VZCZCXYZ0011
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLM #0621/01 1681316
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 171316Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0119
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1240
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 6987
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 3882
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3121
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 3594
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI//J3/J332/J52//
RHMFIUU/CDRUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HI//APCW/APOP//

UNCLAS COLOMBO 000621 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/INSB, PRM, PM/WRA (NETLAND) 
STATE ALSO PASS TO USAID 
AID/W FOR ANE/SCA 
AID/W FOR DCHA/FFP FOR JDWORKEN, JBORNS 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA FOR ACONVERY, RTHAYER AND RKERR 
BANGKOK FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA WBERGER 
KATHMANDU FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA MROGERS AND POL SBERRY 
USMISSION GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
USUN FOR ECOSOC DMERCADO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM CE
SUBJECT: The Way Forward in the North - A Serious Discussion about 
De-Mining and Returns 
 
¶1.  SUMMARY: Charge met with Presidential Advisor Basil Rajapaksa on 
June 15 to ask about Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) priorities for 
de-mining and to discuss how the U.S. Government (USG) could support 
those within a strategic framework.  M.S. Jayasinghe, Chairman of 
the National Steering Committee for Mine Action, W.K.K. Kumarasiri, 
Secretary of the Ministry of Nation Building and Estate 
Infrastructure Development (M/NBEID) also attended, as well as USAID 
officer responsible for coordinating de-mining issues.  The 
discussion included de-mining performance to date, the GSL's desire 
to create its own civilian humanitarian de-mining unit (HDU) within 
the Ministry of Nationbuilding, and Rajapaksa's thoughts on a 
strategic framework for de-mining to support returns in the North. 
The conversation also included prospects for an early release of the 
GSL "180-Day Plan" for the North, especially thoughts on how IDP 
returns would take place.  In response to our suggestion, Rajapaksa 
instructed Mr. Kumarasiri to write a letter to the Embassy outlining 
the GSL's priorities for de-mining.  He also agreed to joint work on 
a presentation due in two weeks that will outline a de-mining 
approach for the North incorporating priority geographic areas, an 
illustrative timetable, and coordination of roles for the Sri Lankan 
Army (SLA) and de-mining INGOs.  End Summary. 
 
U.S. SUPPORT FOR A DE-MINING FRAMEWORK 
 
¶2.  State/WRA's proposal to contribute an additional $6 million in 
FY 2009 de-mining funds would make the USG the largest donor this 
year to de-mining operations in Sri Lanka.  Given the importance of 
de-mining as a prerequisite for displaced people to return home, and 
the need to program these funds within a short timeframe, the Charge 
had requested this meeting to discuss the best use of these 
resources.  To date, the GSL has issued task orders for de-mining on 
a piecemeal basis.  This has proven inefficient, since it does not 
allow mine action NGOs to scale up their operations for a longer 
planning period.  Charge wanted to emphasize the importance of 
operating within a forward-looking, strategic framework. 
 
GSL PRIORITIES FOR DE-MINING THE NORTH 
 
¶3.  Rajapaksa outlined what he saw as priorities for de-mining 
operations in the North.  He spoke of the need to consider the Sri 
Lankan Army's (SLA's) three corridor advance, as it fought the LTTE 
- columns that moved northward from Mannar, Trincomalee, and 
Vavuniya.  He said that a current priority of SLA de-miners was to 
gain access to communities by clearing the main roads in these 
corridors (A32 along the Mannar coast, A9 leading to Kilinochchi and 
Jaffna, and A34 and A35 leading into Mullaitivu District).  Clearing 
mines along these main trunk roads allows infrastructure projects to 
take place, including road widening and the installation of 
electricity lines.  He emphasized how important de-mining is to 
support economic reconstruction, particularly for specific projects 
likely to receive foreign assistance.  Examples sited in Mannar 
District included potential World Bank funding of reconstruction 
work on the Giant's Tank and Japanese Peace Fund funding for work on 
the Akattimurripu Tank.  He also described the JICA-funded 
transmission line leading north from Trincomalee, the irrigation 
canal leading to Jaffna from the Iranamadu Tank in Kilinochchi 
District (with possible Asia Development Bank financing), the 
Padawiya Wewa Tank in southern Mullaitivu District, and the Walawe 
Oya irrigation system of one of the Mahaweli River tributaries. 
Unrolling maps of the Northern Province's five districts, he pointed 
out areas of former high population density - such as Kilinochchi 
Town - as top priorities for de-mining.  He emphasized that 
de-mining of population centers should include hospitals, schools, 
and government facilities, as well as housing.  In contrast to the 
East, where people returned to their communities before the 
surrounding paddy fields had been cleared of contamination, 
Rajapaksa emphasized the importance of simultaneously clearing areas 
of important economic activity (paddy fields for farmers and access 
to the sea for fisher communities).  He also pointed out Madhu 
Church on his map - an area heavily mined and a famous Catholic 
shrine that receives up to 500,000 pilgrims every year. 
 
¶4.  Charge then brought up the State Department's pending proposal 
of an additional $6 million in FY09 funding for de-mining and how to 
 
best utilize these resources.  He suggested a phased approach 
emphasizing assessments and technical surveys to release large areas 
quickly for IDP returns, and defining the respective roles of the 
Army and international mine action NGOs.  Rajapaksa took issue with 
the suggestion that the INGOs' work could be more productive if they 
were to begin with surveys of large areas of responsibility (such as 
Mannar District's Manthai West Division, which is approximately 600 
square kilometers).  He pointed out that much of the North is 
uninhabited jungle, and that technical surveys and de-mining 
operations need to be focused on the priority roads and larger 
towns.  Although not opposed to assessments and technical surveys 
for identifying areas of low mine risk, Rajapaksa wanted to be sure 
that INGOs "did not bite off more than they could chew."  He also 
said that the survey work of INGOs would have to rely mostly on SLA 
maps and army experience as to where minefields had been laid, since 
civilians had been herded out of conflict areas by the LTTE before 
its fighters had withdrawn, making civilian testimonies of mine 
placement out of date. 
 
HUMANITARIAN DE-MINING UNIT 
 
¶5.  Rajapaksa asked if some of the $6 million from PRM/WRA could be 
used to equip the nascent civilian HDU within the Nationbuilding 
Ministry (note: to be staffed largely by retired military 
personnel).  He said that the HDU was, in part, a response to the 
Japanese Government's suggestion that a civilian de-mining 
capability be developed within the GSL.  (Note: Japan recently 
announced an additional $1.5 million for de-mining operations in Sri 
Lanka, including funding for INGOs, andJapan has contributed 
significant resources for d-mining in the East.)  Charge reiterated 
that Stte Department funds were to finance INGO operation, but 
that he would consult immediately with State/WRA to see if there was 
any flexibility.  Charge also brought up a potential FMF 
contribution of up to $2 million to purchase de-mining equipment for 
the SLA, depending on the recommendations of the upcoming DoD 
demining mission. 
 
BATTLEFIELD AREA CLEARANCE IS NOT HUMANITARIAN DE-MINING 
 
¶6.  Rajapaksa again referred to a Nationbuilding Ministry-prepared 
table that showed that from 2002 to date 75 percent of mine 
clearance had been performed by the Army (75 percent) and another 10 
percent by an Indian mine action NGO, Horizon.  EmbOffs pointed out 
that Battlefield Area Clearance (BAC) was in no way comparable to 
humanitarian de-mining.  Rajapaksa responded that the SLA works 
faster - and longer hours.  One of his advisors added, "SLA 
de-miners start at eight o'clock in the morning and end each day at 
four in the afternoon.  INGOs begin at ten and end at two.  INGO 
demining teams stand down for one week, after three weeks of work, 
whereas the army never stops." 
 
CONCRETE STEPS TOWARD A FRAMEWORK 
 
¶7.  Rajapaksa agreed to two U.S. suggestions to better define the 
contributions of the SLA and INGOs to humanitarian de-mining 
operations in the North.  First, he committed to have the GSL send a 
letter to Charge outlining GSL priorities for de-mining the North. 
This will help planners work within a strategic framework that 
addresses the Government's priorities for returns.  The second 
suggestion was that - taking advantage of the upcoming DoD 
assessment - the SLA and INGOs meet to define their roles and 
relative strengths, and to develop a collaborative approach to 
addressing the de-mining priorities in the North.  Rajapaksa agreed 
to prepare a presentation of this approach in two weeks' time. 
 
RETURNS -- HARD TO PIN DOWN 
 
¶8.  The discussion turned to returns and GSL plans for addressing 
the priority recovery needs in the North.  Rajapaksa stated that the 
Government's return policy is "first displaced, first to return." 
This is consistent with suggestions in other fora that the GSL's 
return strategy may be a comprehensive one that includes people 
displaced from their homes in the North over the past several years, 
and not only the roughly 280,000 IDPs displaced since last October 
 
by the conflict.  Rajapaksa indicated that there were already 
100,000 people living in Mannar District, another 100,000 in 
Vavuniya District, and 559,000 in Jaffna District, in addition to 
the IDPs in the Vavuniya camps.  These people, he said, should be 
given priority consideration in terms of reconstruction planning. 
 
¶9.  The Government has requested all ministries to draft 
recovery/reconstruction plans for the North.  By sector, these plans 
address the priority needs of the first 180 days, and then a 
two-year time period.  Rajapaksa proceeded to thumb through several 
preliminary drafts of these sector plans, pointing out priority 
projects for ports, electricity, irrigation, health, and others.  He 
mentioned that he would be traveling the next day to Vavuniya to 
speak directly with district authorities about their 180 day and 
two-year priorities, and that he would be making similar trips to 
discuss the priorities of other districts of the North.  By the end 
of June, he expected to have the sector plans fully vetted and 
consolidated.  The Charge encouraged him to share these plans with 
the international community within the shortest possible timeframe. 
 
¶10.  Rajapaksa also touched on conditions in the Vavuniya IDP camps. 
 From a returns standpoint, he said that it was important that 
returns take place, as soon as possible, to all five districts. 
Otherwise, he thought that it would be psychologically hard for 
people to see others returning to one or two districts (for example 
to Mannar or Jaffna), with no returns to their own districts (for 
example, Mullaitivu).  He said that it was important for people in 
the camps to feel engaged and to be suitably prepared for rebuilding 
their lives at home.  He talked about the importance of vocational 
training, for example to help with shelter construction.  He 
suggested that a shift to temporary shelters in the camps - those of 
wooden poles and tin roofs - would be practical not only for 
immediate shelter needs in the camps, but also as part of the 
package for families who return.  He lamented that a few individuals 
and international organizations were making statements and 
assumptions about the GSL's long-term intentions for these IDPs, 
when, in reality, the GSL wanted them to return as soon as possible 
- with appropriate skills to aid their reconstruction and recovery. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶11.  Charge asked whether the GSL had any concrete goals for returns 
by the end of 2009.  Rajapaksa said, "If we can finish de-mining, 
we'll return everyone by then.  It depends on whether we get the 
equipment we need."  We found this an unfortunate way to end what 
was otherwise a serious and constructive meeting, typical of GSL 
responses to the international community's repeated requests for the 
GSL to disclose its timetable and strategy for the returns of its 
displaced people in the North.  However, Rajapaksa articulated clear 
and defensible priorities for de-mining.  He welcomed that that the 
USG is ready to commit substantial resources to support de-mining 
efforts, but remains skeptical that the INGOs will perform at the 
speed required.  We are concerned that this will set the stage for 
the GSL to blame the INGOs if de-mining proceeds at a pace short of 
expectations.  Since humanitarian mine action agencies are to focus 
on people, and not economic assets, Rajapaksa's list of 
infrastructure priorities for de-mining may be somewhat at odds with 
the mission of mine action INGOs.  This illustrates the importance 
of better defining roles of the INGOs and SLA.  His willingness to 
share the GSL's priorities in written form is a positive signal. 
 
¶12. COMMENT CONTINUED: The next two weeks will be important, as post 
and the DoD assessment team work with the SLA and INGOs to develop 
guidelines for roles and closer cooperation.  PRM/WRA's anticipated 
grants to mine action INGOs are therefore very timely.  The 
challenge will be to incorporate these resources into an overall GSL 
de-mining framework and to get started while avoiding bureaucratic 
delays.  Embassy staff will need to play an active role as 
facilitators among the different players such as the SLA, the 
Nationbuilding Ministry, and UNDP.  Although there was no mention of 
a "returns framework" the meeting offered hope that the GSL is 
sincere about people returning home as soon as conditions are right. 
 Factors discussed included a) the speed of de-mining operations, b) 
the need for returns to all districts, c) the importance of meeting 
 
the needs of the entire displaced population of the North, not just 
the 280,000 Vanni IDPs, and d) the soon-to-be-disclosed 180-Day 
Plan, as an indicator of what the Government views as priority 
conditions for returns and recovery.  Each of these factors has 
political overtones, reflecting their complexity and the continuing 
uncertainty around how and when returns will actually occur. 
 
MOORE