VZCZCXRO8264
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #1522/01 1651325
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 141325Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9418
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC 0818
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 0107

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001522 
 
DEPT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/RA, AND SCA/A 
DEPT PASS FOR AID/ANE 
DEPT PASS USTR FOR DELANEY AND DEANGELIS 
DEPT PASS OPIC 
DEPT PASS FOR TDA FOR STEIN AND GREENIP 
USOECD FOR ENERGY ATTACHE 
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
TREASURY FOR MHIRSON, ABAUKOL, AWELLER, AND MNUGENT 
COMMERCE FOR HAMROCK-MANN, DEES, AND FONOVICH 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.  12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL EAID ECON AF
SUBJECT: EU, U.S. AMBASSADORS DISCUSS STRATEGY, DEVELOPMENT 
 
CIV-MIL SURGE TOPS LIST OF TOPICS 
 
¶1. (SBU) During a brief June 7 courtesy call, Ambassador Eikenberry 
briefed European Commission Ambassador Hansjoerg Kretschmer on the 
US strategy in Afghanistan.  The Ambassador told Kretschmer that 
strategy focuses on the most insecure areas in southern and eastern 
Afghanistan, and that the civilian aspect would be highlighting work 
on both governance and reconstruction.  The Ambassador said that 
there would be a more balanced civ-mil approach to operations. 
 
¶2. (SBU) At the same time, the Ambassador acknowledged that the lack 
of a secure environment for implementation of civilian programs was 
going to require a military effort.  He said the objective of 
military operations would be to improve the security of the 
population and create an environment in which civilian efforts could 
engage effectively.  The Ambassador added that the concept of Clear, 
Hold, Shape, Build was not linear, with each step in order; rather, 
he emphasized that some of these steps would be simultaneous and 
that the civilian and military activities would need to be well 
integrated to exploit this.  District Support Teams would be crucial 
in this effort, he said. 
 
INTEGRATION OF CIV-MIL EFFORTS CRUCIAL 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Ambassador told Kretschmer that civ-mil activities 
needed to be better coordinated at the regional level and below.  He 
said that often military commanders cannot identify real civilian 
counterparts. The Ambassador said that measures were being taken to 
address this problem.  Kretschmer noted that the strategy depended 
on numerous variables, and he asked the Ambassador if some 
relatively peaceful areas would see a benefit to being "bad boys" in 
order to get attention and economic aid.  Kretschmer also asked what 
the strategy would mean for cooperation with the international 
community. He specifically asked if the USG still found ANDS 
relevant. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Ambassador said that SRAP Holbrooke had created an 
international network to address just such issues.  He added that 
the United States was not pulling back from ANDS, and remained very 
much committed to the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF).  The 
Ambassador did note, however, that some funding for security may be 
applied in ways perhaps not envisioned by the JCMB.  Kretschmer 
expressed concern about the military's role in Rule of Law issues. 
He also asked why the United States believed that an increase in 
military force would address security concerns, when an increase in 
troop levels has coincided with an increase in insurgent activity. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Ambassador said that the increase in military forces 
will provide troops to secure at-risk populations and help 
accelerate the training of the Afghan National Army and Police.  He 
said that much depends on how we define progress.  While NATO-ISAF 
and the Afghan National Security Forces will not be able to gain 
control over all areas in the East and South, there will be evident 
gains.  Still, the Ambassador emphasized that we will still be 
fighting there a year from now, and perhaps as we squeeze the 
insurgency in some areas, there will be additional violence in other 
areas.  He added that having control over significant population 
centers in Helmand and Kandahar is also an attainable goal.  The 
Ambassador added that Pakistan remains a crucial variable in all 
this and that the Pakistani Army's actions in Swat are important and 
possible action in Waziristan could yield significant gains.  At 
present, however, there was no indication that the Pakistanis would 
be taking on the Afghan Taliban. 
 
WHAT CONSTITUTES "A WIN"? 
 
¶6. (SBU) Kretschmer asked how we would define victory in 
Afghanistan.  Are defeating the Taliban and eliminating the source 
of international terror the same thing, or are they different 
objectives?  He asked further if indeed international terror could 
be defeated.  Does defeat of international terror mean an end to Al 
Qaeda operations worldwide?  Kretschmer noted British Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown's recent comment that the coalition was in Afghanistan 
"to create a living democracy."  Kretschmer bluntly said that if 
 
KABUL 00001522  002 OF 002 
 
 
that were the real reason, "we wouldn't be here now." 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Ambassador said that "modern jihad" began with the 
fight against the USSR and not 9/11.  He added that if AQ were to be 
driven out of Pakistan and its top leadership eliminated, then the 
movement would lose credibility.  As to Afghanistan, our efforts 
here were to ensure that the country never again becomes a safe 
haven, and to do that we must transform conditions on the ground. 
Kretschmer said that the country can only be transformed to the 
extent that it wanted to be.  He noted the National Solidarity 
Program (NSP) as being perhaps a good model of success, empowering 
the local village leadership and giving them a stake in providing 
security.  Kretschmer opined that currently, the choice for many 
Afghans was to suffer the Taliban reluctantly or fight them, risking 
death on behalf of what he called a corrupt and unresponsive 
government. 
EIKENBERRY