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Viewing cable 09KABUL1682, ENSURING CREDIBLE ELECTIONS: MEDIA AND DEBATES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL1682 2009-06-29 04:07 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO0985
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #1682/01 1800407
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 290407Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9745
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001682 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PREL AF
SUBJECT: ENSURING CREDIBLE ELECTIONS: MEDIA AND DEBATES 
 
REF: SECSTATE 62422 
 
1.   This is the fifth in a series of cables updating and 
providing additional details on Embassy plans and efforts for 
the Afghan presidential and provincial council elections, per 
the request in ref A.  This cable addresses the issues of 
media engagements with and airtime for candidates. 
 
------------------------------------ 
EMC SPONSORED DEBATES & ROUNDTABLES 
------------------------------------ 
 
2.  The Electoral Media Commission (EMC), through UNDP ELECT, 
will sponsor media engagement for candidates, media training 
and media monitoring.  The EMC will use part of those funds 
for its sponsored advertising program (SAP) - scheduled to 
start at the end of June - to sponsor 16 presidential 
candidate roundtables during the campaign season.  The 
primary purpose of the roundtables is to provide a certain 
minimum media presence for all candidates, enabling them to 
introduce their political platforms to the electorate.  The 
EMC will sponsor eight TV roundtables, with about five 
candidates each, to be rebroadcast on five TV stations in 
Dari and Pashtu and eight radio roundtables to be rebroadcast 
on 10 radio stations in Dari and Pashtu.  UNDP New York 
provided final approval of the funding on June 27.  The EMC's 
plan to provide 16 radio and TV roundtables sets a busy 
schedule for the remaining 45 days of the campaign period, 
particularly when the rebroadcasting schedule is taken into 
consideration. 
 
3.  The EMC, together with the service provider (SP) - 
tentatively identified as Radio Arman (TOLO) - will determine 
the radio roundtable schedule and the number and order in 
which candidates will participate.  The EMC and the SP will 
also have responsibility to identify an appropriate 
moderator(s) for each roundtable.  The moderator(s) will 
introduce the presidential candidates, moderate the 
discussion and ask questions developed in advance by the 
moderator and the IEC.  Each radio roundtable will run 
approximately 40 minutes and will focus on specific topics 
that the service provider will develop in close cooperation 
with the EMC.  The possibility of including a live, studio 
audience and impromptu questions remains under discussion by 
the EMC.  The SP will record the roundtables live, and air 
them, unedited, in the order in which they are filmed.  The 
EMC and the service provider are tentatively planning to 
broadcast the roundtables during the 8:00 AM time-slot, which 
allows for a broad audience without competing with 
entertainment programming. 
 
4.  The EMC will schedule the 40-minute TV candidate 
roundtables, to commence in early-July.  The EMC and the SP - 
tentatively identified as TOLO TV - will determine the number 
of candidates that will participate in each roundtable in 
order for candidates to receive an equal amount of time to 
address the electorate.  The EMC and the SP have not yet 
determined the organizational details of the roundtables, but 
are considering a lottery to set the calendar and 
participants.  The moderator will ensure candidates receive 
equal allocation of airtime.  The SP and the EMC will 
identify moderator(s) who will perform the same function as 
in the radio roundtables.  The EMC and the service provider 
are still considering incorporating an audience or public 
participation.  Because the program only received funding 
yesterday, the final schedule is not expected until July. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
State Airtime & Private Media Debates 
----------------------------------------- 
 
5.  RTA, the state-run media organization, is producing and 
has begun broadcasting a 20-minute interview of each 
presidential candidate, with the intent of providing 
candidates with an opportunity to advertise their platforms. 
The production is run by RTA; candidates have told the 
Embassy that they perceive that the production process and 
results to be a fair product.  The interviews started airing 
on June 19 and are broadcast during the regular news day. 
Although offered to all candidates, Ashraf Ghani has declined 
to participate. 
 
 
6.  Private media organizations are also scheduling debates 
and roundtables without receiving funding from the candidates 
or the EMC.  On June 19, Ariana TV hosted a debate for five 
candidates: Zia-ul-Haq Hafizi, Shanawaz Tanai, Besmellah 
Shir, Bashir Behzan and Ramazan Bashardost.  We will report 
on the outcome septel.  TOLO TV also plans to host three 
debates with candidates it will select.  The first debate, to 
be held in early July, is reported to include President 
Karzai, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, Ashraf Ghani and two other 
candidates. 
 
KABUL 00001682  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
7.  President Karzai has accepted a public challenge to 
debate with Dr. Abdullah.  Karzai's conditions for acceptance 
are reported to have included that the debate and moderator 
should be run by RTA.  No date or other information is 
available. 
 
--------------------- 
Troublesome Requests 
--------------------- 
 
8.  On June 21, The EMC's UNDP advisor, John Matisson - a 
member of the 2005 EMC -  requested additional funds from the 
U.S. to hold extra roundtables on both TV and radio.  On June 
25, he reiterated the request, noting that the EMC intends to 
identify the top five or six candidates out of the current 
field of 41 through a one question poll.  The proposed 
single-question poll would use a sample of only 1400 
participants with no specification of participants from 
certain provinces.  The EMC would have the poll results by 
mid-to-late July and would use the information to organize 
additional roundtables - beyond those described above - for 
the top candidates.  Matisson requested U.S. funding for the 
poll and intends to engage private media to request donated 
airtime. 
 
 
9.  The EMC proposal for additional debates with only "top" 
candidates, fails under analysis.  The Embassy will not 
provide funds for this project.  There is considerable risk 
in using US funding to pick "top" candidates, an initiative 
that could undermine the USG policy of impartiality.  The use 
of a single question poll makes that proposal more tenuous, 
particularly with the IEC in the lead.  The poll organizer 
could possibly shape the winning candidates through poll 
composition and sample selection, depending on the sample 
selected or question composition.  The probable result of 
Karzai as the top candidate could reinforce public perception 
that the IEC is a biased organization or that foreign 
governments are meddling in the Afghan electoral process. 
 
10.  Even if the poll selected the true top-five candidates, 
the IEC lacks a mechanism to force President Karzai to 
participate in additional debates.  As a powerful and 
"favored" incumbent, it is unlikely that Karzai will appear 
in more than two-three debates total.  Karzai is already 
committed to a substantive debate on TOLO TV and may be drawn 
into an additional one based on the initial debate's outcome. 
 If he performs well in the TOLO debate, he has less 
incentive to participate in further debates.  Karzai 
spokesmen have already charged the EMC with bias against the 
President because of its criticism of his use of state-radio, 
making any concurrence to IEC requests unlikely. 
 
------------------------------------- 
The Way Forward On Additional Funding 
------------------------------------- 
 
11.  The Embassy is preparing to provide USD 2 million of 
additional funding to the EMC to support an enhanced media 
activity schedule.  USAID will direct the funds through IFES, 
which will assist the EMC with administration.  USAID will 
earmark the funding for use to support additional roundtable 
and broader media access for all candidates. 
 
12.  Although this funding was originally conceived to 
support roundtables, we will recommend that it is managed by 
UNDP for individual campaign announcements equally divided 
among all candidates.  The radio and TV roundtables and 
rebroadcasts are already saturating the Afghan media and the 
audience.  Prospect of the IEC forcing a grand match between 
key candidates is unlikely.  Further, the broad list of 
candidates, many of whom are likely to endorse a more 
prominent candidate later in the campaign, is more consistent 
with Afghan politics.  Each will energize a portion of the 
electorate that may not show if the candidate roster is 
artificially narrowed - particularly with perceived western 
influence. 
EIKENBERRY