VZCZCXRO5457
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #1489 1611445
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 101445Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9345
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS KABUL 001489 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV AF
SUBJECT: TEPID PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE HEDAYAT ARSALA 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (SBU) Former Senior Minister Hedayat Arsala laid out to 
the Ambassador on June 8 a substantive agenda that would 
focus on strengthening governance by fighting government 
corruption and interdicting the narcotics trade.  He asserted 
that Karzai held such strong advantages of incumbency that 
the United States had to help opposition candidates.  The 
Ambassador reiterated our position on favoring no candidate, 
and challenged the opposition to take responsibility to use 
Afghan institutions to draw attention to any electoral 
irregularities.  Arsala had equally little detail on his 
campaign strategy.  He grouped himself with Abdullah and 
Ghani as the three strongest candidates, and hoped he would 
edge them out and make it to a second round to challenge 
Karzai. 
 
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Few details on policy or campaign strategy 
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¶2. (U) Arsala focused his policy agenda on strengthening 
governance, speaking about the mistakes made early in the 
transition by allowing too much authority to go to former 
warlords.  Without citing a specific plan, he spoke about 
fighting government corruption and interdicting the narcotics 
trade.  He asserted that our combined focus should be on 
improving the lives of farmers, so they would choose licit 
crops over poppy, and on creating jobs in urban areas to 
alleviate poverty.  Arsala had few specifics beyond that. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Arsala acknowledged that Karzai appeared to hold the 
upper hand in the contest now.  Arsala recognized that the 
United States was backing no candidate, but he contended that 
the field was not level.  He recited similar complaints that 
we have heard from other opposition candidates about 
officials using government resources to favor Karzai.  He 
asserted that Karzai held such strong advantages of 
incumbency that the United States had to help opposition 
candidates.  He did not specify what form of help he had in 
mind. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Ambassador made clear our policy of favoring no 
candidate ) either the incumbent or the opposition, and put 
the responsibility back on Arsala and others to use electoral 
institutions, the media and public opinion to draw attention 
to electoral irregularities.  He added that the United States 
was working to support a fair and transparent process, and we 
would encourage all candidates to make this a campaign 
involving a competition of ideas. 
 
¶5. (U) On his campaign, Arsala was working quietly both in 
Kabul and in the regions.  He was not appearing in the media 
yet, but planned to do so as soon as the official campaign 
season begins.  As for resources, he would use his own, 
though he is seeking support from certain businesspeople and 
traders.  When pressed, he had little more specific to say on 
his campaign strategy. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Arsala contended that he, Abdullah Abdullah and 
Ashraf Ghani constituted the strongest candidates.  He had 
hoped the three would align together, and thought he would be 
the right person to head the ticket.  He argued that many 
people knew Ghani had a hot temper, a quality that people 
would not want in a president.  Arsala declared that both 
Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns distrusted Abdullah, in part 
because of his Panjshiri Tajik background.  Arsala insisted 
that no one opposed him.  The key would be for him to rise 
above the other candidates to run against Karzai in a second 
round. 
 
¶7. (U) Notwithstanding press reports to the contrary, Arsala 
confirmed that he had resigned his position as senior 
minister in order to contest the election. 
EIKENBERRY