VZCZCXRO5454
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0735 1611448
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 101448Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4464
INFO RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 9631
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4184
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7839
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE 0222

UNCLAS BRASILIA 000735 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL BR
SUBJECT:  VISIT OF S/CRS COORDINATOR JOHN HERBST 
 
¶1.  (SBU) S/CRS Coordinator Ambassador John Herbst visited Brasilia 
May 21 for consultations with the GOB on Brazil's growing 
stabilization capabilities and possibilities for future cooperation. 
 In meetings with Brazil's Ministry for External Relations (MRE) and 
Brazilian Agency for Cooperation (ABC - Brazil's USAID equivalent), 
Herbst outlined S/CRS structures and capabilities and compared them 
to elements of Brazil's own experience leading the UN peacekeeping 
mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).  Herbst noted that the change in 
Brazil's approach in Haiti over the past two years, from simply 
providing peacekeepers to taking responsibility for building 
sustainable communities, mirrored S/CRS's approach.  MRE Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs Vera Machado described the situation 
in Haiti as "fragile stability" and said Brazilian efforts to 
maintain peaceful conditions and improve police training had met 
with some success but were undermined by a lack of resources 
resulting from a "disappointing" donors conference. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Herbst suggested that possibilities for cooperation 
between Brazil and the United States will grow over the next twenty 
to thirty years as more states could destabilize over that period. 
He told the Brazilians that while the USG was not recommending 
involvement in any specific crisis, it seemed natural to enhance 
bilateral consultations on stabilization, so that when Brazil 
decided its interests would be served by involvement in a crisis 
operation, it would be prepared.  Peacebuilding in failed states was 
difficult, he said, with only a few positive examples to guide 
future efforts.  Herbst cited Colombia's success in restoring 
government control to areas like the Macarena which had  previously 
been under FARC control.   Herbst also spoke of  S/CRS' role in 
planning for Kosovo's  transition to independent government as an 
example of stabilization work.  Brazilian and U.S. interest in 
promoting stability in Africa offered possibilities for cooperative 
approaches to prevent states from failing.  Herbst then offered to 
invite Brazilians to participate in S/CRS-developed training 
programs, either in Washington or online.  Brazilian Director for 
International Organizations Carlos Duarte agreed that there was 
scope for greater cooperation in Haiti and in Africa, particularly 
in Guinea Bissau. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  ABC Director Marco Farani showed a strong interest in 
participating in S/CRS training.  Within a day of meeting Herbst, he 
had his office call Embassy Brasilia for information on the upcoming 
course.  Farani explained that while ABC had previously lacked 
resources, he was expecting a budget increase and authority to hire 
forty additional personnel this year.  Herbst suggested using the 
India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) consultative mechanism to encourage 
interest in stabilization operations and said the Indians had 
previously expressed interest in such consultations.  Farani also 
believed there were possibilities for cooperation in Guinea Bissau 
and elsewhere in Africa.  He agreed that the African Union was a 
potentially valuable partner and asked when S/CRS would be able to 
send experts to help the AU develop its capabilities. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  COMMENT.  Brazil is a latecomer to the area of 
reconstruction and stabilization, having been initially reluctant to 
become involved in Haiti.  As Brazil's view of itself as a world 
power develops, so is its understanding of the responsibilities that 
come with a larger global role.  ABC clearly is more forward-leaning 
in this regard than is the MRE, but President Lula's emphasis on 
outreach to Africa has created openings for engagement with Brazil 
on promoting stability on that continent.  The S/CRS approach that 
Brazil should decide where and when to be involved, with the USG 
willing to cooperate when appropriate, was particularly effective 
with the MRE, which is typically wary of U.S. requests to get 
involved in third countries. 
 
¶5.  (U) Ambassador Herbst has cleared this cable. 
 
SOBEL