VZCZCXRO2911
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #1461/01 1591020
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 081020Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9307
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001461 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/A, S/CRS, INL/AP, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR FLOURNOY 
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-101, POLAD, JICENT 
KABUL FOR COS USFOR-A 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS MASS AF
SUBJECT:  FLASHES OF GIROA LEADERSHIP IN PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  Recent media statements from MOI and MOD citing 
civilian casualties caused by the Taliban and supporting the 
presence of international troops demonstrated unusual and welcomed 
Afghan leadership in public communications.  This may be the result 
of a patient and determined effort by the Government Media and 
Information Center (GMIC) to reach out to MOI and MOD and to promote 
Afghan Government communications with the Afghan public.  End 
summary. 
 
 
¶2. (U) Over Sunday and Monday, May 31 - June 1, GIRoA security 
officials provided three separate statements to the press that put 
the Taliban in a bad light and supported the presence of foreign 
troops.  This has not been common practice. 
 
 
¶3. (U) One of the leading stories over the 24-hour period was the 
Ministry of Interior's announcement that it is ready to launch 
operations to take back the 10 districts that are not under 
government control.  No specific timetable was given, and MOI 
spokesperson Zamary Bashari noted that the ANP will need backup from 
other security forces in order to ensure success.  Ministry of 
Defense spokesperson General Azimi added that the ANA is 
intensifying operations to ensure election security. 
 
 
¶4. (U) In a separate statement, Gen. Azimi said that the cause of 
violence in Afghanistan is terrorism, which requires the presence of 
international forces.  "If the enemy wants international forces to 
leave the country, then the enemy should lay down its weapons and 
join the government," he said. 
 
 
¶5. (U) A local TV channel quoted MOI Bashari as saying that in the 
last 7 days, 120 terrorist attacks took place across the country, 
killing 42 innocent civilians and injuring another 54.  He went on 
to note the death of 85 insurgents and the arrests of an additional 
¶69. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶6. (SBU) GIRoA officials rarely make public statements blaming the 
Taliban and other enemies of the state for innocent deaths or to 
justify the presence of foreign troops.  We have encouraged the 
positive, proactive public communication to help counter the 
disinformation disseminated so effectively by the Taliban. 
Nonetheless, most GIRoA statements have focused on civilian 
casualties allegedly caused by Coalition forces. 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) Over the past month, Afghanistan's Government Media and 
Information Center (GMIC) has hosted a series of internal meetings 
to discuss messaging on elections security and other topics and has 
urged both MOI and MOD to be more proactive in communicating with 
the public.  MOI and MOD both agreed with GMIC's dynamic young 
Afghan leader and staff to increase their public posture. These 
recent public statements evidently are the results.  They illustrate 
the basic GMIC objective of building the status of the Afghan 
government with the Afghan people: GMIC put MOD and MOI publicly in 
the lead, rather than leaving ISAF/USFOR-A as the only voice 
speaking out against the insurgency within Afghanistan. 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) We are also seeing other signs of improved communication 
among security stakeholders in Kabul outside the GMIC process. 
Media sources tell us that the MOI and MOD spokesmen, Mr. Bashari 
and Gen. Azimi, have increased their cooperation and coordination 
efforts over the past few months. At Minister Atmar's direction, the 
MOI's Public Affairs office is being more proactive in sending out 
positive press releases regularly.  CSTC-A has assisted MOI with 
technical support and MOI has welcomed close coordination with 
USFOR-A Public Affairs office. 
 
 
9 (SBU) Strengthening Afghanistan's security, governance and 
development to counter the insurgency require regular and effective 
communication, in both directions, between the GoIRA and the people 
of Afghanistan.  In public communications as in all else, our 
strategic interest lies in promoting Afghan leadership, Afghan 
capacity, and Afghan sustainability.  That means avoiding our 
predisposition to do Afghans' public communicating for them, out of 
the sense that we know best not only what the Afghan Government 
should say, but also how they should say it.  When we do see flashes 
 
KABUL 00001461  002 OF 002 
 
 
of GoIRA leadership in public communications -- as in any field-- we 
must subtly support and encourage it.  When we don't see Afghan 
leadership in public communications, the answer must not be to 
amplify the volume and frequency of our own messages directed at the 
Afghan audience, but rather to develop, to influence, and to support 
the most authoritative and effective Afghan communicators. 
 
 
EIKENBERRY