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Viewing cable 09KABUL1421, JOINT WARDAK-LOGAR POLICE SUMMIT PART OF EFFORT TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL1421 2009-06-06 07:05 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO2278
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #1421/01 1570705
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 060705Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9254
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001421 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID AF
SUBJECT: JOINT WARDAK-LOGAR POLICE SUMMIT PART OF EFFORT TO 
DEVELOP POLICING 
 
1.    (SBU) Summary:  To address police deficiencies in Logar 
and Wardak provinces, the 3rd Brigade 10th Mountain Division 
(3/10) is working with national police and the local police 
chiefs to implement both a bottom-up and top-down police 
development strategy.  Through a series of inspection tours 
and a provincial summits the 3/10 has worked with the Afghans 
to bring together national, provincial and district police 
leadership to collectively address habitual police problems 
in the two provinces.  In the long run, however, improvements 
in the Afghan National Police (ANP) will require sustained 
mentoring, a recognized form of accountability, and other 
measures specifically focused on reinforcing the entire chain 
of command at the national, provincial and district levels. 
End Summary. 
 
Series of Police Inspections in Logar and Wardak 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
2.    (SBU) Prior to its deployment in December 2008, the 
3/10 determined to prioritize police development.  Prior to 
the 3/10's arrival, limited Coalition Force presence did not 
permit for extensive interaction with the police.  Upon its 
arrival, the 3/10 began to implement both a bottom-up and 
top-down strategy by bringing together national, provincial 
and district police leadership to collectively address 
habitual police problems in their area of operations.  From 
the bottom, the 3/10 sought to duplicate the Afghan National 
Army (ANA) training system, to include strong and sustained 
mentoring and accountability.  From the top, the 3/10 brigade 
commander and the provincial police chief carried out a 
series of police inspections in each of the districts. 
(Comment: Prior to this, neither of the provincial police 
chiefs had visited a number of their districts in more than a 
year.) 
 
3.    (SBU) Questions raised during the district inspections 
included personnel and equipment accountability, patrol 
schedules, authority to hire and fire, Afghan National Civil 
Order Police (ANCOP) command and control, and insufficient 
tashkiel (NCO policemen) allocation.  The most common 
problems centered on logistics, specifically fuel 
distribution, barrier materials and vehicle maintenance. 
Blame for these problems was placed across the board but 
usually on whomever was not present, particularly the 
national leadership. 
 
Logar-Wardak Police Summit 
------------------------- 
 
4.    (SBU) Recognizing that the police would continue to 
pass the buck and continuously blame others for their 
problems, a plan was conceived to bring decision makers 
across the national, provincial and district level is 
together in one room for a "police summit."  Deputy Minister 
of Interior LTG Mangal agreed to chair the meeting, which was 
held on May 19 at FOB Shank.  Logar and Wardak provincial 
chiefs of police and most of the district police chiefs 
attended the meeting.  (Comment: Also invited to attend were 
Deputy Minister of Interior for Administration and Supply, 
LTG Haydir Basir and the regional commander, MG Alimi 
Khoistani, but they failed to show.  Minister of Interior 
Atmar commented after the summit that he was disappointed 
that neither attended.)  The meeting marked the first time 
that national, provincial and district police leadership came 
together to collectively interact with one another and 
address policing issues in Logar and Wardak.  For police at 
the district level it provided the novel experience of 
interacting with their national leadership. 
 
5.    (SBU) The role played by 3/10 during the summit was 
limited to the brigade commander highlighting commonly held 
problems raised during the inspection tours as a series of 
questions to spur discussion and debate among all of the 
police present.  While solutions were not reached on most of 
the problems discussed, the summit served as a forum in which 
the parties could better understand the Afghan process and 
forge a sustained Afghan solution.  The discussions, many 
times uninterrupted by translators, allowed for candid and 
constructive conversation.  For example, while the Logar 
provincial police chief gave a rosy perspective of the 
province, some of the district chiefs were brutally candid 
and realistic in their comments, saying directly to the 
deputy minister, "That is not how things really are since we 
can't get what we need," and "We are stationed in a school 
and don't want to be there." 
 
6.    (SBU) Furthermore, while all police participants 
understood how police officers and tashkiel were hired, not 
 
KABUL 00001421  002 OF 002 
 
 
all understood who has hiring and firing authority, nor did 
they all initially understand basic questions such as whether 
ANCOP report to provincial police chiefs or to Kabul. 
(Comment: ANCOP answer to the provincial chief of police. End 
Comment.) Commenting that he felt like he was "on the witness 
stand" for much of the meeting, LTG Mangal was nonetheless 
constructive and listened to all of the chiefs' comments.  He 
acknowledged that the MOI is severely deficient in a number 
of areas but said he would directly involve himself in 
addressing their issues, particularly fuel shortages.  While 
he promised to review resources, he also encouraged the 
district chiefs to be creative and try to find a resolution 
themselves.  As a means of maintaining a focus on the issues 
discussed, Mangal recommended a follow on meeting on August 
10, before the elections. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
7.    (SBU) The police in Logar and Wardak have a long road 
ahead of them to reach adequate self sustained capabilities, 
let alone to achieve operational effectiveness on par with 
the Afghan army.  A series of inspections or police summits 
are not enough to fix the problems.  These efforts will also 
need to be complemented with prolonged mentoring, a 
recognized form of accountability, and other measures that 
specifically focus on reinforcing the entire chain of command 
at the national, provincial and district levels. 
EIKENBERRY