VZCZCXRO6312
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #1600/01 1740237
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230237Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9615
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 001600 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF GLOBAL WOMEN'S ISSUES 
AMBASSADOR TO AFGHANISTAN 
 
¶1. (SBU) We warmly welcome your visit to Afghanistan.  Your 
timing could not be better.  You are coming at a 
crucialperiod in Afghanistan's movement toward a more secure 
and democratic society.  The presidential election campaign 
has just begun, as has our increase in military forces, plus 
a dramatically large uplift of civilian personnel.  The 
government and the public here have welcomed the 
UnitedStates' new strategic purpose: strengthen security, 
buildaccess to justice and broader governance capacity at 
both thenational and local levels, and develop the economy. 
The number of U.S. civilians working in a range of 
disciplines throughout Afghanistan will be significant, with 
concentration in the most sensitive Southern and Eastern 
regions.  The most immediate political objective, which we 
share with the Afghans and our Coalition partners, is to 
ensure the legitimacy and transparency of the August 20 
presidential and provincial council elections. 
 
Elections 
--------- 
¶2. (SBU) The August elections influence nearly everything 
political here.  Some 40 are running in the presidential 
race, and June 16 the official campaign season began. 
President Karzai holds a significant advantage over his 
nearest competitors: ex-Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, 
ex-Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani, and Deputy Speaker of 
theLower House Mirwais Yaseni.  In the end, only those three 
of 
the half-dozen rumored top-tier challengers registered, 
alongside relatively obscure running mates, signaling a lack 
of broad-based support for their campaigns among 
Afghanistan's political powerbrokers.  Other registered 
candidates of note include two women who are as unknown 
nationally as the other candidates.  Karzai, who has received 
endorsements from nearly every major political, ethnic, 
mujahideen, and religious leader in Afghanistan, is confident 
that he will win re-election.  He may not, however, be able 
to win 50% of the vote on August 20, and thus be forced into 
a runoff in early October. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Sensing the popular mood, Karzai and opposition 
candidates alike claim to welcome international support for a 
level playing field and free and transparent elections.  The 
Independent Election Commission (IEC), with 
stronginternational backing and technical support from UNDP, 
the United States, and other major donors, has worked to 
foster at least theoretical opportunity for real competition. 
 The IEC and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) 
have issued statements expressing standards of conduct for 
the campaign and spelling out government officials' duty of 
impartiality. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Ambassador launched on June 20 his public 
engagement with opposition presidential candidates, to 
counter the widely held perception of U.S. backing for 
President Karzai's reelection.  He met and conducted press 
conferences on successive days with the three major 
opposition candidates: Ghani on June 20, Abdullah on June 21 
and Yaseni on June 22.  At each event, the Ambassador told 
journalists he wanted to demonstrate US impartiality and 
commitment to credible, secure, and inclusive elections.  The 
US neither supported nor opposed any one presidential 
candidate.  Moreover, this year's election was an opportunity 
for Afghan voters to give the government a "report card" on 
its past five years, and for candidates to vigorously debate 
the issues and offer solutions to problems that most concern 
Afghans.  We believe these public events are turning public 
perceptions.  We suspect President Karzai was behind a phone 
call from Foreign Minister Spanta to the Ambassador on June 
22, following the Abdullah press event, to protest what he 
characterized as U.S. interference in Afghanistan's internal 
affairs.  The Ambassador disputed the point, pointing out 
that he was invited to each event, and that he simply 
reiterated President Obama's statement on U.S. impartiality. 
 
¶5. (SBU) We are also doing more operationally to ensure 
credible, secure and inclusive elections.  The U.S. mission 
will be facilitating air transportation for the most viable 
candidates; assuring access to media over and above what 
theIEC required; running additional polling; and coordinating 
international observers.  We are stepping up our own voter 
education work with women, youth, media, and other civil 
society groups, soon to be adding an extra $700,000 in State 
Department democracy program funding.  In May, President 
Karzai issued a presidential decree on non-interference in 
the election process, in response to pressure from us and the 
international community to pass a Hatch Act-like regulation. 
We are urging the government to finalize a media law 
strengthening protections for freedom of expression, 
including in political campaigns. 
 
 
KABUL 00001600  002 OF 004 
 
 
Human Rights Work Ahead 
------------------------ 
¶6. (SBU) A thin but outspoken stratum of Afghan society 
increasingly is giving voice to a desire for positive 
political reform and social change -- reflecting the outlooks 
of an extremely young demographic in this conservative 
society.  Nonetheless, other aspects of Afghanistan's human 
rights record remain poor, including violence and 
discrimination against women, lack of due process and weak 
rule of law, and intimidation restricting the exercise of 
free speech.  In the face of powerful conservative religious 
and tribal patriarchal traditions, the Afghan government has 
shown a lack of sustained will to press forward a systematic 
campaign to promote and protect human rights, particularly 
women's rights. 
 
¶7. (SBU) We are looking to your trip as an important tool to 
highlight the plight of and the progress achieved by Afghan 
women, and to reaffirm to all Afghans that women's rights 
specifically and human rights more generally are key elements 
of our policy focus here.  One of the public affairs 
centerpieces of your visit will be your announcement of a 
three-year, $27 million grants program to support gender 
equality in Afghanistan.  The Ambassador's program will 
strengthen Afghan-led civil society organizations by 
providing technical assistance and small grants to Afghan 
NGOs.  This target group has traditionally been underserved. 
This infusion of new resources, and technical assistance to 
use the resources soundly, will fill a gaping need here. 
 
¶8. (SBU) We, and others, are tracking two high profile 
freedom of religious expression cases.  In October 2008, the 
Afghan Supreme Court upheld a local court's conviction and 
20-year prison sentence for student Sayed Pervez Kambakhsh, 
for distributing an article over the internet about women's 
rights that allegedly defamed Islam.  The international 
community is pushing for a presidential pardon, and we would 
ask you to do the same with Karzai.  Also, Ghows Zalmai and 
Mullah Qari Mushtaq are challenging their 20-year sentences, 
handed down by a Kabul Appeals Court in February, for 
publishing and distributing a Dari translation of the Koran 
that did not include the original Arabic text - an act 
considered sacrilegious by extremely doctrinaire Muslims. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Following the initial firestorm in response to 
President Karzai signing a Shia Family Law in March, civil 
society actors pushed for a review  and amendment process 
inclusive of women and civil society.  To date, however, the 
MOJ review process has been internal and the outcome is 
difficult to predict, although a finished product is unlikely 
before the August election.  Civil society activists and the 
Ministry of Women's Affairs drafted a progressive domestic 
violence bill, also under review by the MOJ.  We speak 
regularly with Justice Minister Danesh to assure the outcome 
of the process will be consistent with the constitution and 
Afghanistan's international treaty obligations, particularly 
as they pertain to women's rights. 
 
Complex Security Situation 
--------------------------- 
¶10. (SBU) GEN Stanley McChrystal assumed command of USFOR-A 
and ISAF on June 14 and reorganization of the command 
structure is proceeding apace.  GEN McChrystal faces a 
security situation in Afghanistan of sharply increasing 
violence over the last two years.  Attacks in the last weeks 
(about 400 per week) are at their highest levels since the 
fall of the Taliban in 2001, in part because the Coalition is 
going after insurgent sanctuaries and safe haven.  GEN 
McChrystal has announced that reducing civilian 
casualties--an issue which undermines Afghan popular and 
government backing for all we do--is a major priority as he 
pursues the necessary military effort to provide a secure 
environment for strengthening Afghanistan's society and 
government and for implementing the growing civilian programs 
designed for those ends.  American and other contributing 
nation troops continue to steadily increase for the longer 
COIN fight, and for the immediate task of giving the Afghan 
populace adequate security for the August 20 elections.  U.S. 
forces are expected to top 68,000 in 2010; there are 
approximately 32,000 non-U.S. international forces in 
Afghanistan.  The quality and size of the Afghan National 
Security Forces (ANSF) is also rising.  Current levels about 
90,000 Afghan army personnel and about 83,000 Afghan police. 
The Afghan army is growing by more than 2,500 personnel per 
month and should reach 134,000 in 2011.  Vigorous reform 
programs are underway to reduce corruption, especially in the 
ANP. 
 
Developing Governance Abilities 
-------------------------------- 
¶11. (SBU) Karzai's state and government suffer from inability 
 
KABUL 00001600  003 OF 004 
 
 
to deliver essential services, compounded by endemic 
corruption, political intimidation, poverty, criminality, 
insurgency and ethno-tribal politics, all exacerbated by 
three decades of war and misrule since the Russian invasion 
of 1979.  Electoral dynamics are further complicating the 
problem, leading Karzai to make expedient decisions on one 
hand, but also to appoint top-flight leaders like Minister 
Atmar to deliver police services.  Nonetheless, rapid 
transformation is underway in Afghanistan and there is much 
to work with.  Atmar is only one among a solid group of 
impressively capable and clean technocratic leaders.  What 
the state and civil society lack in broad institutional 
capacity is offset by the striking dedication, energy and 
patriotism of many Afghans, including many who have returned 
from comfortable lives abroad to rebuild their country.  The 
energy and ambition of Afghan youth are particularly 
striking at the burgeoning university campuses. 
 
¶12. (U) In order to accelerate improved responsiveness in 
Afghan institutions and local capacity, our new strategy 
requires an increase in the U.S. civilian presence alongside 
the increases in U.S. military personnel.  New positions in 
Afghanistan under consideration in the FY-09 supplemental 
request from all agencies would total 421.  There are many 
more positions with separate funding mechanisms.  Of the 421, 
we will fill 56 by July 2009, 49 in the field and 7 in Kabul. 
 The remaining 365, split between 224 in the field and 141 in 
Kabul, will arrive between August 2009 and March 2010, 
phased in coordination with arrival of military units and 
establishment of safer operating environments.  The new 
civilians will join various State Department and USAID 
elements, the Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecutors and the 
FBI (Legal Attache), the Departments of Agriculture, 
Treasury, Homeland Security (DHS), Transportation (DOT), and 
Health and Human Services (HHS/CDC), as well as the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA). 
 
¶13. (SBU) In Kabul, the focus is on Afghans creating a 
merit-based, professional bureaucracy; and building its 
capacity to deliver services to the public.  Strong 
ministries include Foreign Affairs, Defense, Public Health, 
Education, Finance, Communications, Rural Development, 
Counternarcotics, and the Afghan Central Bank.  Interior, 
Agriculture and Finance stand out among ministries for 
strong leadership.  We also work effectively with the other 
ministries, although mixed agendas or a legacy of weakness 
slow progress.  For instance, the Supreme Court and the 
Ministry of Justice suffer from the acute lack of qualified 
professionals, a legal system that combines elements of 
Sharia, tribal, and Western law, and a lack of national 
consensus on the way forward. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Outside Kabul, U.S. civilian and military efforts 
aim to strengthen local government at all levels, through 
Brigade Task Forces, PRTs, and (with the upcoming civilian 
increase) District Support Teams.  We work with traditional 
leadership structures as well as those who gained power 
through force or wealth during the days of conflict, but who 
have proven ready to cooperate with constitutional government 
and rule of law.  Lack of local consensus, traditionally weak 
connections between the capital and provinces, long-standing 
personal, ethnic, and tribal rivalries and distrust, and the 
presence of insurgents or criminals complicate our task. 
The goal is to support and help develop responsive, reliable 
leadership in local communities, reciprocally bound to the 
capital. 
 
Little Momentum on Taliban reconciliation 
------------------------------------------ 
¶15. (SBU) President Obama stated U.S. policy on 
reconciliation March 27: "There will be no peace without 
reconciliation among former enemies... That's why we will 
work with local leaders, the Afghan government, and 
international partners to have a reconciliation process in 
every province."  Afghans broadly welcomed that U.S. policy. 
Nonetheless, reconciliation with Taliban or other insurgent 
leaders remains controversial.  Many welcome the possibility 
of reduced violence and instability, while others (mainly 
non-Pashtuns, women, and certain civil society groups) fear 
an Intra-Pashtun deal could come at the expense of their 
interests.  Although there are spikes of press stories from 
time to time about secret deals with the Quetta Shura and 
Hezb-i-Islami Gulbadin (HIG), the reality is no deal is 
imminent, and any talks are on the question of talks about 
talks.  Certainly, nothing will be resolved before the 
election. 
 
Economy 
--------- 
¶16. (SBU) Recovery in agricultural production, following 
 
KABUL 00001600  004 OF 004 
 
 
severe drought in 2008, is expected to boost real economic 
growth to about nine percent in 2009-10.  Inflation is 
declining due to lower food prices, and the Afghan currency 
is stable.  The pre-election period is not especially 
conducive to implementing major economic reforms to support 
private sector development.  That said, relatively young, 
dynamic and reformist ministers of Finance, Commerce and 
Agriculture are taking positive steps to improve the 
business climate.  Afghanistan's key economic challenge is to 
establish conditions for self-sustaining growth and 
strengthen fiscal sustainability so that it can reduce 
dependence on foreign aid over time.  It remains one of the 
poorest countries in the world, and is facing spending 
increases that are further outpacing revenue year-over-year. 
 
¶17. (SBU) In our economic assistance programs, the U.S. is 
gradually channeling more aid through the Afghan government, 
and urging other donors to do the same, while ensuring proper 
transparency and accountability.  Our motto is: 
"Afghanleadership, Afghan capacity, Afghan sustainability." 
The 
U.S. is also placing renewed emphasis in its assistance 
programs supporting agriculture, both as a basis for 
sustainable growth and to create licit economic alternatives 
to the insurgency and poppy cultivation.  U.S. assistance 
will focus on agriculture programs that create jobs, develop 
roads and water systems supporting farm production and trade, 
and expand farm credit opportunities.  To better link the 
center to the provinces, increased U.S. assistance will help 
bring provincial priorities into the national budget 
process.  We are also encouraging greater Af-Pak cooperation, 
for example by supporting negotiations to update the 
decades-old agreement governing transshipment of Afghan 
agricultural and other exports across Pakistan to world 
markets. 
 
Narcotics: Positive Trends, Challenge in the South 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
¶19. (SBU) The narcotics challenge continues in the south, 
where seven provinces now account for 98 percent of the 
country's opium, and narcotics trafficking and the insurgency 
have become mutually sustaining.  We are increasing our focus 
on boosting licit agriculture, improving local governance, 
and increasing interdiction of drug traffickers to disrupt 
the link between narcotics trafficking and the insurgency. 
Poppy cultivation remains extensive, and costly eradication 
efforts can yield mixed results in COIN terms.  Hence we are 
de-emphasizing eradication while increasing interdiction 
efforts and providing alternative rural livelihoods through 
agricultural development. Nevertheless, there is some 
promising news.  Poppy cultivation dropped by 19 percent in 
2008, the first reduction since 2005.  Just as notably, 
poppy-free provinces grew from 13 to 18, or more than half of 
all provinces.  Governors in three formerly major poppy 
cultivating provinces- Badakhshan, Balkh, and Nangarhar - 
have eliminated or 
nearly eliminated poppy cultivation.  Poppy cultivation has 
died away by itself in other parts of the north and east of 
the country.  This year, Helmand Governor Gulabuddin Mangal, 
whose province produces more than half of Afghanistan's opium 
poppy, conducted a comprehensive multi-season campaign 
against poppy cultivation in a 100-square mile area of 
central Helmand.  Mangal's campaign combined public 
information, agricultural assistance, and law enforcement, 
including eradication by Afghan police with force protection 
from the Afghan army.  The UN Office for Drugs and Crime 
believes poppy cultivation has dropped substantially in 
Helmand and predicts more poppy-free provinces in other parts 
of the country. 
 
International Community and Afghanistan 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶20. (SBU) Relations between the government and the 
international community are uneven.  The UN presence is 
strong; SRSG Kai Eide plays a key coordination role, but 
suffers from insufficient budgetary and personnel commitment 
from New York.  President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and 
Special Representative Holbrooke have rallied world attention 
and increased resources for the Afghan-Pakistan complex of 
threats to regional stability.  International support is 
holding as demonstrated at recent conferences, including the 
March 31 Hague Conference where more than 80 countries and 
international organizations reaffirmed their long-term 
commitment to Afghanistan and the April 2009 JCMB where 
donors committed to providing funding for an almost 5,000 
member increase in the Kabul police force in time for August 
elections. 
EIKENBERRY