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Viewing cable 09BRASILIA730, DEFENSE MINISTER JOBIM ON BRAZIL'S FIGHTER PURCHASE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BRASILIA730 2009-06-08 19:46 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBR #0730 1591946
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 081946Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4458
INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0494
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0078
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7835
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4180
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000730 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA AND PM. OSD FOR DUSD VERGA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2019 
TAGS: MASS PREL ETTC BR
SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER JOBIM ON BRAZIL'S FIGHTER PURCHASE 
 
REF: BRASILIA 634 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel.  Reason 1.4 (d) 
 
1.  (C)  During his late May visit to the U.S., Brazilian MOD 
Jobim expressed greater confidence in the U.S. as a possible 
source for the purchase of Brazil's next generation fighter. 
Despite a long laundry list of past export control 
difficulties that Jobim delivered to DepSecDef Lynn, Jobim 
said he was beginning to feel more confident about the U.S. 
as a partner in Defense technology.  (Embassy Note: Embassy 
has confirmed that most of these cases have been resolved.) 
In a later meeting with Ambassador Sobel and Boeing President 
Albaugh, Jobim said that he now believes he has enough facts 
to "engage" President Lula in a discussion of purchase of the 
Super Hornet. 
 
2.  (C) EMBASSY COMMENT.  Although Jobim did not say he would 
support a purchase from Boeing, this is the most positive 
statement he has made regarding the possibility of purchase 
of the Super Hornet.  The week after Jobim's visit, a group 
of Brazilian Congressional leaders visited the U.S. and gave 
a more positive view.  While they were convinced that Boeing 
offered the best aircraft, they believed that lack of USG 
financing support was a significant negative.  They also 
cited direct lobbying of French President Sarkozy (and the 
lack of similar efforts from the U.S.) as potentially 
decisive with President Lula.  Brazilian Government sources 
told Ambassador Sobel that they were suprised that President 
Obama did not raise the fighter sale during his conversation 
with Lula before the Summit of the Americas and that this was 
perceived as indicating a lower level of USG interest, 
particularly in light of heavy lobbying from the leaders of 
France and Sweden.  Embassy has heard repeatedly from 
high-level Brazilians that Presidential advocacy could be 
decisive. 
SOBEL