VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUB #0327/01 1561139
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 051139Z JUN 09
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4451
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0036
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS HAVANA 000327 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP 
DEPT PASS TO KCC 
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS SMIG CPAS CMGT ASEC CU
SUBJECT:  FRAUD SUMMARY Q CUBA 
 
Ref: (A) 08 State 00844 (B) HAVANA 142 
 
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COUNTRY CONDITIONS 
------------------ 
 
¶1.  Although initially optimistic that Raul CastroQs 
formal assumption of power might bring significant 
improvements to their lives, the economic and 
political reality on the ground continues to drive 
many Cubans either to the Interests Section or more 
unacceptably, the high seas, in any hopes for 
emigration. Over 20,000 Cuban immigrant visas and 
paroles were issued in FY2008 in compliance with the 
1994 US-Cuba Migration Accords, with the number of 
petitions filed in FY08 alone tripling as a result 
of the Cuban Family Reunification Program (CFRP). 
CFRP provides fast-track status for Cubans currently 
awaiting a non-current immigrant visa case.  In 
conjunction with SpainQs new nationality law (see 
paragraph 10), these programs have resulted in new 
opportunities for legal migration.  Between 2009 and 
2011, a quarter of a million Cubans out of a total 
population of 11 million will either legally 
emigrate or acquire a second nationality. With much 
of the Cuban public still eager to leave the island, 
significant incentive still exists for illegal 
migration to the US for those who do not qualify via 
legal migration procedures. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  The level of consular fraud at Post is medium. 
Although post believes the market for fraudulent 
civil documents is growing, the Cuban governmentQs 
stringent controls on the exit visa process and the 
countryQs general reputation for the stringent 
policing of its citizens result in lower levels of 
corruption than elsewhere in the Caribbean. 
 
--------- 
NIV FRAUD 
--------- 
 
¶3.  There is little large-scale fraud among Post's 
NIV applicants.  Most applicants are senior citizens 
who have family in the United States.  Younger 
people who might otherwise be inclined to apply for 
a visa to facilitate a permanent stay in the United 
States are often deterred from applying by Post's 
high refusal rate for such applicants.  The MRV 
application fee, which is the equivalent Qfive 
months wages for most Cubans, effectively places a 
U.S. visa application out-of-reach for many Cubans, 
especially the large percentage with no access to 
hard currency. 
 
¶4.  A validation study recently conducted by the NIV 
unit of B1 issuances pointed out both successes as 
well as causes for concern. The study, conducted 
with DHS assistance, determined a B1 
overstay/adjuster rate of 3.49 percent for the Aug 
2007-Aug 2008 time period.  However, DHS has alerted 
post that religious ministers previously issued 
numerous B-1 visas are using R-1 visas obtained in 
the United States as a method of circumventing 
CubaQs lengthy Security Advisory Opinion process and 
its one entry visa. 
 
¶5.  Post has also recently attempted to curb the use 
of B1/B2 visas by the families of African diplomats 
after recognizing patterns of behavior inconsistent 
with legitimate tourist travel.  In one particularly 
egregious case, a family member affiliated with the 
Congolese embassy made over 15 trips to the US in a 
four-month period.  The results of an RSO 
investigation concluded that these diplomats were in 
fact engaging in the sale in Cuba of US-origin goods 
in violation of US economic sanctions against the 
island.  Subsequent visa applications for these 
individuals have been denied. 
 
 
--------- 
IV FRAUD 
--------- 
 
¶6. Post continues to see a high incidence of fraud 
involving K and Immediate Relative (IR and CR) visa 
applications.  The dismal results of a 2006 K-1 
validation study confirmed USINTQs anecdotal 
evidence that approximately 38% of issued applicants 
did not marry their petitioning fianc after arrival 
in the US.  As a result, post initiated mandatory 
Lexis-Nexis searches on all K-1 applicants to combat 
fraud and sends roughly 1/3 of all K cases back to 
the US for revocation.  The IV unit has seen a 
significant drop-off in fianc visa interviews 
scheduled in FY09, and hopes to continue avoiding 
spurious K petitions by combating mala-fide 
applicants while managing the necessary increase in 
back-office investigations of these cases. 
 
¶7. Post expects to fill the vacant Fraud Prevention 
LES position during FY 09.  One IV/P locally 
contracted employee is assigned to the FPU on a 
part-time basis. 
 
 
-------- 
DV FRAUD 
-------- 
 
¶8.  Post has begun to scrutinize DV cases in which 
the primary applicant marries after receiving 
notification of a successful DV entry. Recent cases 
of what appear to be marriage fraud and mala-fide 
supporting documentation have led the FPM to pursue 
more stringent methods of document verification (see 
paragraph 16). 
 
 
 
---------------------- 
ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD 
---------------------- 
 
¶9. Travel restrictions prohibiting most Americans 
from visiting Cuba limit the demand for ACS 
services.  American citizens requesting a 
replacement passport generate the greatest volume of 
citizenship work, and rarely pose a problem 
involving fraud. Even cases involving Cubans making 
claims for American citizenship are usually quickly 
resolved without any suspicion of fraud. 
 
¶10. Recent changes in SpainQs citizenship and 
nationality laws may affect Cuban migration patterns 
over time. The Spanish government has announced that 
all Cuban citizens with at least one documented 
Spanish-born grandparent are eligible to receive 
Spanish citizenship.  The Spanish Embassy in Havana 
expects approximately 150,000 Cubans to take 
advantage of this program, which was implemented in 
December 2008. Since Spanish passport holders may 
enter the United States without a visa under the 
Visa Waiver Program, there may be an increase in 
Cuban-born Spanish citizens arriving in the U.S. and 
attempting to adjust status under the Cuban 
Adjustment Act. 
 
-------------- 
ADOPTION FRAUD 
-------------- 
 
¶11.  Cuba does not permit adoption of its citizens 
by foreign nationals. 
 
---------------------------------- 
USE OF DNA TESTING 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  Post uses DNA testing in IV and CRBA cases in 
which evidence of a biological relationship cannot 
be sufficiently supported by other evidence. In 
general, US law does not allow American citizens to 
spend more than 14 days in Cuba under an authorized 
OFAC license. Therefore, post sees a relatively 
small number of cases in which DNA exams are 
required to establish a relationship that could not 
have been sufficiently supported by other evidence. 
 
---------------------------------- 
ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD 
---------------------------------- 
¶13. Post continues to work with DHS stateside in 
confirming the legitimacy of Cuban civil documents. 
DHS continues to receive claims of Cuban birth from 
a number of migrants crossing the Mexican border, 
replete with Cuban birth certificates to facilitate 
residency.  Recent checks on average have shown one- 
third to half of the current DHS civil document 
submissions to post to be fraudulent. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
---------- 
ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING AND TERRORIST TRAVEL 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
---------- 
 
¶14. Organized trafficking organizations based in 
Florida continue to attempt to smuggle significant 
numbers of migrants to the United States each year. 
In recent years, the majority of Cuban migrants 
reaching the United States have come through Mexico. 
USINT is becoming increasingly concerned as this 
route is attracting migrants from further afield. 
In the last month, two American citizens have been 
detained by the Cuban authorities on suspicion of 
smuggling Chinese migrants to the US and Mexico 
through Cuba. While migrant flows declined 
significantly in FY 08 (Ref B), the smuggling of 
undocumented migrants to the United States remains a 
serious problem. 
 
-------------------------------- 
DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶15. In Havana, the RSO Section provides 
investigative assistance to the Consular Section on 
an as-needed basis.  Since the last fraud summary 
submitted, RSO has assisted interview applicants who 
provided questionabQdocuments, applicants who 
appear to have obtained either an appointment or 
appearance notice outside of established procedures, 
and LCN employees who may have tried to assist 
applicants in various ways.  Given the lack of 
bilateral relations, RSO does not have an 
established mechanism to work law enforcement 
investigations with the GOC. (see paragraph 17) 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
-------- 
HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS AND CIVIL 
REGISTRY 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
-------- 
 
¶16.  As mentioned previously, post is increasingly 
concerned with document fraud, specifically as it 
relates to the large number of Cuban parole cases 
adjudicated at post. Because of the lack of 
cooperation with Cuban government authorities for 
verification purposes, HavanaQs FPM has sought to 
strengthen ties with other interested parties. 
Recent positive developments in this area have led 
to one-on-one meetings with the Canadian EmbassyQs 
fraud prevention team as well as an upcoming visit 
to the Mexican Embassy to determine what further 
measures the FPM and USINT in general can make in 
confirming the validity of birth, marriage and 
divorce certificates. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶17.  The United States does not have diplomatic 
relations with Cuba.  The GOC actively seeks to 
frustrate USINTQs efforts to carry out many aspects 
of its daily work. Post occasionally receives 
cooperation from working-level Cuban law enforcement 
officials in helping resolve ACS cases with 
immigration implications.  However, the lack of 
systematic cooperation severely hampers the work 
being conducted by USINT, which is by far the 
largest issuer of visas out of diplomatic posts in 
Cuba.  For example, Italian counterparts have 
confirmed their ability to verify documents by 
sending them directly to MINREX, assistance which 
would be much welcomed by post in its efforts to 
combat fraudulent activity. 
 
¶18.  Post continues to enhance cooperation with 
colleagues by attending and sharing information 
within a multi-embassy fraud prevention working 
group. PostQs FPM has found this an especially 
invaluable tool in developing working-level 
relationships with colleagues who share similar 
overlap in Cuban fraud issues, such as the Mexicans 
and Canadians, but who otherwise might hesitate to 
meet with USINT officials privately due to GOC 
intransigence. Strong continued interest and 
cooperation led the British Embassy to host the 
groupQs next meeting in May. 
 
--------------------------- 
AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN 
--------------------------- 
 
¶19.  Questions about the political and economic 
future of Cuba abound; their resolution will likely 
impact the scale of Cuban migration to the United 
States.  Post remains vigilant to the possibility 
that any number of dramatic political or economic 
developments could lead to a mass migration crisis 
similar to the 1994 Balsero (QRafterQ) Crisis or the 
1980 Mariel Boatlift. 
 
---------------------- 
STAFFING AND TRAINING 
---------------------- 
 
¶20.  Anita Lyssikatos is Havana's FPM.  She is 
assigned concurrently to the IV/P Unit as a line 
officer, which allows her to attend to the fraud 
portfolio on a part-time basis only.  She has 
completed PC-541 Fraud Prevention for Consular 
Managers at FSI as well as the distance learning 
courses PC544 Detecting Fraudulent Documents, PC 128 
Detecting Imposters, and PC 545 Examining US 
Passports. 
 
FARRAR