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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CARACAS 000692 
 
SIPDIS 
 
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM SOCI VE
SUBJECT: EXPLAINING VENEZUELAN ACQUIESCENCE 
 
CARACAS 00000692  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR FRANCISCO FERNANDEZ, 
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  President Chavez's efforts to concentrate 
more power in his hands and undermine the democratic 
opposition have been met in Venezuela with more acceptance 
and resignation than outrage and resistance.  There are 
numerous, credible theories to explain Venezuelans' 
acquiescence to an increasingly authoritarian government 
ranging from Chavez's charismatic leadership and popular 
social programs to the fear, fatigue, and ineffectiveness 
that prevail among government opponents.  Moreover, the 
majority of Venezuelans, long reliant on their petro-state's 
largesse, appear to prioritize "social rights" and 
self-preservation over abstract civil liberties.  The 
enormous, corporatist Government of the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela (GBRV) is for many citizens both an 
irreplaceable provider and exclusive source of information. 
Finally, Chavez has also effectively and systematically 
squelched any opposition to his rule either from within his 
ranks or from other political parties.  While Chavez's 
popularity may gradually erode as he radicalizes and the 
local economy worsens, the Venezuelan president still appears 
well positioned to keep accelerating his Bolivarian 
revolution at the expense of remaining democratic 
institutions.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------- 
Increasing Authoritarianism 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Since winning the February 15 referendum eliminating 
term limits, President Chavez has accelerated his Bolivarian 
revolution, further undermining political and economic 
freedoms in Venezuela.  In recent months the Chavez 
government has clamped down on leading opposition members 
while simultaneously using the National Assembly to close off 
any possible avenue for the opposition.  The GBRV pressed a 
corruption case against former Defense Minister Raul Baduel 
and Maracaibo Mayor and 2006 consensus opposition 
presidential candidate Manuel Rosales.  Baduel is awaiting 
trial in a military prison; Rosales fled to Peru.  The 
National Assembly passed laws that allowed the central 
government to take control over highways, ports, and airports 
previously controlled by state governments.  The Chavez 
government selectively applied the measure in states run by 
opposition governors. 
 
¶3. (C) In addition, the National Assembly created a new 
presidentially appointed position to run Caracas, removing 
virtually all responsibilities and funding from the recently 
elected opposition mayor of Caracas.  A law expanding this 
model to opposition-led states is reportedly in the works. 
The National Assembly is also actively considering a law that 
would give Chavez's PSUV party a significant advantage in the 
allocation of seats in legislative elections.  Moreover, the 
National Electoral Council intends to suspend any elections 
until work on the draft law is complete.  Chavez recently 
threatened to close Globovision, the only remaining 
opposition-oriented television network, and GBRV officials 
are pressing charges against Globovision's president.  The 
GBRV also nationalized over 50 oil service companies and has 
not yet offered swift and equitable compensation.  The GBRV 
has also intervened in the food industry, nationalizing a 
plant owned by U.S. agribusiness giant Cargill and occupying 
a second, as well as nationalizing land owned by FEMSA, the 
Mexican company that bottles and distributes Coca-Cola in 
Venezuela. 
 
¶4. (C) The opposition's response to these measures has been 
muted.  On May 1, the Caracas Metropolitan Police quickly 
dispersed a relatively small crowd of opposition marchers 
with tear gas.  There were far more Venezuelans stuck in 
beach traffic during that long weekend than took to the 
streets in defense of their liberties.  University students 
and faculty led an inconsequential march of several thousand 
to the Ministry of Education on May 20 primarily to protest 
higher education budget cuts.  Fewer than five thousand 
persons participated in a May 27 protest against the 
threatened shut down of Globovision.  Moreover, Chavez 
continues to enjoy considerable support in the polls, despite 
growing public dissatisfaction with key issues, such as crime 
and inflation.  Prominent pollster Alfredo Keller told us 
recently that Chavez is slipping in the polls, but still 
enjoys roughly 60% support; Luis Vicente Leon of Datanalisis 
put Chavez's popularity at over 54% as of April.  Edmond 
Saade of Datos also confirmed recently that Chavez enjoys 
majority support and far more support than any other public 
figure. 
 
------------------------- 
Hope and Purchasing Power 
------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) There are numerous reasons why Venezuelans are 
acquiescing to Chavez's anti-democratic measures.  The 
charismatic Venezuelan president conveys far more hope to 
voters than any of his competitors.  State media outlets 
constantly laud government initiatives, social programs, and 
"achievements of the revolution."  Chavez himself regularly 
launches building projects, opens government cooperatives, or 
announces expropriations on his weekly "Alo, Presidente" 
radio and television talk show.  While government critics 
rightly point out that many of the GBRV's projects are 
unsustainable, inefficient, or corrupt, local pollsters point 
out that Venezuela's poor report that they have more money in 
their pockets.  Large numbers of Venezuelans also avail 
themselves of GBRV social programs, most commonly shopping at 
subsidized Mercal or Pdval stores, or receiving medical care 
courtesy of the Barrio Adentro program.  "At least Chavez has 
given us something," is prevalent local sentiment among 
sectors of society long reliant on government largesse ("Papa 
estado"). 
 
---------------------------------- 
Class Resentment and Social Rights 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Chavez has also reaped political gains by stoking 
class antagonisms in stratified Venezuela.  Railing against 
local "oligarchs," the Venezuelan president aims most of his 
economic "reforms" at large, and often foreign, enterprises. 
Although the vast majority of Venezuelan still support 
private property protections, there is little popular 
sympathy for big business in Venezuela, and as yet, little 
public recognition of the long-term economic effects of 
driving out foreign investment.  Moreover, Chavez's core 
supporters believe that they would lose anything gained over 
the last decade if Chavez were to fail.  Chavez has sought to 
reassure his base that he is not undermining their economic 
freedoms.  One week after seizing large tracts of farmland in 
his native state of Barinas, Chavez distributed property 
titles last week to urban squatters in a televised ceremony. 
Local pollsters note that in this context most Venezuelans 
prioritize "social rights" over civil liberties.  They tend 
to be more attracted to Chavez's promises of redistribution 
of wealth than alarmed by his concentration of power. 
 
-------------------- 
Frog in a Teflon Pot 
-------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) To explain Venezuelans' relative docility, many 
pundits also cite the analogy that a live frog placed in 
boiling water will try to escape, but if placed in water 
gradually heated up, it will die unsuspectingly.  The 
Venezuelan president reportedly leans heavily on polls and 
has carefully calibrated the pace of change so as not to get 
too far in front of public opinion.  Chavez has paused in the 
face of opposition to politically charged education overhaul, 
a Counterintelligence Law, and the proposed anti-NGO Law of 
International Cooperation.  He accepted a narrow electoral 
defeat in the December 2007 constitutional referendum, but 
later enacted many of the proposed reforms through a 
compliant legislature.  He also subsequently won acceptance 
for the elimination of term limits in the February 2009 
referendum. 
 
¶8. (C) With full control over all other branches of 
government, Chavez usually succeeds in imposing his will 
through ostensibly "legal" means.  Constitutional experts' 
arguments to the contrary tend to get lost on most voters. 
For example, most Venezuelans are far more concerned about 
obtaining good government services than they are interested 
in a debate as to whether the central government or state and 
local governments should provide such services.  When 
Venezuelans do express dissatisfaction with the government, 
they tend to blame Chavez's ministers and other senior 
officials rather than Chavez himself.  This holds true 
despite the fact that Chavez selects all senior GBRV 
officials and generally rotates a small, closed circle of 
confidants to key positions. 
 
---------------- 
What Opposition? 
---------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Some local pundits call the political opposition 
Chavez's best ally.  Ten years after Chavez was first 
elected, the democratic opposition is still talking about the 
need to articulate a politically attractive, democratic 
alternative.  Opposition parties regrettably are still mostly 
personalist vehicles with no discernible party platforms. 
Moreover, almost all opposition parties are relatively strong 
in specific regions and lack a genuine nationwide presence. 
With few exceptions, most opposition leaders have focused on 
criticizing Venezuela's Teflon president rather than engage 
in much-need grassroots organizing among Venezuela's poor. 
Chavez's United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) enjoys a 
virtual monopoly in Venezuela's countryside.  Moreover, 
opposition parties continue to squabble among themselves, and 
there is currently no single opposition leader who enjoys 
anything approaching the popularity of Chavez. 
 
¶10. (C) Opposition parties failed to unite in a few key 
gubernatorial and numerous mayoral races in November 2008, 
allowing Chavez's United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) 
to win races the PSUV otherwise would have lost.  Opposition 
parties have not yet agreed on a methodology to pick unified 
candidates for the 2010 parliamentary elections (they 
foolishly boycotted the 2005 elections).  At the same time, 
the central government is actively hampering opposition-led 
states and municipalities to prevent elected opposition 
leaders from building democratic alternatives to Chavismo. 
The student movement injected new life into the opposition Q 
2007, but student politics are inherently transitory. 
Numerous student leaders have formally entered politics and 
visible student activism has declined.  Pro-Chavez 
dissidents, for their part, have not made much of a dent at 
the polls so far. 
 
------------ 
Fear Matters 
------------ 
 
¶11. (C) Chavez has also spun what pollster Luis Vicente Leon 
calls a "web of fear."  Rather than engage in wholesale 
repression, the GBRV has made examples of prominent sector 
leaders that have had a chilling effect on the rest of civil 
society.  For example, the GBRV closed RCTV, launched 
investigations into electoral NGO Sumate, and recently 
sentenced three former Caracas police commissioners to 
30-year prison terms for their alleged role in the 
short-lived 2002 coup.  Chavez regularly vilifies selected 
Catholic bishops and personally announced that Manuel Rosales 
would be jailed even before charges were brought against him. 
 Opposition activists receive pointed, threatening phone 
calls (one former ambassador was told, "We know you have only 
one kidney."). 
 
¶12. (C) The GBRV also allows pro-Chavez thugs, most notably 
the "La Piedrita" and "Alexis Vive" collectives, to engage in 
political violence with impunity.  In a society awash in 
conspiracy theories, Venezuelans are inclined to believe the 
GBRV is omnipotent.  Moreover, the GBRV has relied heavily on 
"litmus lists."  Whether you signed the presidential recall 
referendum drive ("Tascon List") or are among the five 
million voters who purportedly registered with Chavez's PSUV 
party can determine whether or not you have access to 
government services, loans, scholarships, or can even obtain 
a passport. 
 
--------------------- 
Been There, Done That 
--------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) Opposition leaders concede that only a small minority 
of Venezuelans are inclined to attend protest marches or 
political rallies.  They note that many Chavez opponents are 
discouraged by the fact that street protests have done little 
to change Chavez's decisions or undermine his popularity. 
Massive opposition rallies in 2002, the 2002-2003 general 
strike, and the presidential recall referendum drive did not 
succeed in forcing Chavez from power (except for three days 
during the April 2002 interregnum).  Rosales' 2006 
presidential campaign mobilized large opposition rallies, but 
Rosales polled only 37% of the vote.  Student-led protests in 
2007 did not dissuade the GBRV from shuttering RCTV, nor do 
they appear to be deterring the GBRV from going after 
Globovision.  Student leaders recently conceded to us that 
their street power is only "effervescent." 
 
------------------------ 
Accommodation and Plan B 
------------------------ 
 
¶14. (C) In the absence of hope for change, many Venezuelans, 
including business and professional elites, have found ways 
to accommodate themselves to the Bolivarian revolution, or at 
a minimum, to avoid political risks.  Because the GBRV 
regulates and dominates the domestic economy so much, private 
sector leaders argue they have little choice but to find ways 
to "get along" in order to survive and prosper.  Opposition 
political parties report that contributions from the private 
sector have virtually dried up.  Moreover, large numbers of 
well educated and skilled Venezuelans have chosen flight over 
fight.  The Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese embassies have 
all experienced a boom in citizenship claims.  Millions of 
Venezuelans have claims to citizenship in EU countries due to 
massive European immigration in the 1950's.  These 
Venezuelans tend to be middle class, multilingual, and 
better-educated, making emigration a viable alternative to 
confronting Venezuela's political and economic problems. 
There is a six-month backlog for U.S. non-immigrant visa 
interview appointments.  Jewish community leaders report that 
their small community has been devastated by the emigration 
of the younger generation. 
 
------------------ 
The Media Monopoly 
------------------ 
 
¶15. (C) Many Venezuelans appear to be unaware of Chavez's 
concentration of more power in his hands because the GBRV 
exerts a virtual monopoly over the news.  Chavez closed RCTV, 
the only free-to-air network critical of the GBRV in May 
2007, and opposition-oriented cable news network Globovision 
is only free-to-air in Caracas and Valencia.  Six state 
television channels laud Chavez and cheerlead his Bolivarian 
revolution while the remaining free-to-air networks exercise 
considerable self-censorship.  The GBRV also controls a wide 
network of community radio stations and sustains a continued 
socialist ideology campaign via thousands of specially 
trained promoters.  Chavez has also presided over 1200 hours 
of obligatory TV and radio broadcasts ("cadenas").  Local 
polling firms all tell us that public opinion is decidedly 
against further centralization, but most Venezuelans profess 
to be unaware of Chavez's efforts to undermine elected 
opposition governors and mayors.  Pollsters also note a 
marked tendency for Chavez's strongest supporters to give 
unconditional support to their president. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶16. (C) Despite controlling all branches of government, 
centralizing economic activity in the government's hands, 
controlling the information fed to the majority of the 
population, and enjoying majority support, President Chavez 
may yet be confronted by new political challenges.  Public 
support for him is likely to erode if the ongoing 
radicalization of the Bolivarian revolution or an economic 
downturn begin to erode the purchasing power of his political 
base.  Venezuelans still prefer social democracy to Chavez's 
ill-defined "Socialism of the 21st Century" by a wide margin 
and are tired of political polarization, according to local 
polls. 
 
¶17. (C) Nevertheless, Chavez right now appears to be squarely 
in the driver's seat.  He has recouped personal popularity 
and survived tough economic times before, including during 
the 2002-2003 national strike.  Moreover, the Venezuelan 
president has carefully taken the necessary steps to 
eliminate any real political challenger, and the opposition 
has yet to present a concrete, attractive alternative to 
Chavismo.  He also fully controls the legislature and 
judiciary, and with parliamentary elections at least 18 
months away, Chavez has plenty of time to develop the legal 
framework to try to stay in power for as long as he wishes. 
 
CAULFIELD