VZCZCXRO3352
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #1466/01 1591434
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 081434Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9313
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001466 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV AF
SUBJECT: DIAG COMMITTEE'S FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
CANDIDATE VETTING 
 
REF: A. KABUL 1274 
     ¶B. KABUL 1406 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  To discuss the results of the candidate 
vetting process, National Security Advisor Zalmai Rassoul 
hosted a meeting on June 7 for Minister of Interior Atmar, 
Minister of Defense Wardak, Vice-Chair of the Demobilization 
and Reintegration Commission Mohammed Stanekzai, Independent 
Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) Deputy Barna Karimi, 
UNAMA DSRSG Peter Galbraith and Ambassadors from the 
Embassies of Japan, Canada, the UK and the United States. 
Stanekzai presented the results of the Demobilization and 
Reconciliation Commission's (DRC) re-vetting of candidates 
who challenged their links to illegallyed groups (IAG) or 
began the formal disarmament process after receiving 
notification of possible disqualification of candidacy.  On 
June 8, the DRC will recommend to the ECC that two 
presidential or vice-presidential (VP) and 59 provincial 
council (PC) candidates be excluded from the final candidate 
list based on continuing links to IAGs.  The group concurred 
that working within the legal structure is critical, noting 
the flaws of the current system.  The ECC may eliminate other 
candidates based on criminal convictions.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------- 
IDENTIFYING IAG CONNECTIONS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Rassoul opened the meeting by citing numbers: out 
of 43 presidential candidates and 86 vice-presidential 
candidates, the DRC identified four individuals with possible 
IAG connections.  From the initial 3,324 provincial council 
candidates, the DRC found 112 individuals had possible IAG 
connections.  DRC's initial review of the candidate lists was 
completed and reported to the international community on May 
18 (ref A). 
 
¶3.  (SBU) On May 23, the DRC began notifying candidates with 
potential IAG ties of the challenge to their candidacy. 
Stanekzai reported that notification to all candidates was 
completed on June 3, as the DRC faced many difficulties in 
contacting candidates, noting incorrect phone and address 
information provided on candidate application forms.  The 
DRC, with ECC monitoring, used all available means to ensure 
individuals received notification of IAG related challenges 
to candidacy; phone calls, e-mails, delivery by provincial 
governors or chiefs of police and even PRT assistance.  The 
DRC documented all attempts to contact individuals to prevent 
subsequent denials of receipt of notification. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Candidates disqualified by the initial IAG review 
had five days to respond to the notification (ref B).  If 
listed as active IAG members, disqualified candidates could 
withdraw from the race, present evidence to provincial DIAG 
offices that they have already cut ties to IAGs, or begin the 
formal disarmament process through provincial DIAG offices. 
The DRC re-vetted candidates who challenged their IAG 
connection or began to formally disarm. 
 
------------------------------- 
PRESIDENTIAL AND VP CANDIDATES 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Stanekzai detailed the DRC findings in the cases of 
four presidential and VP candidates, emphasizing that the DRC 
must have sufficient evidence to support its recommendations 
to the ECC.  The DRC will recommend the ECC disqualify 
presidential candidate Mohammad Akbar Bai and VP candidate 
Zai-u-din.  Akbar Bai, a rival of former Uzbek warlord 
Dostum, responded to the DRC challenge by denying ownership 
of illegal weapons or ongoing ties to IAG groups.  Based on 
evidence from security and intelligence agencies showing 
continuing ties to illegally armed groups, the DRC will stand 
firm on the negative recommendation.  For Badghis-based 
Zia-u-din (on the ticket of presidential aspirant Sangin 
Mohammed Rahmani), security agency information again 
demonstrated ongoing ties to IAG groups despite the 
candidate's claim of disarmament. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The DRC will not recommend disqualification in the 
cases of presidential candidates Mullah Abdul Salam Raketi 
and Haji Abdul Ghafar Zori.  Stakenzai asserted that the DRC 
has insufficient evidence of ongoing ties to IAGs and 
stressed the disqualifying factor of current, not historical, 
activities.  Raketi contested ongoing links with IAGs, 
providing DRC with evidence of weapons previously turned in 
to U.S. and Afghan authorities ) including four Stingers. 
Zori also disputed current links to IAGs, maintaining that he 
formally disarmed in 2005.  Afghan security and intelligence 
agencies were unable to provide additional information in 
either case demonstrating current IAG links. 
 
KABUL 00001466  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Stanekzai asserted that recommending 
disqualification of candidates without sufficient supporting 
evidence would discredit the vetting process to the Afghan 
people, noting the important role of DIAG vetting in the 2010 
district council and parliamentary elections.  He declared 
the DRC could not judge a candidate's moral background but 
must rely on current evidence.  Wardak concurred, and 
stressed the legal restrictions on vetting.  He emphasized 
the burden of proof required to disqualify an individual, 
noting that a conviction is required to eliminate a candidate 
for criminal actions and the difficulties the ECC faces in 
providing the second nationality for candidates accused of 
dual citizenship.  The international community 
representatives agreed that the process must comply with the 
letter and spirit of the existing law, but suggested legal 
revisions could improve the process. 
 
------------------------------ 
PROVINCIAL COUNCIL CANDIDATES 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (SBU) For the 112 provincial council (PC) candidates 
initially challenged for IAG ties, the DRC will recommend 59 
for disqualification.  Two candidates proved that they were 
not the targeted individual.  For 51 candidates, the DRC 
either lacks evidence of continuing ties to IAGs or the 
candidates began formally disarming.  The DRC will not 
recommend the ECC exclude these candidates.  Over 245 illegal 
weapons were turned-in by candidates since the notification 
process began.  Some candidates not found ineligible by the 
DIAG list are voluntarily disarming.  In Jowzjan, one 
candidate surrendered 80 weapons to prevent possible future 
problems.  One instance of success is the DRC's 
recommendation to exclude two Helmand candidates, Abdul 
Rahman Jan and Amir Mohammad Akhundzada, both known to Post 
to have ties to IAG groups. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Stanekzai explained that in addition to formally 
surrendering weapons, the weapons are verified by Afghan 
authorities, and the candidates must sign a declaration that 
they own no other illegal weapons.  The DRC then works with 
local authorities to assess the individual's situation and 
ties to IAGs and the final decision is based on the complete 
situation.  He cited the example of Badghis PC candidate Haji 
Khan Mohammad who turned in 100 weapons after being notified 
of his DRC challenge.  Subsequent investigation by Afghan 
security agencies suggested that the weapons surrendered 
represented only a fraction of those owned by Khan and the 
DRC recommended his removal from the candidate list. 
 
----------------------- 
NEXT STEPS AND CONCERNS 
----------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Atmar suggested to the group the need for an 
agreement with the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and 
the ECC on consequences for candidates who falsely claim to 
have disarmed.  He proposed the Afghan government, in 
coordination with UNAMA, should petition the courts for legal 
authorization to search the property of candidates who have 
signed a declaration disavowing illegal weapons, where there 
is doubt about compliance.  If illegal weapons are found, the 
ECC could disqualify that candidate regardless of when the 
weapons are found ) even post polling day he believed. 
Ambassador Carney noted that any such policy would require a 
basis in the electoral law. 
 
-------------------------- 
DUAL CITIZENSHIP CONCERNS 
-------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Atmar also raised an upcoming issue for the ECC - 
identifying presidential candidates who hold dual 
citizenship.  The Afghan constitution forbids presidential 
and VP candidates from holding dual nationality.  However, 
the ECC has not yet established a mechanism to determine if a 
candidate holds dual citizenship.  Ambassador Carney and the 
UK and Canadian ambassadors stressed that each country's 
privacy laws restricted the release of information without 
specific consent from the individual.  Atmar and Rassoul 
speculated about including such authorization as part of a 
required form for candidates; no decision was reached. 
EIKENBERRY