VZCZCXRO2265
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #1568/01 1691411
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 181411Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9567
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001568 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV AF
SUBJECT:  SUBJECT:  Afghanistan National Program of Peace and 
Reconciliation (AMPPR) 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  At a May 30 meeting with Emboffs, Special 
President Advisor on Internal Security and Vice Chairman of the 
Demobilization and Reintegration Commission Mohammed Masoon 
Stanekzai outlined the main points of a proposal he has presented to 
President Karzai on reconciliation.  The proposal suggests 
appointment by the President of a central coordinator, backed by a 
small secretariat, to orchestrate the activities of various 
government entities able to contribute to the reconciliation 
process.  Stanekzai places considerable importance both on the 
Independent Directorate of Local Governance's governor-led 
reconciliation program (endorsed in our own new strategic approach) 
as well as on the mechanisms of the existing Disbandment of Illegal 
Armed Groups (DIAG) program.  He hopes his paper will be ready for 
sharing generally with international stakeholders within the next 
few weeks.  Importantly, he calls for holding firm on loyalty to the 
existing constitution by reconcilees and strict avoidance of Swat 
Valley-type arrangements.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Background:  To date there have been various strands to 
the reconciliation discussion but little coordination among these 
initiatives.  At the highest, political level, Deputy National 
Security Advisor Spinzada has watched over the issue of outreach to 
top-level insurgent leaders and has ostensible oversight of the 
other efforts.  That oversight appears to be loosely taken.  The 
Peace Through Strength (PTS) program, headed by Upper House Speaker 
Mojaddedi, claims to have "reconciled" 7000 former lower-level 
insurgents, but few credit those numbers.  The program has also had 
serious administrative problems (resulting in the withdrawal of U.S. 
funding) and its impact has been limited.  Separately, Stanekzai's 
own Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) process has had some 
success (though likely not as much as is sometimes claimed) but has 
not been focused on insurgents.  Early last year, reconciliation 
came in for discussion in several Policy Action Group (PAG) 
meetings, but National Security Advisor Rassoul ultimately 
terminated the PAG's involvement, indicating he preferred to see the 
issue handled internally, with a view to finding a way to coordinate 
all of the Afghan government elements potentially involved in 
reconciliation.  Finally, late last year the Independent Directorate 
of Local Governance (IDLG) began work on its own proposal for 
governor-led reconciliation at the provincial level.  That program 
was specifically endorsed in our new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  During a four-month stint last year with the U.S. 
Institute for Peace, Minister Stanekzai had time to give some 
thought to the problem and for the last two months has worked on a 
"framework" for an Afghan-led reconciliation process.  At a May 30 
meeting with Emboffs, Minister Stanekzai outlined the paper he has 
now presented to the President.  He hopes to see his suggested 
approach approved soon.  He believes it may be ripe for general 
consultation with international partners within about two weeks.  He 
stresses that such an overall framework with broad buy-in from 
partners is essential if the Afghan government is to be able 
eventually to deal with the issue from a position of strength. 
Having everyone on the same sheet of music is also critical to 
improving Afghan and international strategic communications, where, 
Stanekzai believes, we have all been decidedly outmaneuvered by the 
enemy. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Stanekzai calls for the creation of a small unit 
answerable to the Palace, with an equally small Secretariat, to 
provide authoritative direction.  A handful of internationals would 
also be involved to guarantee proper coordination regarding such 
issues as military targeting, intelligence agency seizures and 1267 
blacklisting.  Otherwise, his plan calls for using or retooling 
existing programs and mechanisms to do the actual work.  He welcomes 
the IDLG's draft program, which envisions governors playing a major 
role in pursuing reconciliation.  At the same time, Stanekzai 
believes the Afghanistan Public Protection Program (AP3) could be 
expanded to help provide greater community-level security for 
reconcilees; the mapping of opposition elements done by the DIAG 
process could be utilized and its regional offices and provincial 
committees possibly enlisted to act as the eyes and ears in the 
field of those coordinating reconciliation efforts from Kabul; and 
even MRRD's Community Development Councils and/or District 
Development Assemblies might be given a broader mandate to play a 
part. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Stanekzai sees three general elements as essential for any 
viable reconciliation process.  First, there must be true 
reintegration, meaning genuine post-reconciliation engagement with 
former fighters to give them the necessary support to provide them a 
genuine new start.  Second, with the help of moderate mullahs, 
reconcilees must be put through a process of de-radicalization to 
overcome their entrenched mindset.  Finally, there must be proper 
monitoring, something that has been markedly absent to date from the 
PTS process.  For the International Community, the Minister foresees 
four contributions.  First, we should work to align our messaging so 
as to speak with one voice on the reconciliation.  Second, we should 
 
KABUL 00001568  002 OF 002 
 
 
put pressure on insurgent sanctuaries, both diplomatically and 
militarily.  Third, we should increase intelligence-sharing so 
Afghan and international forces have a common understanding of the 
insurgency.   And fourth, we should provide Afghan authorities with 
material and technical help to provide the reintegration needed of 
the former insurgents. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) It is important to note that Stanekzai insists that our 
common red lines must remain intact as a guarantee against entering 
into Swat- or Musa Qala-like compromises that pose a threat to 
Afghanistan's nascent democracy.  This includes loyalty to the 
existing constitution. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Comment:  We will continue to pursue our dialogue with 
Special Advisor Stanekzai and await with interest the eventual 
reaction of other international stakeholders to his full proposal, 
when it is distributed.  Inasmuch as he calls largely for 
incorporating and adapting existing initiatives and mechanisms 
rather than creating something totally new, we judge his chance of 
success as fairly good inside the Palace and bureaucracy.  Although 
Stanekzai himself appears intent on forging ahead as quickly as 
possible, launching a major new program - even one made up of 
existing elements - would likely be seen as politically motivated if 
done before the elections.  For this reason, the proposal could well 
be on hold for the next couple of months. 
EIKENBERRY