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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 CHENNAI 000185 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O.  12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM KDEM IN
SUBJECT: BHARAT BALLOT 09:  TAMIL NADU ANALYSIS:  CONGRESS-DMK 
ALLIANCE STAGES A STUNNING VICTORY 
 
REF:  CHENNAI 163 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The alliance between the Congress Party and the 
regional DMK party surprised nearly all observers by winning a 
thumping victory in Tamil Nadu in the recent parliamentary 
elections.  Most commentators expected an opposition led by an 
alliance of regional and communist parties to gain the lion's share 
of the state's 39 Lok Sabha seats.  Instead, the Congress-DMK 
alliance won 27 seats, leaving only 12 for the opposition coalition, 
led by another regional party, the DMK's arch-rival, AIADMK. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary, continued:  The opposition parties focused on the 
plight of Sri Lanka's Tamils (and the Congress-led GOI's inability 
to help them) as a major campaign issue, but this issue appears to 
have had little electoral traction, apart from the felling (and 
near-felling) of a few of Congress's top candidates in the state. 
Post-election analysis points to the role of a new party, the 
unexpectedly strong support of religious minorities, the appeal of 
some of the populist measures undertaken by the current government, 
the DMK's unparalleled ability to deliver cash handouts to voters, 
and possible vote-tampering as factors contributing to the 
Congress-DMK alliance's victory.  The DMK's victory has not only won 
it powerful ministerial positions in New Delhi, it also appears to 
ensure the survival of its minority government in Tamil Nadu, which 
relies on the support of the Congress party to remain in power.  End 
Summary. 
 
Solid victory for DMK-led alliance 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) The DMK's alliance turned in an unexpectedly solid 
performance in the elections, winning 27 of the state's 39 seats. 
(In the 2004 parliamentary elections, a DMK-led alliance swept all 
39 seats, but much of that alliance has since crumbled.)  The DMK 
itself won 18 of the 22 seats it contested, while Congress Party 
candidates won 8 of the 15 they contested.  The VCK (a small party 
based in northern Tamil Nadu that supports the Dalit, or 
"untouchable" community), the DMK's only other formal ally in the 
state, won one of the two seats where it fielded candidates. 
Altogether, this alliance garnered 42.5 percent of the total votes 
polled. 
 
Tears for the opposition 
------------------------ 
 
¶4. (U) The opposition to the DMK-led coalition came from an 
AIADMK-led alliance, which managed to win only 12 seats and 37.4 
percent of the popular vote.  The AIADMK itself won only 9 of the 23 
seats it contested while its main ally, the PMK (a party strong in 
the northern parts of the state that was part of the DMK's coalition 
until recently) lost all 6 constituencies in which it competed.  The 
MDMK (a vocal supporter of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), the Sri Lankan based terrorist group fighting for an 
independent Tamil homeland on the island) and the two communist 
parties (CPI and CPM) each won one seat. 
 
Surprising results 
------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) The DMK-Congress victory in Tamil Nadu left even seasoned 
observers scratching their heads, as nearly all pundits had 
predicted that the AIADMK and its allies would come out on top.  The 
majority of both Tamil and English media outlets forecast a decisive 
victory for the AIADMK-PMK-CPM-CPI-MDMK coalition, believing that 
the "alliance arithmetic" that saw the AIADMK gain allies as quickly 
as the DMK lost them would reverse the 2004 sweep in the AIADMK's 
favor.  The results stunned even hardened political leaders. 
Usually never at a loss for words, AIADMK supremo Jayalalithaa, who 
had planned to go to New Delhi after the vote counting for post-poll 
alliance talks and to play a possible role as king-maker, remained 
indoors instead, refusing to meet the press. 
 
What mattered:  1) Cash 
----------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Critics of the DMK were quick to point to foul play to 
explain the party's election success.  One very highly ranked member 
 
CHENNAI 00000185  002 OF 004 
 
 
of the AIADMK alliance told us that the DMK widely distributed cash 
to buy votes, and did so on an unprecedented scale, particularly 
targeting districts where the PMK ran candidates.  One Congress 
leader told us:  "The (DMK-Congress) alliance won because of the 
three Gandhis: Sonia Gandhi, Rahul Gandhi, and Mahatma Gandhi".  (In 
local parlance, "Mahatma Gandhi" stands for the five hundred rupee 
notes which bear his picture.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) The scale of this cash distribution was reported widely in 
Tamil Nadu's media outlets.  One of the more audacious distribution 
networks was reportedly in Madurai (in the central part of the 
state), where M.K. Azhagiri (son of Chief Minister Karunanidhi and 
now Union Minister for Chemicals and Fertilizers) scored an 
impressive win.  Local media reported that the DMK was able to 
insert INR 500-notes (about USD 10, or about two days' wages for a 
reasonably paid day laborer) into the daily newspaper, delivered 
directly to voters' homes.  Our own contacts, including Congress 
supporters perhaps jealous of their own party's inability to match 
the scale of the DMK's cash-handout machine, confirmed these 
accounts. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Our contacts in the opposition parties told us that the 
DMK's tactics paid off particularly well in the state's southern 
constituencies, where the opposition had expected to do well.  They 
also told us that the higher voter turnout in Tamil Nadu (at just 
over 72 percent, nearly 12 percent higher than in 2004) was also due 
to the money factor.  In Madurai, for example, more than 80 percent 
of eligible voters cast votes. 
 
What mattered:  2) A new party 
------------------------------ 
 
¶9. (SBU) Many analysts have suggested that the DMDK, a new regional 
party led by renowned Tamil film actor Vijayakanth, played a key 
role in spoiling the AIADMK's chances.  Although the DMDK did not 
win a seat, it scored 10.1 percent of the total votes, and in 14 
constituencies, the margins of victory of the DMK-Congress 
candidates were less than the votes polled by the DMDK.  Vijayakanth 
had cleverly projected himself as a new avatar of Tamil Nadu's 
legendary (long-deceased ) Chief Minister MG Ramachandran (MGR), 
whose popular goodwill had formed the bedrock of the AIADMK party, 
leading many to conclude that he drew votes mainly from the AIADMK, 
to the DMK's benefit.  Indeed, a Congress supporter told us that the 
DMK even helped finance the DMDK's campaigning, believing that 
Vijayakanth would take more votes from the AIADMK than he would from 
the DMK. 
 
¶10. (SBU) There are limits, however, to how far this factor can help 
explain the election results.  In 13 constituencies, the 
DMK-Congress alliance candidates won more than the votes of the 
AIADMK alliance candidates and the DMDK candidates put together.  In 
addition, the DMDK did about as well in constituencies where the 
AIADMK alliance won as it did in the constituencies where the 
DMK-Congress alliance won, suggesting that it attracted supporters 
from voters who disliked both the DMK and AIADMK.  It also suggests 
that Vijayakanth's popularity may have contributed significantly to 
the increased voter turnout. 
 
What mattered:  3) Religious minorities 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) The AIADMK initially kept its distance from the Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP), at least partially out of fear of alienating 
Muslim and Christian voters wary of the BJP's pro-Hindu stance. 
Speculation continued to swirl, however, that Jayalalithaa and her 
party would happily support a BJP-led coalition at the center, and 
she allowed this speculation to continue, telling journalists, "A 
good politician never rules out anything."  Some observers contend 
that this was enough to encourage most of the state's religious 
minorities to flock to the DMK-Congress alliance.  (According to 
government statistics, Christians and Muslims comprise 12 percent of 
Tamil Nadu's population, but the actual figure is believed to be 
closer to 15 percent.)  Many members of the clergy of the Church of 
South India and the Catholic Church openly supported the 
DMK-Congress coalition, and in one district (Kanyakumari, where 
about half of the population is Christian), both churches openly 
endorsed the DMK candidate, fearing that multiple Christian 
 
CHENNAI 00000185  003 OF 004 
 
 
candidates would split the Christian vote and allow the BJP's 
candidate to win. 
 
What mattered:  4) Popular governance 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) At the state level (the DMK has governed Tamil Nadu since 
2006), the DMK has launched a wide variety of populist (and popular) 
policies and gimmicks, ranging from the sale of rice at INR 1 (USD 
0.02) per kilogram and expanding the state's comprehensive school 
lunch program to fulfilling the party's campaign promise of handing 
out color televisions to every needy household.  DMK leaders have 
told us that these measures have contributed substantially to the 
party's success.  While critics charge the DMK with turning Tamil 
Nadu from a power-exporting state into one with a chronic 
electricity shortage, for example, DMK officials have told us that 
"the people are not against us," citing the positive impact of their 
populist programs. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Some Congress Party supporters, however, were quick to 
tell us about the success of some of their party's programs that 
helped generate a pan-India pro-Congress wave.  In particular, they 
noted the National Rural Employment Generation program that provided 
significant extra income to the rural poor and the farm-loan waiver 
which helped free many farmers from debt traps.  These Congress 
supporters emphasized that the DMK, because of its alliance, was 
also riding this Congress-generated wave. 
 
What mattered, maybe:  5) Vote tampering? 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) The leadership of the two main opposition parties in Tamil 
Nadu (AIADMK and PMK) have also alleged publicly that tampering with 
the state's electronic voting machines (EVMs) was a major factor in 
the DMK's victory.  PMK Chief Ramadoss demonstrated to the press how 
a machine similar to the EVMs can be programmed to favor one party 
over others but journalists were not entirely convinced by the 
performance.  Another PMK official told us privately that 
technicians have shown him how a skilled person can corrupt an EVM 
in less than five minutes.  The AIADMK even adopted a resolution 
calling on the Election Commission to "seriously consider reverting 
to ballot boxes instead of EVMs which can be fiddled with." 
 
¶15. (U) Rejecting these types of claims, Navin Chawla, India's Chief 
Election Commissioner, told the editorial board of "The Hindu" 
(based in Chennai and one of India's major national dailies) that 
the EVMs are "tamper-proof."  He cited the decisions of multiple 
state-level courts and the Supreme Court to back up this assertion, 
and went into some detail about the precautions taken to eliminate 
the possibility that the EVMs can be manipulated. 
 
 . . .And what didn't matter 
---------------------------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) Surprisingly, given the amount of attention it received in 
the media during campaigning, the issue of Sri Lanka's Tamils and 
the inability or unwillingness of the Indian Government to put a 
stop to the fighting in Sri Lanka failed to swing voters.  The 
opposition alliance (particularly the AIADMK and its pro-LTTE allies 
MDMK and PMK) had made the issue their main campaign plank, as they 
attempted to blame the DMK and its Congress ally for the GOI's lack 
of effective action on the issue.  Jayalalithaa even told supporters 
at her campaign rallies that she supported the creation of Tamil 
Eelam (a separate homeland for Tamils) and that she would force the 
Government of India to send the Indian Army to aid the Tamils. 
Voters were unimpressed, however, and the parties with the longest 
record of active involvement on this issue (the MDMK and the PMK) 
fared the worst. 
 
¶17. (SBU)  While the Sri Lankan Tamil issue was not a big 
vote-winner in the state, several high-profile Congress Party 
candidates suffered defeats, reportedly because small, pro-LTTE 
groups worked feverishly in certain districts to campaign against 
them.  Three former Union Ministers (E.V.K.S. Elangovan, Mani 
Shankar Iyer, and R. Prabhu) and the President of the Tamil Nadu 
branch of the Congress Party (K.V. Thangabalu) were among these 
prominent losers.  Current Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram 
 
CHENNAI 00000185  004 OF 004 
 
 
himself barely scraped through with a small margin of 3354 votes 
(see reftel for more details on this controversial victory). 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶18. (SBU) The surprising result in Tamil Nadu for the parliamentary 
elections has important local implications.  Had the AIADMK 
alliance, as many expected, done better, it would undoubtedly have 
attempted to join a coalition government at the center, whether led 
by the Congress Party or the BJP.  This might well have caused the 
collapse of Tamil Nadu's state government, if Congress had accepted 
AIADMK support at the center.  Instead, the election cemented the 
DMK-Congress alliance at both levels, and appears to ensure that the 
DMK will rule Tamil Nadu firmly until at least the next state 
elections in 2011. 
 
SIMKIN