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Viewing cable 09DUSHANBE774, TAJIKISTAN FACES ONGOING FOOD INSECURITY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09DUSHANBE774 2009-06-23 11:50 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Dushanbe
VZCZCXRO6675
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0774/01 1741150
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231150Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0457
INFO RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0994
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0017
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0106
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0156
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0086
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 000774 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN, AGRICULTURE FOR FAS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PHUM ECON PGOV TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN FACES ONGOING FOOD INSECURITY 
 
REF: DUSHANBE 334 
 
DUSHANBE 00000774  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Tajikistan continues to face serious food 
insecurity.  According to the World Food Program (WFP), 1.4 
million of Tajikistan's 7 million inhabitants are food insecure, 
half of them chronically so.  The global financial crisis has 
exacerbated the situation, as have rising food prices and 
anticipated poor harvests.  This year's difficulties come on the 
heels of last year's ruinous winter, during which many families 
borrowed or sold off assets to survive.  The WFP cautions that 
continuing food insecurity may pose a serious risk to public 
health and safety.  This in turn could pose a threat to regional 
stability.  End summary. 
 
 
 
Aid Agencies Warn: Food Situation Precarious 
 
 
 
2. (U) According to the World Food Program (WFP), some 1.4 
million rural residents of Tajikistan -- nearly one-third of the 
country's rural population -- currently faces difficulty getting 
enough food.  Of these, WFP deems 480,000 as severely food 
insecure, their food intake well below minimum nutritional 
values.  More families are resorting to borrowing or begging to 
make ends meet.  Nearly 70% of those WFP canvassed said they 
were increasingly forced to ask shopkeepers to extend them 
credit.  Almost 30% of families report switching to less 
desirable, less expensive foods.  This shift in eating practices 
is seen in family nutrition, with almost one-third of children 
stunted.  Further, as food insecure families seek out less 
expensive means of feeding themselves they are increasingly 
using central markets, which has hurt local markets, reducing 
access to food in remote areas. 
 
 
 
Financial Crisis Hits Tajikistan 
 
 
 
3. (U) The main factor leading to renewed food insecurity is 
increased unemployment resulting from the financial crisis, 
according to surveys conducted by the WFP.  Some one million 
Tajiks work abroad, mostly in Russia, and send home upwards of 
$2 billion each year.  Their families back home depend heavily 
on this money.  In 2008, remittances were equivalent to 52% of 
GDP, by far the highest percentage of any country in the world. 
In the wake of the global financial crisis, however, remittances 
have dropped precipitously.  Many Tajiks work in the Russian 
construction sector, which has been particularly hard hit by the 
crisis: remittances in (month) were down 39% compared to the 
same month the previous year, and the trend continues to move 
downward.  The loss of overseas jobs represents a one-two punch 
for the Tajik economy: at the same time many families' income is 
drying up, returning workers are increasing mouths to feed.  70% 
of severely food insecure households received much lower 
remittances over the last three months -- a time of the year 
when remittances are usually on the rise, according to the WFP. 
 
 
 
4. (U) The financial crisis has affected food costs in 
Tajikistan.  After several months of relative stability, prices 
for basic commodities such as vegetable oil and wheat have risen 
over the past two months, in some cases by as much as 15%.  The 
situation is exacerbated by the fact that most of Tajikistan's 
basic food items are imported, mostly from Russia.  The recent 
depreciation of the Tajik somoni against the Russian ruble has 
thus contributed to the rising prices.  (The somoni has devalued 
even more dramatically against the dollar, which has resulted in 
other increased living costs, for instance for power.) 
 
 
 
5. (U) The government of Tajikistan has responded to the crisis 
by announcing the creation of over 100,000 new jobs, most of 
them in the agricultural sector.  According to surveys conducted 
by the WFP, however, these jobs -- if they exist -- are leading 
to few if any tangible improvements.  The vast majority of 
respondents indicated they are waiting for the financial 
 
DUSHANBE 00000774  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
situation to improve in Russia rather than looking for underpaid 
work in Tajikistan. 
 
 
 
Agricultural Damage 
 
 
 
6. (U) With only 7% of its land arable and the bulk of its 
terrain mountainous, Tajikistan is highly vulnerable to climatic 
and weather variations.  This year poor harvests caused by this 
spring's heavy rains and natural disasters -- including floods, 
landslides, and hail -- may exacerbate Tajikistan's food 
insecurity.  While the WFP survey went into the field before 
much of this damage occurred, at a recent donor meeting the 
United Nations Resident Representative in Tajikistan announced 
preliminary data showing that heavy rainfall and associated 
problems had destroyed 22,000 hectares of cotton, 8,000 hectares 
of cereals, and smaller areas of vegetables and potatoes, and 
3,200 head of livestock.  Numerous sources report significant 
but as yet unknown damage to agricultural infrastructure, 
particularly irrigation canals.  Although no concrete data are 
yet available about this year's harvest, agricultural experts 
say that this spring's excessive and -- especially -- late rains 
may cause low yields among many crops, particularly cotton. 
Despite these concerns, Tajikistan's President Rahmon has 
predicted a heavy cotton crop. 
 
 
 
Ripple Effects: Public Health and Regional Security 
 
 
 
7. (SBU) The WFP warns that as a result of decreased income and 
food security, families have less to spend on health care and 
medicine, which, combined with poor drinking water, could lead 
to a serious degradation of the public health situation.  As 
reported reftel, a relatively small humanitarian crisis in 
Tajikistan has the potential to become a serious security 
problem for Central Asia.  First, it may drive more Tajik 
families into the drug trade, helping to smuggle opium across 
Tajikistan's 1,344-km border with Afghanistan.  Second, a large, 
suddenly-unemployed male population watching its children go 
hungry may provide willing recruits for anti-regime groups. 
Indeed, Tajikistan has seen a recent uptick in militant activity 
in some traditionally anti-regime areas.  And chronic and 
worsening food insecurity quite literally weakens the Tajik 
people, making Tajikistan more dependent on aid and less able to 
play a constructive role in this dangerous region. 
 
 
 
U.S. Assistance Ending 
 
 
 
8. (U) Since 2005, USAID has supported a Multi-Year food 
Assistance Program (MYAP) in Tajikistan.  However, this $26 
million program ends this month.  The MYAP was particularly 
effective because it not only distributed food directly to 
beneficiaries but also sold a portion on the local market.  The 
proceeds supported important development programs that among 
other things made further contributions to household food 
security, teaching villagers how to extends growing seasons with 
greenhouses, improving food preservations, and supplementing 
household food stocks through poultry keeping and other 
activities.  MYAP participant households reported having two 
additional months of food in 2008, compared to the previous 
year.  USAID provided two additional short-term programs in 
response to last winter's humanitarian crisis: a $3.5 million 
Local Resource Procurement Program and a $5 million Single Year 
food Assistance Program (SYAP).  Both provided immediate 
benefits to families with very few resources, and built goodwill 
with participating communities.  These programs are scheduled to 
end by October 2009. 
 
 
 
9. (SBU) Comment: Since the fall of 2007, each new season has 
 
DUSHANBE 00000774  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
brought rural Tajikistan a new crisis.  Families that were still 
recovering from the brutal winter of 2007-2008 faced a severe 
drought in 2008, which combined with a large locust attack to 
reduce harvests.  This year's financial crisis and agricultural 
destruction will further challenge families' ability to 
replenish their stores in time for winter.  In light of this 
situation, now is a particularly inauspicious time to end food 
assistance in a strategically vital state neighboring 
Afghanistan.  A new MYAP would be a particularly effective 
program, because it would allow us to supply food to those in 
need while achieving a number of other long-term development 
goals.  If a MYAP is not possible, we would recommend that the 
current SYAP be renewed and paired with other assistance to 
continue the agricultural, food preservation, health, and 
education components of a MYAP.  Activities should also be 
implemented that generate income at the local level to help 
people earn enough money to buy the food that is available.  We 
have an effective model to work from, and are prepared to move 
quickly, but the window of opportunity to avoid a potentially 
destabilizing crisis is closing quickly.  End Comment. 
JACOBSON