VZCZCXYZ0000 
RR RUEHWEB 

DE RUEHBUL #1557/01 1681420 
ZNR UUUUU ZZH 
R 171420Z JUN 09 
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9542

UNCLAS KABUL 001557 
 
DEPT FOR S/CRS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: CHALLENGING THE ELECTION PROCESS TO DELIVER: 
KABUL RESPONSE 
 
Ref: (A) State 62422; (B) Kabul 1493; (C) Kabul 1424; 
(D) Kabul 1140;(E) Kabul 1148; (F) Kabul 1519 
 
 
Introduction 
------------ 
¶1. (SBU) Post appreciates Department's efforts to offer us collegial 
advice on how to improve our handling of the upcoming Afghan 
election campaign. As will be clear from the specific responses 
below, much of what has been recommended is already well underway 
and has been for some time. We would caution, however, that our 
role is to ensure that no candidate should be able to credibly view 
our stance as favoring or opposing any candidate(s). Even as we 
promote a free and equitable election campaign, we must guard 
against opposition candidates perceiving us as biased toward Karzai, 
and also ensuring that Karzai does not conclude that we are biased 
against him. A difficult challenge, but one that we can achieve if 
we do not allow ourselves to be pressured by any interest groups. 
 
Access to Transport for Candidates 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) We have been indentifying several lines of effort to 
provide transportation to candidates: 
 
-- Purchase commercial air tickets for candidates. There are 
commercial flights to Mazar, Herat, and Kandahar, the major 
population (and vote) centers outside of Kabul. We will follow up 
with a cost estimate for Washington funding. 
 
-- Expand dedicated aircraft for candidates, under USAID-leased 
aircraft: estimated $2.5 million, would take about 3 weeks to begin 
from the time a contract is signed. 
 
-- Space-A travel on ISAF/Chief of Mission aircraft, and UN 
aircraft. We expect this resource to be limited, for both ongoing 
operational requirements, as well as some current use in support of 
moving election materials to provinces. 
 
¶3. (SBU) We recommend making this service available only to those 
candidates conducting serious campaigns. We would identify those 
individuals on the following basis: those candidates who have 
developed a clearly articulated, issues-based policy platform, and 
have displayed their commitment to a serious campaign by 
establishing a political apparatus, with campaign workers, offices, 
and a national campaign strategy. We expect the majority of 
candidates would not qualify on this basis. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Regarding Karzai travel - we recognize the need to make a 
distinction between official and campaign travel. We have been 
devising a formula. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Ambassador Carney met with ISAF DCOS Staff Stability 
Admiral Borsboom today (June 17) to request ISAF airlift support to 
presidential candidates. From a public perception stance, high 
visibility ISAF airlift for opposition candidates would demonstrate 
the international community's impartiality. Admiral Borsboom noted 
it will be a tough sell, and will brief COMISAF on the 
recommendation. Note: Decisions for ISAF to be engaged with 
providing transportation support to Presidential candidates will 
likely be made at HQ NATO and not in theater. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Our plan would be to provide one trip/week to each of the 
individuals deemed viable. That would come to eight trips total per 
candidate over the campaign period. The transportation would also 
cover travel of staff and security. 
 
Adequate Security for Candidates 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) As already explained in reftel B, MOI has offered to 
provide personal security details (PSD) to candidates. Minister 
Atmar has also asked France to undertake a training program to 
produce 500 MOI police PSD members. The idea is to produce as many 
PSDs as quickly as possible for the election period this summer, 
then form them into a VIP-protection unit after the election. 
Reftel B also explains Atmar's offer to allow candidates to maintain 
their own private security. MOI would provide additional PSD 
training and deputize them as ANP officers. We expect most 
candidates will choose their own trusted personal security. No 
candidate has asked us for PSD protection. We will continue to 
query candidates on this issue. MOI Atmar told us on June 9, having 
earlier raised the matter with the UK, that he needs 7 to 11 armored 
vehicles, which he would distribute to the top candidates for a 
period of three months. Instead we are looking to provide these 
vehicles and drivers directly to viable candidates through a 
contract with Global Security, and are querying them for costs to do 
so. 
 
Media and Public Debates 
------------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) To ensure media fairness, we will continue to use all 
avenues to push for gazetting of the media law. Again, as noted in 
Reftel B paragraph 5, we will continue to report on the Media 
Commission and UNDP-Elect's media monitoring activities. These two 
give both a domestic and international dimension to media 
monitoring. We will maintain close dialogue with Afghan and 
international journalists. Also, on Jun 10, Chief Media 
Commissioner, Mr. Towhidi, emphasized that the IEC Media Commission 
was capable of supporting media law issues regardless of the status 
of the new media law. He said that both existing and pending media 
laws are adequate for the elections. Consequently, gazetting the new 
law is not an issue for the IEC Media Commission. 
 
¶9. (SBU) As described also in ref B, we will proceed to support with 
additional funding the existing UNDP candidate media access budget, 
which would buy additional airtime for candidates. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The Media Commission will sponsor 16 roundtables: 8 TV 
media roundtables to be held and rebroadcasted on 5 stations; also 8 
radio media roundtables to be held and rebroadcast on 10 radio 
stations. Private companies, such as Moby Media, are also planning 
public debates. The Media Commission members and UNDP -ELECT 
advisors also advised on Jun 10 that the issue for roundtables was 
not money. Process and time will restrict adding additional 
roundtables. The campaign period is approximately 60 days. Sixteen 
roundtables is approximately one every four days. 
 
¶11. (SBU) We have repeatedly requested funding or budgetary guidance 
to support communications and outreach planning. The first unfunded 
requests were included in the elections strategic communications 
plan forwarded to S/SRAP and SCA/A in early May in Washington. 
Funding support for elections outreach and media has been sought for 
outreach efforts by Kabul since 25 May. 
 
Polling 
------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) We agree that additional polling would be very useful (see 
again ref B). IRI recently proposed to USAID to conduct two 
additional polls before the election. USAID will review 
expeditiously, and has money for these polls. We need additional 
funding ($400,000) to leverage other existing USG contracts to 
conduct two additional nationwide polls using different polling 
organizations and up to four targeted focus groups on regional 
issues related to elections. Polling requires approximately two 
weeks before and after the poll for preparation and analysis. Help 
from SRAP to identify a funding source will facilitate this 
additional polling. 
 
Minimizing Fraud 
---------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) The Elections Team has proposed, and IEC Chief Electoral 
Officer Najafi has enthusiastically endorsed, a comprehensive audit 
process aimed at limiting potential fraud, from bogus registration 
cards and polling staff collusion. On election day, ECC/IEC 
auditors would proactively sample and check ballot boxes once they 
arrive at provincial centers, especially in areas deemed highly 
vulnerable to fraud. The audit teams would have the ability to void 
results of these locations if the evidence warrants it. Election 
Support Team staff have begun discussions on the audit idea with the 
head of the IEC Secretariat Procedures Department and with 
UNDP-ELECT. 
 
¶14. (SBU) In recognition that public knowledge of the audit process 
would dissuade potential fraud, the Embassy will help the IEC 
develop a public information campaign targeted at political elites 
and polling station workers that would begin one month before 
elections. This process was used with some success in Iraq. Refs D 
and E list a number of other safeguards in place designed to reduce 
fraud. 
 
International Observers 
----------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) A cable on the EU observer mission will arrive septel. We 
expect a total of 150-200 international observers in theatre, and we 
have created an Observer Secretariat to share information among the 
missions. In an effort to coordinate all civilian movement and 
logistic support, the Embassy is proposing a joint visitors bureau 
made up of elements of existing JVBs at USFOR-A, ISAF, and Embassy 
Kabul. 
 
Implementation of Presidential 
Decree on Non-Interference 
----------------------------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) Ref F includes comments by President Karzai's chief of 
staff on implementing the decree. We are urging Karzai at every 
opportunity to publicize his decree. Paragraphs 7-9 of ref B list 
ways post is working to enhance reporting on electoral 
irregularities. 
 
PRT Guidance 
------------ 
 
¶17. (SBU) On May 10 the Deputy Ambassador signed civ-mil guidance 
for election support. Between May 20 and June 4 the guidance went 
out: From the Embassy to US elements in the field (to PRT State 
reps); USAID out to USAID elements in the field; USFOR-A to regional 
US elements. ISAF took an abridged version and sent out as a FRAGO 
to Regional Commands. Before we issue further civ-mil guidance, 
elements in the field need ISAF guidance on what support they should 
extend to civilians arriving in theater for the elections. Amb. 
Carney addressed this with ISAF on June 17. We will work to get the 
next round of guidance distributed soonest. Post is separately 
drafting instructions from Amb. Eikenberry to U.S. elements in 
theatre as well as FAQs on what to do when election irregularities 
are encountered. 
 
Indelible Ink 
------------- 
 
¶18. (SBU) Indelible ink will be used throughout the country on 
election day. UNDP is currently testing the ink for quality. The 
notion of using invisible, UV fluorescent ink is based on a 
misunderstanding of militant Taliban practice. The Taliban are very 
unlikely to target individuals -- or their offending, ink-stained 
appendages -- even if the Taliban decide to oppose the election. 
Rather, they would target international forces, polling centers, 
electoral officials, or candidates rather than see a popular 
reaction stemming from deliberate attacks on the population itself. 
Nor is there enough lead time to identify a truly fluorescent 
durable, invisible ink, purchase it and the hardware to use it with, 
and train a fraction of the polling station officials in its use. 
We raised the idea with the British Embassy (without leading the 
witness), and got the very same analysis. 
 
EIKENBERY