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Viewing cable 09KABUL1390, CODEL LANGEVIN DISCUSSES SECURITY AND ELECTIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL1390 2009-06-02 07:38 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO8062
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #1390/01 1530738
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 020738Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9204
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001390 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MASS KDEM PTER AF
SUBJECT: CODEL LANGEVIN DISCUSSES SECURITY AND ELECTIONS 
WITH CONFIDENT KARZAI 
 
1. (SBU) Summary. Codel Langevin (Rep. James Langevin, Rep. 
Mike Coffman, Rep. Tom Rooney, Rep. Kilili Sablan) met with a 
relaxed, confident President Karzai May 30 to discuss 
Afghanistan's greatest challenges - insecurity and weak 
governance, as well as Karzai's plans for the country's 
future.  Karzai was confident of re-election and stressed the 
need for continued U.S. assistance to achieve a more secure, 
sustainable Afghanistan.  He pledged to strengthen his focus 
on capacity building and anti-corruption efforts if 
re-elected, and contended reconciliation was both feasible 
and desirable to promote stability. 
 
FIGHT AGAINST TERROR STILL TOP PRIORITY 
--------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Karzai agreed that Afghanistan and the U.S. must 
continue to focus on the fight against terrorism.  Karzai was 
increasingly worried about the impact Pakistan's growing 
instability - especially in the border areas - was having on 
Afghanistan's own security.  Afghanistan continued to seek 
improved security cooperation with Pakistan.  Karzai thought 
assistance from countries from the Arab world and the "world 
of Islam" (especially Saudi Arabia) was necessary to 
successfully address the insurgent threat in Pakistan.  The 
Ambassador noted that President Obama would deliver a speech 
in Cairo this week addressing broader global issues and the 
Muslim world. 
 
KARZAI'S OUTLINES DESIRED LEGACY 
------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU)  Whatever the outcome of the upcoming elections, 
Karzai stressed the Afghan people must see the election 
process as fair and transparent.  This, he said, would be a 
key step in the institutionalization of democracy in 
Afghanistan.  The Codel asked how Karzai saw his legacy in 
five years if he were re-elected.  The Representatives 
pointed to some good ministers working to strengthen their 
institutions, especially the Ministers of Interior, Defense 
and Finance, and asked if Karzai intended to retain these 
officials if re-elected.  Karzai assured the Codel he 
intended to continue forward with his most effective 
ministers. 
 
4. (SBU) If elected to another term, Karzai hoped 2014 would 
see a more united Afghanistan in which its people did not 
live in fear, either from militants or their own officials. 
A more democratic, economically sound Afghanistan that 
offered its children a brighter future, took its place as an 
equal among nations, and lived at peace both within its own 
borders and with its neighbors, and an Afghanistan that still 
counted the U.S. as a strong ally. 
 
GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY CHALLENGES 
--------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Responding to the Codel's concerns regarding 
governance and security problems, Karzai acknowledged there 
were still many problems but added his government had 
accomplished much in recent years.  He pointed to education 
and health as areas were Afghanistan had made great strides - 
from primary schools to universities, thousands more students 
were participating in the education system each year.  And 
the spread of health clinics and practitioners to more remote 
parts of the country was directly improving quality of life 
for the Afghan people. 
 
6. (SBU) Counterterrorism remained at the top of the list of 
Afghanistan's concerns, but close behind, Karzai said, was 
the lack of governance capacity.  Below the most senior 
levels, administrative and governmental capacity remained 
extremely weak.  If re-elected, he planned to focus more 
closely on ways to bridge this gap and praised India's model 
of civil service training and administration.  Karzai wanted 
to develop programs to build up Afghanistan's civil service 
similar to those programs already being implemented to reform 
and strengthen the army, police and judiciary.  In the 
absence of significant improvements in governance, Karzai 
asserted that Afghanistan would be a long-term burden for the 
U.S. and the international community.  U.S. and international 
support to build this administrative capacity was critical. 
 
7. (SBU) Regarding the Codel's inquiry on his efforts to 
combat corruption and strengthen rule of law, Karzai noted 
Afghanistan's judicial structures had been virtually 
destroyed after 30 years of war.  The judiciary needed more 
technical assistance and educated judges and lawyers.  Karzai 
agreed widespread corruption was a problem, but asserted that 
it went beyond government and represented a societal 
challenge as well.  He noted the government sometimes 
struggled to hold a local official or community leader 
 
KABUL 00001390  002 OF 002 
 
 
accountable for misconduct because the community would often 
band together out of loyalty and pressure the government to 
drop its efforts, even knowing the individual was guilty of 
wrongdoing. 
 
KARZAI OPTIMISTIC ON RE-ELECTION 
------------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Karzai was cautiously optimistic regarding his 
re-election prospects.  He related that earlier in the day, 
he had struck deals with leaders of the Hazara and Uzbek 
political contingents (Haji Mohammed Mohaqqeq and Sayed 
Noorullah, respectively).  Karzai noted the leaders had 
attached surprisingly few conditions in offering to throw 
their support to Karzai.  According to the President, both 
Mohaqqeq and Noorullah said their communities were satisfied 
with Karzai's representation of ethnic minorities and saw him 
as a unity candidate. 
 
9. (SBU) The President claimed the overall political system 
was weakened by having too many marginal presidential 
candidates.  Many had joined the race only to see what deals 
could be made when the major candidates sought to consolidate 
support.  This "dealmaking" diminished the process in the 
eyes of the public.  (Note: An ironic observation coming from 
the candidate making most of the deals thus far.)  The Codel 
asked if development of stronger political parties would not 
go far in addressing this concern.  Karzai agreed, saying he 
favored the U.S. system of two strong parties instead of "30 
small squabbling parties." (Note: Karzai has consistently 
opposed development of strong Afghan political parties in 
favor of the more traditional system of personal patronage 
and informal, shifting political alliances - the system that 
enabled him to strike the deals with Mohaqqeq and Noorullah.) 
 
RECONCILIATION 
------------- 
 
10. (SBU) The Codel asked about the prospects for 
reconciliation.  Karzai affirmed reconciliation remained an 
attainable, desirable goal to heal rifts within Afghanistan. 
Only those with ties to al-Qaeda or foreign intelligence 
services were outside the circle of potential reconcilables. 
Karzai maintained most local taliban fighters were poor, 
uneducated people who could be convinced to lay down arms and 
accept Afghanistan's constitution.  Karzai hoped for 
continued support from partners like the U.S. and Saudi 
Arabia in moving reconciliation forward, however 
incrementally.  One ongoing problem in securing the support 
of at-risk communities was civilian casualties. Karzai 
recognized the U.S. suffered losses - along with Afghan 
forces - in fighting the enemy and that Coalition Forces 
continually sought to avoid civilian losses. Nonetheless, it 
was a profoundly sensitive issue for the Afghan people and 
one that was used as an effective wedge by those hard-core 
militants who opposed reconciliation. 
 
POPPY STILL A PROBLEM 
--------------------- 
 
11. (SBU) The Codel asked about Karzai's counternarcotics 
efforts, noting that 93 percent of the world's opium still 
came from Afghan poppy.  Karzai pointed out that the vast 
majority of that poppy originated in Helmand province in 
areas outside government control.  He pointed to the dramatic 
decline of poppy cultivation in other parts of Afghanistan, 
saying that in areas where security and some level of 
governance were present, poppy declined or disappeared, 
adding that where there is little security there is "much 
poppy" and where there is no security there is a "lot of 
poppy." Karzai also criticized earlier poor coordination of 
counternarcotics efforts by the international community and 
the UN with the Afghan government, but noted coordination had 
improved markedly over the past year. 
 
EIKENBERRY