VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBUL #1493/01 1620247
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 110247Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9349

UNCLAS KABUL 001493 
 
DEPT FOR S/CRS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: ENSURING CREDIBLE ELECTIONS:KABUL RESPONSES 
 
REF:  STATE 59361 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
------------ 
¶1. The USG and its international partners are taking steps to help 
Afghanistan hold credible presidential and provincial council 
elections in 2009.  The augmented U.S. Mission will lead 
implementation of a number of efforts.  Successful realization of 
these objectives will rely in most cases on broad international 
community consent, ISAF/USFOR-A support, and most importantly, GIRoA 
buy-in and action.  This cable does not represent the entirety of 
Mission efforts in support of elections, but instead identifies some 
key nodes designed to enhance the credibility of elections. 
 
¶2. Achieving credible elections requires a proactive strategy of 
changing Afghan popular perceptions that elections will be 
inherently flawed and that the United States will determine the 
outcome of the election.  In order to change this perception, we 
must aggressively implement a strategy of impartiality through 
definitive action and not by words alone. 
MESSAGING:  A VITAL ELEMENT 
--------------------------- 
¶3. Embassy Kabul recommends POTUS make a statement endorsing the 
elections process as a sign of Afghanistan's progress, underscoring 
USG support for the process, and declaring our impartiality over 
candidates.  We additionally recommend that all USG elements refrain 
from making predictions on electoral outcomes - both publicly, to 
President Karzai, and in private conversations.  It is increasingly 
clear that statements implying the outcome is a forgone conclusion 
directly influence the behavior of political figures in Afghanistan. 
 SRSG Kai Eide and leaders of key donor nations should make similar 
statements of neutrality. 
 
¶4. Ambassador Eikenberry will continue to meet with presidential 
candidates to demonstrate impartiality.  He would deliver a 
three-pronged message:  a) The elections are an Afghan-led process 
with strong international support; b) Candidates must present the 
electorate clear choices by discussing concrete issues and programs; 
c) Whatever the outcome, it is vital that Afghans see these 
elections as advancing the institutionalization of processes toward 
representative government; hence the critical need for fairness and 
transparency. 
BOLSTERING MEDIA FREEDOM 
------------------------ 
 
¶5. We will continue to publicly call for President Karzai to gazette 
the Media Law.  Meanwhile, we will focus on  strengthening the 
Electoral Media Commission (EMC), as described in the next 
paragraph, and scrutinizing any IEC Media Commission sanctions or 
referrals to the Ministry of Information, Culture and Tourism.  We 
will encourage the EMC to refer complaints to the Electoral 
Complaints Commission (ECC) when feasible.  USG or partner-initiated 
media monitoring activities at this stage would send a signal of 
over-involvement.  Three bodies work to improve election-related 
media monitoring:  the Independent Election Commission (IEC), the 
Media Commission, and UNDP-ELECT. 
 
CANDIDATE ACCESS TO MEDIA 
------------------------- 
 
¶6. In addition to enforcing the Mass Media Code of Conduct to seek 
fair media treatment for candidates, the Media Commission has 
accepted responsibility for providing "Sponsored Advertising 
Programming" which offers each presidential candidate a baseline 
amount of cost-free radio or TV airtime.  While the IEC has set 
aside USD 2 million for candidate roundtable discussions, we 
recommend establishing a separate fund that could buy additional 
airtime for candidates on private airwaves, or sponsor private 
presidential debates.  The IEC and the ECC would approve this fund, 
likely be administered by UNDP-Elect, prior to its creation.  We 
understand UNDP has a small budget for candidate media access and 
has agreed to add to this budget.  At issue is the D/SRSG contention 
that access be equitable, not equal.  The problem is who determines 
candidate strength to realize equitable funding. 
 
REPORTING ELECTORAL IRREGULARITIES 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶7. The Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) is behind schedule in 
building its office and staff capacities in the provinces.  This is 
a significant weakness.  Post has engaged with the IEC, UNDP, IEC 
and donors to identify ways to accelerate this timeline.  Further, 
Ambassador Carney has proposed the establishing a regionally-based 
ECC Quick Reaction Force (QRF) that would respond to substantial 
violations in a short amount of time. 
 
¶8. We have consulted with the ECC on how to raise its profile in 
publicizing instances of electoral intimidation. 
 
¶9. Post has developed guidelines and FAQs for civilian PRT and 
Regional Command representatives for their appropriate role in 
reporting and acting on electoral fraud and irregularities.  These 
guidelines will emphasize that USG employees may not refer 
complaints directly to the ECC under Afghan law, but that they may 
advise Afghans on how to report complaints.  By following this 
process, we will help strengthen the ECC as an Afghan institution. 
Post has set up a portal to collect and compile reports on election 
irregularities from U.S. Mission elements "in the field."  PRT 
officers regularly meet with provincial election officials and 
candidates to identify logistical issues, to discuss basic elections 
concepts, and to report on elections-related news from their 
provinces.  We expect the volume of reporting to increase 
significantly as the campaign season kicks off on June 16. 
 
¶10. We will work with the MoI to set up the joint police monitoring 
body proposed by Minister Atmar to Ambassador Carney on June 9 
(septel).  This body would include representatives of the 
international community, presidential candidate agents, political 
party agents, existing MOI inspector general officials and 
international military representatives.  The team would review ANP 
performance and behavior in relation to the elections and evaluate 
observed or reported irregularities in ANP behavior.  The team would 
report incidents to the MoI and the ECC for appropriate follow up 
action. 
 
CANDIDATE SECURITY 
------------------ 
 
¶11. The MoI will make ANP personal security details (PSD) available 
to all candidates, but we anticipate that candidates will want to 
source their own private security.  We have engaged MOI to ensure it 
will allow candidates to choose private, licensed security.  This 
may require raising the current cap on private security companies. 
Ambassador Carney asked Minister Atmar on June 9 to use his 
authority to raise the cap.  Atmar has agreed in principle to allow 
candidates to select their own PSDs and ensure these individuals 
receive similar training to those ANP assigned PSD duty.  While 
candidate security is important to fair and transparent elections, 
USG direct funding of candidate PSDs would be problematic for 
political and legal reasons. 
 
TRANSPORT FOR CANDIDATES 
------------------------ 
 
¶12. The presidential incumbent has a natural advantage with regard 
to transport and logistical support.   However, commercial aviation 
- which reaches all major cities - is available to Afghans with 
sufficient financial resources.  The GIRoA agreed to establish a 
fund for candidates' travel, but it has not identified a funding 
source nor agreed who would manage such a fund.  Other 
non-commercial air transport options include the United Nations, 
ISAF, and U.S. Mission aircraft.  The international community in 
Kabul are discussion options for providing support in this area. 
The number of candidates and their desire to travel (not a 
traditional method of campaigning in Afghanistan) would impact the 
design of this scheme. 
 
¶13. Note:  USAID is exploring the capacity to temporarily increase 
the number of aircraft in its fleet to partially accommodate the 
demand for election observers, officials, and media.  Post views the 
equal provision of travel to candidates on U.S. Mission-provided 
transport as a tangible demonstration of USG neutrality in the 
election. 
 
ENHANCING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE IEC 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶14. The IEC is generally perceived by the Afghan public as biased in 
favor of the inumnal election polls if 
fve audit process 
aimed at limiting potential fraud from bogus registration cards and 
polling staff collusion.  ECC/IEC auditors would proactively sample 
and check ballot boxes at provincial centers, especially in areas 
deemed highly vulnerable to fraud.  The audit teams would have the 
ability to void results of these locations if the evidence warrants 
it.  Election Support Team staff have begun discussions on the audit 
idea with the head of the IEC Secretariat Procedures Department. 
¶21. In recognition that public knowledge of the audit process would 
dissuade potential fraud, the Embassy will help the IEC develop a 
public information campaign targeted at political elites and polling 
station workers that would begin one month before elections.  This 
process was used with some success in Iraq. 
EIKENBERRY informing voters and poll workers of the regulations 
and possible consequences of misapplication or fraud. 
 
POLLING 
------- 
 
¶16. The International Republican Institute (IRI) will soon release 
the results of a long-in-the-works poll.  A second USAID-funded IRI 
poll is awaiting IRI submission of a contract request.  There are 
few unbiased polling agencies that can reliably perform credible 
country-wide polls.  We will continue to seek out polling agencies 
that could provide credible elections polling.  Given these 
constraints, in addition to the short timeframe before the election, 
the Embassy will arrange two to three additional election polls if 
funding can be arranged.  Due to the unreliability of exit polling 
in Afghanistan, and the weak public understanding of their purpose 
we believe exit polls could undermine the normal electoral process, 
particularly if initial feedback does not reflect the final result. 
 
OTHER MEASURES TO ENHANCE THE CREDIBILITY 
OF ELECTIONS -- ACCELERATING CIVIC EDUCATION 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶17. International partners will continue supporting the ongoing IEC 
national civic education on the electoral process and election 
safeguards.  For elements particularly aimed at youth and female 
audiences, the international community should augment country-wide 
dissemination of IEC approved materials - including through ISAF 
media facilities - and discuss elections with local religious and 
civil leaders to gain their understanding, support to the election 
process, and commentary on local concerns and issues.  We have 
forwarded three funding proposals to S/SRAP that would expand civic 
outreach. These efforts include a national newspaper ($200k), 
additional radio stations in the South and East ($3M), and election 
outreach, interviews, and SMS texting ($40k), and would support 
immediate election goals and long-term strategic communication 
objectives. 
 
STIMULATING NATIONAL DEBATE 
--------------------------- 
¶18. Post is working with locally-based partners to encourage Afghan 
media to stimulate a deliberative dialogue of key local and national 
issues.  This, in turn, will require candidates to articulate 
specific visions and platforms, and will serve to emphasize that 
individual votes count.  Tolo TV and Radio Watandar have several 
initiatives on this front.  The Embassy will continue to host "web 
chats" with Afghan citizens on topics related to elections.  Our 
goals are to foster a deeper civic understanding of the spirit of 
elections. 
 
SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS AND INTERNATIONAL 
MEDIA 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶19. With UNDP endorsement donor buy-in, the Interagency Elections 
Support Team is working to establish an ad-hoc Secretariat to 
coordinate international observation - which we expect will be 
around 200 observers strong - and facilitate international media 
observation country-wide.  The Secretariat will map international 
observer delegations, including those from resident diplomatic 
missions, identify observer standards, create an observer training 
program, and share information (when appropriate) on deployment. 
The Secretariat might also facilitate logistical support to 
observers and media in outlying regions.  We are also outlining the 
bedspace and transport facilities available at Regional Commands and 
subordinate units and will work with ISAF to produce an order 
outlining appropriate support.  We may require support in obtaining 
NATO HQ or SHAPE guidance to ISAF to facilitate observer and media 
missions. 
 
AUDIT CONCEPT 
-------------- 
¶20. The Elections Team has proposed, and IEC Chief Electoral Officer 
Najafi has enthusiastically endorsed, a comprehensive audit process 
aimed at limiting potential fraud from bogus registration cards and 
polling staff collusion.  ECC/IEC auditors would proactively sample 
and check ballot boxes at provincial centers, especially in areas 
deemed highly vulnerable to fraud.  The audit teams would have the 
ability to void results of these locations if the evidence warrants 
it.  Election Support Team staff have begun discussions on the audit 
idea with the head of the IEC Secretariat Procedures Department. 
¶21. In recognition that public knowledge of the audit process would 
dissuade potential fraud, the Embassy will help the IEC develop a 
public information campaign targeted at political elites and polling 
station workers that would begin one month before elections.  This 
process was used with some success in Iraq. 
EIKENBERRY