-needed military transport 
helicopters.)  Nevertheless, they point out recent operational 
improvements as evidence of the maturation of the once-maligned 
peacekeeping force.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Current deployment of the UN-African Union Mission to 
Darfur (UNAMID) stands at 13,485, approximately 69 percent of the 
total permitted under UNAMID's current mandate.  UNAMID Formed 
Police Units (FPUs), designated to patrol within IDP camps and towns 
of Darfur, are currently deployed at only 50 percent of full 
capacity.  Senior UN officials in New York predict all peacekeeping 
troops, FPUs and international support staff will be fully deployed 
by November of this year.  However, according to Colonel Noddy 
Stafford, chief of J-5 plans for UNAMID in El Fasher, UNHQ's rosy 
outlook does not take into account the negative impact of the rainy 
season on hindering deployment, particularly in Sector West.  Based 
on experience gained during last year's rainy season, Stafford 
foresees that the dirt "roads" used by UNAMID to transport 
contingent-owned equipment (COE) from El Obeid to Darfur will turn 
completely into muddy gullies by July.  He adds that with all the 
slots for transport at the region's airports already taken, no air 
options will exist to hasten deployment during the rainy season. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Recent arrivals to Darfur indicate slow but steady progress 
in UNAMID deployment.  The May arrival of the Bangladeshi Movcon 
platoon presages the completion of the deployment of the South 
African battalion to North Darfur, whose final 201 members will 
arrive in June.  The largest scheduled influx of peacekeeping troops 
remains the 1,650 members of the Egyptian battalion, whose advance 
reconnaissance party has not yet scheduled a visit to Darfur.  As a 
result, the Egyptian arrival will most likely be pushed back until 
well after the rainy season, in September or October.  Additionally, 
UNAMID senior leadership remains disappointed that concrete pledges 
have yet to emerge to finance the speedy overland deployment of the 
2nd Ethiopian battalion, whose 170-vehicle convoy intends to drive 
directly from Addis Ababa to Sector South, Darfur, as soon as 
funding is secured. 
 
¶4. (SBU) UNAMID received formal notification in mid-May that the 
Thai parliament has approved deployment of a Thai peacekeeping 
battalion to Sector West in late summer 2009.  UNAMID leadership in 
El Fasher is not aware of any foreseeable that would delay the 
deployment of this peacekeeping battalion, but the unpredictable 
ferocity of the rainy season will most likely delay its full 
deployment.  In a promising sign, the UNDPKO's Force Generation 
Service has formally requested details of the Thai reconnaissance 
party due to conduct its operations in Darfur June 6 to 11, after 
which UNAMID will have a better idea of the requirements and 
capacities of the Thai battalion. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In response to concerns on the ground in Darfur, UNAMID 
senior leadership has engaged in a series of pro-active moves that 
they hope will signify the strategic maturation of their fledgling 
mission.  After fighting in May between rebel factions and Sudanese 
forces in the towns of Umm Barro and Karnoi, in the far western 
corner of Sector North, UNAMID redrew its map to designate what 
comprises "Dar Zaghawa" as part of Sector West.  UNAMID officials 
predict this change will ensure swifter reaction to conflict in the 
area, and better monitoring, as the area is technically closer to El 
Geneina than El Fasher.  Also in Sector West, by the end of the 
year, UNAMID will have deployed three Francophone battalions, 
assisting in interacting with refugees and their counterparts in 
EUFOR across the border in Chad.  Finally, aware that IDPs and 
Darfuris remain skeptical that the presence of peacekeeping troops 
can ensure security in rural areas of Darfur, UNAMID peacekeepers 
have conducted patrols in 5,620 villages of Darfur over the last 
four months, and senior leadership pledges to continue to increase 
such patrols in rural areas. 
 
¶6. (SBU) However, in addition to continued snags in the deployment 
of the second Ethiopian battalion, UNAMID claims the mission is 
facing substantial operational shortfalls the solutions for which 
lie in increasing the commitment of the international community to 
peace and stability in Darfur.  Key contributions required by 
UNAMID, but not yet pledged, include a transportation unit, a 
 
KHARTOUM 00000719  002 OF 002 
 
 
multi-role logistics unit, fixed-wing military aircraft, and 
military transport helicopters.  UNAMID Joint Special Representative 
Rodolphe Adada, who spoke with Codel Isakson in El Fasher on May 26 
(ref A), said, "Even at full deployment, the geography of Darfur 
presents challenges, and we need full mobility.  That is why 
aviation assets are key." 
 
¶7. (SBU) Comment: Senior mission leadership is genuinely 
appreciative of the recent achievements of the Friends of UNAMID, 
and they look to the U.S. for leadership on resolving recurring UN 
logistical and operational shortfalls.  Disappointingly, however, 
JSR Adada steadfastly avoided the issue of GOS stalling on visas for 
Western staff officers during his May 26 briefing for Codel Isakson. 
 Privately, Post concurs with ranking UNAMID military officers that 
the presence of experienced military officers is the main reason why 
UNAMID has come so far in the last twelve months.  With the peace 
process and humanitarian coverage in Darfur dependent for full 
resolution on more than just the Government of Sudan's political 
good-will, approval of visas for senior Western military officers 
seconded to UNAMID should be a key request to officials from the 
National Congress Party during our ongoing discussions with them. 
End comment. 
 
WHITEHEAD