VZCZCXRO5040
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #1577/01 1720722
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 210722Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9582
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 001577 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR NSA, ACTING SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR AFGHANISTAN J. TIEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR NATO OVIP PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF NSA TO AFGHANISTAN 
 
 ¶1. (SBU) We warmly welcome your visit to Afghanistan.  Your 
timing could not be better.  You are coming at a crucial 
period in Afghanistan's movement toward a more secure and 
democratic Society.  The presidential election campaign has 
just begun, as has our increase in military forces, plus a 
dramatically large uplift of civilian personnel.  The 
government and the public here have welcomed the United 
States' new strategic purpose: strengthen security, build 
access to justice and broader governance capacity at both the 
national and local levels, and develop the economy.  The 
number of U.S. civilians working in a range of disciplines 
throughout Afghanistan will be significant, with 
concentration in the most sensitive Southern and Eastern 
regions.  The most immediate political objective, which we 
share with the Afghans and our Coalition partners, is to 
ensure the legitimacy and transparency of the August 20 
presidential and provincial council elections. 
 
 
Elections 
--------- 
¶2. (SBU) The August elections influence nearly everything 
political here.  Some 41 are running in the presidential 
race, and June 16 the official campaign season began. 
President Karzai holds a significant advantage over his 
nearest competitors: ex-Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, 
ex-Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani, and Deputy Speaker of the 
Lower House Mirwais Yaseni.  In the end, only those three of 
the half-dozen rumored top-tier challengers registered, 
alongside relatively obscure running mates, signaling a lack 
of broad-based support for their campaigns among 
Afghanistan's political powerbrokers.  Other registered 
candidates of note include two women who are as unknown 
nationally as the other candidates.  Karzai, who has received 
endorsements from nearly every major political, ethnic, 
mujahideen, and religious leader in Afghanistan, is confident 
that he will win re-election.  He may not, however, be able 
to win 50% of the vote on August 20, and thus be forced into 
a runoff in early October. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Sensing the popular mood, Karzai and opposition 
candidates alike claim to welcome international support for a 
level playing field and free and transparent elections.  The 
Independent Election Commission (IEC), with strong 
international backing and technical support from UNDP, the 
United States, and other major donors, has worked to foster 
at least theoretical opportunity for real competition.  The 
IEC and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) have 
issued statements expressing standards of conduct for the 
campaign and spelling out government officials' duty of 
impartiality. 
 
¶4. (SBU) For our own part, we will be doing more to ensure 
credible, secure and inclusive elections.  The U.S. mission 
will be facilitating air transportation for the most viable 
candidates; assuring access to media over and above what the 
IEC required; running additional polling; and coordinating 
international observers.  We are stepping up our own voter 
education work with women, youth, media, and other civil 
society groups, soon to be adding an extra $700,000 in State 
Department democracy program funding.  In May, President 
Karzai issued a presidential decree on non-interference in 
the election process, in response to pressure from us and the 
international community to pass a Hatch Act-like regulation. 
We are urging the government to finalize a media law 
strengthening protections for freedom of expression, 
including in political campaigns. 
 
 
Complex Security Situation 
--------------------------- 
¶5. (SBU) GEN Stanley McChrystal assumed command of USFOR-A 
and ISAF on June 14 and reorganization of the command 
structure is proceeding apace.  With the support and 
authority of NATO, a new 3-star "intermediate" headquarters 
will be established, with the 3-star commander focusing on 
the day-to-day tactical, operational effort and thus freeing 
up GEN McChrystal for full strategic political-military 
activity in coordination with the International Community. 
The U.S. and NATO training and development mission-expanding 
the size and capacity of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and 
Afghan National Police-will be the responsibility of MG 
Richard Formica, CSTC-A Commander, and dual-hatted.  The new 
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) falls to him. 
EUPOL presence and positive role in the police training and 
mentoring effort is growing. 
 
¶6. (SBU) GEN McChrystal faces a security situation in 
Afghanistan of sharply increasing violence over the last two 
 
KABUL 00001577  002 OF 004 
 
 
years.  Attacks in the last weeks (about 400 per week) are at 
their highest levels since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, 
in part because the Coalition is going after insurgent 
sanctuaries and safe haven.  GEN McChrystal has announced 
that reducing civilian casualties--an issue which undermines 
Afghan popular and government backing for all we do--is a 
major priority as he pursues the necessary military effort to 
provide a secure environment for strengthening Afghanistan's 
society and government and for implementing the growing 
civilian programs designed for those ends.  American and 
other contributing nation troops continue to steadily 
increase for the longer COIN fight, and for the immediate 
task of giving the Afghan populace adequate security for the 
August 20 elections.  U.S. forces are expected to top 68,000 
in 2010; there are approximately 32,000 non-U.S. 
international forces in Afghanistan.  The quality and size of 
the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is also rising. 
Current levels about 90,000 Afghan army personnel and about 
83,000 Afghan police.  The Afghan army is growing by more 
than 2,500 personnel per month and should reach 134,000 in 
¶2011.  Vigorous reform programs are underway to reduce 
corruption, especially in the ANP. 
 
 
Developing Governance Abilities 
-------------------------------- 
¶7. (SBU) Karzai's state and government suffer from inability 
to deliver essential services, compounded by endemic 
corruption, political intimidation, poverty, criminality, 
insurgency and ethno-tribal politics, all exacerbated by 
three decades of war and misrule since the Russian invasion 
of 1979.  Electoral dynamics are further complicating the 
problem, leading Karzai to make expedient decisions on one 
hand, but also to appoint top-flight leaders like Minister 
Atmar to deliver police services.  Nonetheless, rapid 
transformation is underway in Afghanistan and there is much 
to work with.  Atmar is only one among a solid group of 
impressively capable and clean technocratic leaders.  What 
the state and civil society lack in broad institutional 
capacity is offset by the striking dedication, energy and 
patriotism of many Afghans, including many who have returned 
from comfortable lives abroad to rebuild their country.  The 
energy and ambition of Afghan youth are particularly striking 
at the burgeoning university campuses. 
 
¶8. (U) In order to accelerate improved responsiveness in 
Afghan institutions and local capacity, our new strategy 
requires an increase in the U.S. civilian presence alongside 
the increases in U.S. military personnel.  New positions in 
Afghanistan under consideration in the FY-09 supplemental 
request from all agencies would total 421.  There are many 
more positions with separate funding mechanisms.  Of the 421, 
we will fill 56 by July 2009, 49 in the field and 7 in Kabul. 
 The remaining 365, split between 224 in the field and 141 in 
Kabul, will arrive between August 2009 and March 2010, phased 
in coordination with arrival of military units and 
establishment of safer operating environments.  The new 
civilians will join various State Department and USAID 
elements, the Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecutors and the 
FBI (Legal Attache), the Departments of Agriculture, 
Treasury, Homeland Security (DHS), Transportation (DOT), and 
Health and Human Services (HHS/CDC), as well as the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA). 
 
¶9. (SBU) In Kabul, the focus is on Afghans creating a 
merit-based, professional bureaucracy; and building its 
capacity to deliver services to the public.  Strong 
ministries include Foreign Affairs, Defense, Public Health, 
Education, Finance, Communications, Rural Development, 
Counternarcotics, and the Afghan Central Bank.  Interior, 
Agriculture and Finance stand out among ministries for strong 
leadership.  We also work effectively with the other 
ministries, although mixed agendas or a legacy of weakness 
slow progress.  For instance, the Supreme Court and the 
Ministry of Justice suffer from the acute lack of qualified 
professionals, a legal system that combines elements of 
Sharia, tribal, and Western law, and a lack of national 
consensus on the way forward. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Outside Kabul, U.S. civilian and military efforts 
aim to strengthen local government at all levels, through 
Brigade Task Forces, PRTs, and (with the upcoming civilian 
increase) District Support Teams.  We work with traditional 
leadership structures as well as those who gained power 
through force or wealth during the days of conflict, but who 
have proven ready to cooperate with constitutional government 
and rule of law.  Lack of local consensus, traditionally weak 
connections between the capital and provinces, long-standing 
 
KABUL 00001577  003 OF 004 
 
 
personal, ethnic, and tribal rivalries and distrust, and the 
presence of insurgents or criminals complicate our task.  The 
goal is to support and help develop responsive, reliable 
leadership in local communities, reciprocally bound to the 
capital. 
 
 
Little Momentum on Taliban reconciliation 
------------------------------------------ 
¶11. (SBU) President Obama stated U.S. policy on 
reconciliation March 27: "There will be no peace without 
reconciliation among former enemies... That's why we will 
work with local leaders, the Afghan government, and 
international partners to have a reconciliation process in 
every province."  Afghans broadly welcomed that U.S. policy. 
Nonetheless, reconciliation with Taliban or other insurgent 
leaders remains controversial.  Many welcome the possibility 
of reduced violence and instability, while others (mainly 
non-Pashtuns, women, and certain civil society groups) fear 
an Intra-Pashtun deal could come at the expense of their 
interests.  Although there are spikes of press stories from 
time to time about secret deals with the Quetta Shura and 
Hezb-i-Islami Gulbadin (HIG), the reality is no deal is 
imminent, and any talks are on the question of talks about 
talks.  Certainly, nothing will be resolved before the 
election. 
 
 
Economy 
--------- 
¶12. (SBU) Recovery in agricultural production, following 
severe drought in 2008, is expected to boost real economic 
growth to about nine percent in 2009-10.  Inflation is 
declining due to lower food prices, and the Afghan currency 
is stable.  The pre-election period is not especially 
conducive to implementing major economic reforms to support 
private sector development.  That said, relatively young, 
dynamic and reformist ministers of Finance, Commerce and 
Agriculture are taking positive steps to improve the business 
climate.  Afghanistan's key economic challenge is to 
establish conditions for self-sustaining growth and 
strengthen fiscal sustainability so that it can reduce 
dependence on foreign aid over time.  It remains one of the 
poorest countries in the world, and is facing spending 
increases that are further outpacing revenue year-over-year. 
 
¶13. (SBU) In our economic assistance programs, the U.S. is 
gradually channeling more aid through the Afghan government, 
and urging other donors to do the same, while ensuring proper 
transparency and accountability.  Our motto is: "Afghan 
leadership, Afghan capacity, Afghan sustainability."  The 
U.S. is also placing renewed emphasis in its assistance 
programs supporting agriculture, both as a basis for 
sustainable growth and to create licit economic alternatives 
to the insurgency and poppy cultivation.  U.S. assistance 
will focus on agriculture programs that create jobs, develop 
roads and water systems supporting farm production and trade, 
and expand farm credit opportunities.  To better link the 
center to the provinces, increased U.S. assistance will help 
bring provincial priorities into the national budget process. 
 We are also encouraging greater Af-Pak cooperation, for 
example by supporting negotiations to update the decades-old 
agreement governing transshipment of Afghan agricultural and 
other exports across Pakistan to world markets. 
 
 
Human Rights Work Ahead 
------------------------ 
¶14. (SBU) A thin but outspoken stratum of Afghan society 
increasingly is giving voice to a desire for positive 
political reform and social change -- reflecting the outlooks 
of an extremely young demographic in this conservative 
society.  Nonetheless, other aspects of Afghanistan's human 
rights record remain poor, including violence and 
discrimination against women, lack of due process and weak 
rule of law, and intimidation restricting the exercise of 
free speech.  In the face of powerful conservative religious 
and tribal patriarchal traditions, the Afghan government has 
shown a lack of sustained will to press forward a systematic 
campaign to promote and protect human rights, particularly 
women's rights. 
 
¶15. (SBU) We, and others, are tracking two high profile 
freedom of religious expression cases.  In October 2008, the 
Afghan Supreme Court upheld a local court's conviction and 
20-year prison sentence for student Sayed Pervez Kambakhsh, 
for distributing an article over the internet about women's 
rights that allegedly defamed Islam.  The international 
community is pushing for a presidential pardon, and we would 
 
KABUL 00001577  004.3 OF 004 
 
 
ask you to do the same with Karzai.  Also, Ghows Zalmai and 
Mullah Qari Mushtaq are challenging their 20-year sentences, 
handed down by a Kabul Appeals Court in February, for 
publishing and distributing a Dari translation of the Koran 
that did not include the original Arabic text - an act 
considered sacrilegious by extremely doctrinaire Muslims. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Following the initial firestorm in response to 
President Karzai signing a Shia Family Law in March, the 
Ministry of Justice has been conducting a review process 
inclusive of women and civil society.  Civil society 
activists and the Ministry of Women's Affairs drafted a 
progressive domestic violence bill, also under review by the 
MOJ.  We speak regularly with Justice Minister Danesh to 
assure the outcome of the process with be consistent with the 
constitution and Afghanistan's international treaty 
obligations, particularly as they pertain to women's rights. 
 
 
Narcotics: Positive Trends, Challenge in the South 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
¶17. (SBU) The narcotics challenge continues in the south, 
where seven provinces now account for 98 percent of the 
country's opium, and narcotics trafficking and the insurgency 
have become mutually sustaining.  To support the Government 
of Afghanistan and local people in confronting it, we have 
formed a civilian-military Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task 
Force (CJIATF) with U.K. and Canadian participation.  Its 
anti-narcotics operations invariably occur with substantial 
Afghan police and/or participation, as we aim to build Afghan 
security force capacities in counternarcotics (CN) as well as 
counter-insurgency (COIN).  CJIATF has begun comprehensive 
counter-narcotics planning for 2009-2010, combining the full 
range of civilian and military resources.  We are increasing 
our focus on boosting licit agriculture, improving local 
governance, and increasing interdiction of drug traffickers 
to disrupt the link between narcotics trafficking and the 
insurgency.  We will continue poppy eradication efforts, but 
will shift 
 emphasis and resources more towards the former objectives. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Poppy cultivation remains extensive, and costly 
eradication efforts can yield mixed results in COIN terms. 
Hence we are de-emphasizing eradication while increasing 
interdiction efforts via CJIATF and providing alternative 
rural livelihoods through agricultural development. 
Nevertheless, there is some promising news.  Poppy 
cultivation dropped by 19 percent in 2008, the first 
reduction since 2005.  Just as notably, poppy-free provinces 
grew from 13 to 18, or more than half of all provinces. 
Governors in three formerly major poppy cultivating provinces 
- Badakhshan, Balkh, and Nangarhar - have eliminated or 
nearly eliminated poppy cultivation.  Poppy cultivation has 
died away by itself in other parts of the north and east of 
the country.  This year, Helmand Governor Gulabuddin Mangal, 
whose province produces more than half of Afghanistan's opium 
poppy, conducted a comprehensive multi-season campaign 
against poppy cultivation in a 100-square mile area of 
central Helmand.  Mangal's campaign combined public 
information, agricultural assistance, and law enforcement, 
including eradication by Afghan police with force protection 
from the Afghan army.  The UN Office for Drugs and Crime 
believes poppy cultivation has dropped substantially in 
Helmand and predicts more poppy-free provinces in other parts 
of the country. 
 
 
International Community and Afghanistan 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) Relations between the government and the 
international community are uneven.  The UN presence is 
strong; SRSG Kai Eide plays a key coordination role, but 
suffers from insufficient budgetary and personnel commitment 
from New York.  President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and 
Special Representative Holbrooke have rallied world attention 
and increased resources for the Afghan-Pakistan complex of 
threats to regional stability.  International support is 
holding as demonstrated at recent conferences, including the 
March 31 Hague Conference where more than 80 countries and 
international organizations reaffirmed their long-term 
commitment to Afghanistan and the April 2009 JCMB where 
donors committed to providing funding for an almost 5,000 
member increase in the Kabul police force in time for August 
elections. 
EIKENBERRY