VZCZCXRO8396
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #1658/01 1760536
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 250536Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9706
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001658 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
COMISAF FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KCOR KJUS AF PK SNAR MOPS KCRM PREL PINS
SUBJECT: DEVELOPING A MASTER PLAN FOR TORKHAM GATE 
 
¶1. SUMMARY: 
 
This is a Joint message from US Embassies Kabul and Islamabad 
with input from US Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). 
The Torkham Gate Working Group met from May 23-24 in 
Jalalabad and Torkham, reviewed the current strategy and 
developed an action plan and statement of work for the 
Torkham Gate Master Plan. The Master Plan will work to 
address overcrowding, security risks, deteriorating and 
inadequate infrastructure, environmental hazards and safety 
concerns for commerce and pedestrians. US Embassies Kabul and 
Islamabad, ISAF, and USFOR-A, members of the working group, 
conducted a review of the Gate and identified immediate quick 
impact projects to mitigate problems and build community 
confidence in progress. The Kabul Embassy and USFOR-A are 
working to fill requirements at the Gate including a project 
manager, additional security capability, and improved 
oversight by Afghanistan. The next step for Embassies Kabul 
and Islamabad is to improve coordination between Afghan and 
Pakistani officials. End Summary. 
 
¶2. Torkham Gate is the primary border crossing for commercial 
and military goods coming into Afghanistan. More than 20,000 
people cross through the Gate daily. Torkham also fuels 
commerce in Jalalabad and further on to Kabul, receiving 20 
percent of total Afghan customs receipts. Overcrowding, 
security risks, loss of revenue, crumbling infrastructure and 
long-running land disputes between tribal groups leave the 
Gate vulnerable. Most Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and 
ISAF military materiel comes through Torkham Gate or the 
equally vulnerable Weesh-Chaman Gate in Spin Boldak. 
 
Developing a Master Plan for Torkham Gate 
------------------------ 
 
¶3.  The Torkham Gate Working Group met May 23-24 in Jalalabad 
and Torkham, reviewed the current strategy, and developed an 
action plan. The Torkham Gate Working Group is a U.S. 
whole-of-government and international effort made up of 
members from the Regional Task Force (TF), Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT), Integrated Civ-Mil Action Group 
(ICMAG), Economic Office, Border Management Task Force 
(BMTF), USAID, US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), USFOR-A, 
and ISAF. The Group has members from the Afghan provincial 
government of Nangarhar, relevant line ministries and local 
leadership from Mohmandara district.  The Embassy will engage 
Customs, Border Police, and the Ministries of Interior and 
Finance to develop Afghan national level engagement, 
oversight, and ownership of the Master Plan and its 
implementation. 
 
¶4. The Group finalized a Statement of Work for a Master Plan 
for Torkham Gate, to be contracted by the end of the month 
and completed within 6 months. This plan will examine 
security, customs, environmental, cultural, and engineering 
requirements to solve problems and enable Torkham to operate 
as an organized and lucrative entryway to Afghanistan. The 
contractor that wins the proposal will work with the PRT, 
Agri-business Development Team, TF, USAID, the Afghan Customs 
Department, Afghan Border Police and local personnel. 
 
Updating the integrated strategy for Torkham Gate 
------------------------ 
 
¶5. The Torkham Gate Working Group aims to improve GIRoA 
capacity to secure and manage the border crossing through: 
upgraded facilities, reduced congestion, more efficient 
customs revenue collection via security force improvements 
and cooperation with local stakeholders.  The goal is to 
develop a well-controlled entryway into Afghanistan to 
facilitate socio-economic progress, market access, licit 
movement of people and goods, and security for communities on 
both sides of the border. 
 
¶6. The Working Group recommended changes to the existing 
strategy. For example, moving the bazaar to widen the 
existing road may be unnecessary. Infrastructure improvements 
devoted to re-routing traffic may be more viable. There is an 
immediate need to establish a contingency crossing point 
given the deterioration of the bridge and risk to adjoining 
projects. The group recommended that the customs control 
point should not be moved inland as this would reduce control 
and possibly customs revenue. Land held by customs and other 
GIRoA ministries could be redeveloped for greater efficiency. 
 
¶7. Several quick impact projects could advance the Master 
 
KABUL 00001658  002 OF 002 
 
 
Plan and maintain local confidence: improvements to 
infrastructure, construction of a pedestrian bridge, and 
development of parking areas with lighting for trucks and 
taxis to open up overcrowded areas and reduce delays. 
 
Meeting requirements at Torkham Gate 
------------------------ 
 
¶8. To meet such requirements, USFOR-A will deploy a Project 
Manager to act as the common point of contact and oversee the 
Master Plan and will request an additional infantry company 
and border police mentors. USFOR-A will fund the Master Plan 
design through CERP funds.  USAID reported the initial site 
selection considerations for the movement of the Torkham 
bazaar on June 9 and will undertake a feasibility study 
concurrent and in direct coordination with the Master Plan 
work to take place over six months. 
 
Opportunities for Af-Pak coordination 
------------------------ 
 
¶9. A major constraint to improved processes at Torkham Gate 
is limited coordination between the Governments of Pakistan 
and Afghanistan.  Infrastructure and processes on both sides 
of the border should be complementary to be effective, and 
changes will need the full engagement of both governments, 
including military and civilian elements locally and at the 
capitals. Another limiting factor is that the USG does not 
have the same degree of access (because of our reliance on 
the Pakistanis for movements into insecure areas) or 
resources on both sides.  Our Torkham Gate Working Group 
includes elements of both US Embassies in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan (the Embassy Islamabad Border Coordinator and the 
Office of the Defense Representative-Pakistan). Our Joint 
Kabul-Islamabad working group will continue to support 
development of Afghan-Pakistani cooperation on Torkham Gate 
customs, security, trade and oversight. 
EIKENBERRY