VZCZCXRO7174
OO RUEHDT RUEHPB
DE RUEHJA #0999/01 1630236
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 120236Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2535
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP 0125
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000999 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, E, INL 
DOJ FOR CRIM AAG SWARTZ, DOJ/OPDAT FOR BERMAN 
NSC FOR E.PHU; MCC FOR ISMAIL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCOR ID
SUBJECT: TICK-TOCK: TIME IS RUNNING OUT ON INDONESIA'S 
ANTI-CORRUPTION COURT LAW 
 
REF: JAKARTA 1818 
 
JAKARTA 00000999  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Parliament's passage of the 
Anti-Corruption Court law by a December 2009 deadline poses a 
critical challenge to the future of anti-corruption reform in 
Indonesia.  The Anti-Corruption Court has been a key part of 
the Corruption Eradication Commission's (KPK) perfect 
prosecution record.  A version of the legislation remains 
pending in Parliament, and President Yudhoyono has pledged to 
extend the court's mandate via decree if Parliament fails to 
act in time.  In either scenario, the KPK will most likely 
face a less-welcoming court, which could make prosecutions 
more difficult.  How the GOI handles this legislation will 
test the Parliament and President's anti-corruption resolve. 
End Summary. 
 
ANTI-CORRUPTION COURT'S MANDATE UP FOR RENEWAL 
 
¶2. (SBU) The unprecedented success of the Corruption 
Eradication Commission (KPK) and the Anti-Corruption Court 
(ACC) has created many enemies for the two bodies in 
Parliament, having convicted several sitting members of 
Parliament of corruption.  The ACC was established in tandem 
with the KPK in 2002 in order to handle corruption cases 
involving high level government officials, significant losses 
to the state, or strong public interest.  In December 2006, 
two alleged corrupters challenged the constitutionality of 
the court, stating that defendants in the ACC were treated 
differently than those tried in the regular courts.  The 
Constitutional Court agreed that this double standard was 
unconstitutional and gave the parliament three years to pass 
a revised law.  The President sent the current draft 
Anti-Corruption Court law to Parliament in August 2008, but 
it remains in committee awaiting deliberation (reftel). 
 
DIFFERENCES IN LEGISLATION 
 
¶3. (SBU) The two top issues that will determine the 
independence and effectiveness of the Anti-Corruption Court 
are: composition of career and non-career judges; and plans 
for expanding the Anti-Corruption Courts to the provincial 
level.  At present, the Anti-Corruption Court's judge 
composition always has a non-career judge majority, either 
three non-career to two career judges or two to one, 
depending on the size and importance of the case.  The draft 
Anti-Corruption Court bill sidesteps the judge composition 
question.  The Supreme Court Chief Justice or Provincial High 
Court Justice could be tasked with determining the proper 
composition.  This lack of specificity potentially removes 
one of the key provisions of the law.  The prominent role of 
the non-career judges is a key reason for the Anti-Corruption 
Court's independence and positive rulings for the KPK, 
according to many analysts. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The current Anti-Corruption Court bill calls for the 
establishment of Anti-Corruption Courts in every provincial 
capital.  These Courts would rule on all corruption cases, 
both from the KPK and Attorney General's Office.  At present, 
there is one Anti-Corruption Court in Jakarta that rules on 
KPK cases only.  This proposed expansion raises 
implementation concerns, particularly on human resource 
capacity.  The current Anti-Corruption Court took nearly two 
years to get up and running.  Selecting qualified non-career 
judges for 33 provincial courts, providing training, and 
approving sufficient budgets could stall this court 
development.  Further, this court proliferation would dilute 
the elite or specialized nature of the Anti-Corruption Court, 
which could threaten its credibility and independence. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Civil society leaders have proposed an alternative 
Anti-Corruption Court law that would keep non-career judges 
as a majority on any corruption case.  The civil society 
draft also would limit the Anti-Corruption Court expansion to 
five regional Anti-Corruption Courts that could handle cases 
outside of Jakarta.  Civil society leaders are lobbying 
Commission III and other Parliament leaders, and met with 
Speaker Laksono on May 18.  Civil society leaders are 
pessimistic they will be able to get their recommendations 
into the current draft law.  They are looking to the 
Presidential Decree and the next Parliament's revisions to 
the law as opportunities to influence the Court's future. 
 
HUNG-UP IN PARLIAMENT 
 
 
JAKARTA 00000999  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The draft Anti-Corruption Court law is currently 
under review in a special committee within Parliament's Legal 
Commission (Commission III).  Speaker of Parliament Agung 
Laksono has promised to consider this bill before Parliament 
adjourns in October; initial deliberations are set for the 
week of June 15.  Civil society leaders and political 
analysts are skeptical that the Parliament will be able to 
pass this contentious bill before the Constitutional Court 
deadline.  The Speaker did not list the Anti-Corruption Court 
bill in his top legislative priorities for the remaining four 
months of this Parliament. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The new Parliament would have less than two months 
to pass the key anti-corruption legislation.  A majority of 
legislators will be new to Parliament when the next 
Parliament convenes in October.  If the current parliament 
does not pass the bill before October, civil society and 
government contacts do not believe the new Parliamentarians 
will have sufficient time to learn about the nuances of the 
law and pass this key legislation before the deadline. 
Presidential legal advisor Denny Indrayana has said that the 
President would issue a Presidential Decree to allow the 
court to continue to operate if Parliament fails to pass the 
law in time.  One prominent member of Parliament indicated 
that he would support a Presidential Decree as a short-term 
solution to keep the Court in operation and give Parliament 
more time to deliberate on the bill. 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The constitutionality of the Presidential Decree 
could be ambiguous.  The decree could fail to address a 
component of the 2006 Constitutional Court's complaint 
against the ACC: that corruption suspects receive different 
treatment depending on which court the case is tried.  Some 
KPK contacts have suggested that the ACC court members are 
biased by a strong desire to punish corrupt activities, 
supporting the Constitutional Court ruling.  A Constitutional 
Court contact indicated that a Presidential Decree would 
likely be unconstitutional, but could not speculate on 
whether the court would take a stand on the issue.  Contacts 
suggest that a corruption defendant convicted under a 
presidentially-extended ACC could launch an appeal of the 
conviction on constitutional grounds, which could hamper the 
anti-corruption drive. 
 
CORRUPTION ERADICATION WITH OR WITHOUT THE ACC 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The Anti-Corruption Court has been a key factor in 
the KPK's success, but not the only one.  The KPK has a 
strong mandate to prevent corruption activities in addition 
to the investigation and prosecution of corruption.  The KPK 
has instituted mandatory wealth reporting and gratuity 
reporting by public officials.  As a component of their 
prevention activities, the KPK has developed a 
train-the-trainer anti-corruption education initiative and 
worked to generate greater public support in the fight 
against corruption.  The KPK has also worked with the State 
Ministry of Administrative Reform to improve the provision of 
public services, a major source of corruption at the local 
level.  The KPK also monitors the administrative management 
of state and public institutions, creating an important 
internal control system.  These preventive elements of the 
KPK's mission are not contingent on the existence of the ACC. 
 
A ROAD FORWARD FOR THE KPK 
 
¶10. (SBU) The end of a specialized Anti-Corruption Court may 
not be the end of the KPK.  If the ACC ceases to exist, the 
KPK would prosecute corruption cases in the regular court 
system.  Although the KPK's rate of successful prosecutions 
would likely decline, KPK and legal reform NGO contacts 
suggest that the KPK could still win cases in the regular 
courts.  Some major institutional advantages of the KPK would 
still continue if there were no ACC.  The KPK would still 
have a significant operating budget, greater independence in 
investigations, and robust investigatory powers, including 
the ability to use wiretapping.  With the KPK's institutional 
advantages in the regular courts, the KPK could demonstrate 
that its success is not dependent on the ACC, but on robust 
investigatory techniques and strong evidence of corruption. 
 
ANTI-CORRUPTION COURT LEGISLATION TESTS GOVERNMENT'S RESOLVE 
 
 
JAKARTA 00000999  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶11. (SBU) Parliament's passage ) or not ) of the draft 
Anti-Corruption Court is a major litmus test for the 
anti-corruption reform movement in Indonesia.  How 
Indonesia's parliament handles the renewal of the 
Anti-Corruption Court law will send a powerful signal to the 
Indonesian public and would-be corrupters, according to civil 
society contacts.  Corruption eradication has been and 
continues to be a main component of President Yudhoyono's 
reform agenda. President Yudhoyono has been a strong champion 
of Indonesia's anti-corruption efforts and met with Speaker 
Laksono to encourage Parliament to pass the bill. 
Additionally, President Yudhoyono has offered a Presidential 
Decree as a potential extension of the court's mandate. 
NORTH