VZCZCXRO8127
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #1657/01 1751810
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 241810Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9704
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001657 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV AF
SUBJECT: PALACE REACTION TO AMBASSADOR'S PRESS 
AVAILABILITIES WITH OPPOSITION CANDIDATES 
 
REF: A. KABUL 1590 
     ¶B. KABUL 1640 
     ¶C. KABUL 1647 
 
¶1. (SBU) The Ambassador's press appearances (6/20-Ashraf 
Ghani, 6/21-Abdullah Abdullah, 6/22-Mirwais Yaseni) have 
generated much political and media attention.  They have also 
not gone unnoticed by the Palace.  FM Spanta called the 
Ambassador on 6/21, following the Abdullah press conference, 
to seek clarification on the media events.  Spanta, almost 
certainly calling on Karzai's behalf, and cordial, 
characterized the events as potentially interference in the 
campaign.  The Ambassador replied that he had accepted the 
candidates' invitations to appear at the events, and had 
simply reiterated President Obama's statement on the United 
States' impartiality in the elections.  He noted that after 
making his remarks, he joined the audience to listen, not 
participating in dialogue with the media. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The press events were reportedly a key agenda item 
at the weekly 6/22 Cabinet meeting.  The Cabinet discussion 
reportedly echoed the themes of the Spanta-Eikenberry phone 
call of the evening before.  Karzai instructed Spanta to send 
a letter to the Embassy outlining the government's objections 
to the Ambassador's participation in the press events. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Ambassador's discussion with Karzai and Spanta 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶3. (SBU) Following the 6/23 meeting between NSA Jones and 
President Karzai (septel), the Ambassador remained behind to 
meet Karzai and Spanta.  The atmosphere was relaxed, with 
Karzai asking what the Ambassador's intentions were in 
participating in the press events, and Spanta reiterating the 
points he raised in his earlier telephone call.  The 
Ambassador reiterated his points on accepting an invitation 
to the candidates' events, and emphasizing the President's 
and USG's position on the elections.  The Ambassador added 
that once he concluded his statement, he took no questions 
and simply listened to the candidates' statements. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Spanta asked the Ambassador if he would participate 
in such events if he were in any other country.  The 
Ambassador noted that Ambassador Jawad attended both the 
Democratic and Republican party conventions last year, and 
the USG had no objection.  The Ambassador stated that it was 
a general principle and practice of diplomatic missions in 
democratic countries to engage with both the ruling and 
opposition parties. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Beyond that, the Ambassador declared that the 
situation here was unique.  The United States had invested 
deeply in Afghanistan, was committed to a long-term 
partnership, and had made significant sacrifices in support 
of the country.  The United States had strong interest in 
success here; a credible, secure and inclusive election 
process, as well as a serious policy debate on the future of 
the country would be important elements of achieving that 
goal of success. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Spanta concluded the brief meeting by declaring that 
the Ambassador understood the government's position, so he 
saw no need to write a letter to the Ambassador.  Karzai did 
not object. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Palace Spokesman and press coverage 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (U) At a 6/23 press conference at the IEC, NSA Jones 
responded to a question regarding Palace spokesman 
Hamadzada's statement of some concern over the Ambassador's 
activities.  Hamadzada stated that the Ambassador's actions 
would be appropriate if they were simply to state the USG's 
policy on the elections.  They would be inappropriate if they 
were a signal of his support for a certain candidate.  Jones 
declared that the Ambassador's actions were appropriate, a 
reiteration of the President's and the USG's policy on the 
elections. 
 
¶8.  (U) State-run media echoed Hamadzada's question as to the 
USG's intent in meetings with candidates.  One article noted 
the USG stated policy of neither supporting nor opposing any 
legitimate candidate, but opined that such meetings 
ultimately called into question Afghanistan,s national 
sovereignty and political freedom.  An editorial in a 
pro-government newspaper suggested that the meetings also 
undermined the positions of the candidates, calling into 
question their independence and suggesting the government is 
controlled by the international community. 
 
KABUL 00001657  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
---------------------------- 
Our assessment of the impact 
---------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The Ambassador's engagement with the opposition 
candidates has excited the media and energized electoral 
politics here.  Importantly, there has been a shift in 
candidate focus from criticizing the legitimacy of the 
election to issues, with major candidates calling for Karzai 
to engage in formal debates.  A vital part of the United 
States' success here will hinge on an election process that 
the Afghan people deem credible, secure and inclusive.  A 
vigorous policy debate would help achieve that success, 
provided the Afghan electoral institutions and the 
international community do a reasonable job.  The absence of 
a policy debate would lead the candidates to focus their 
campaigns on questions over the credibility of the process. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The Ambassador's engagement has also had an effect 
on Karzai, likely diminishing his confidence in an easy first 
round win.  We now intend to encourage UNAMA and our 
international partners here to raise their visibility in 
advancing a credible, secure and inclusive process that would 
raise the level of discourse to a policy debate on the future 
of the country. 
EIKENBERRY